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Foreword
T
he global economy is in a tumultuous phase with significant rise in sovereign vulnerabilities in certain
advanced economies against a backdrop of weaker outlook for global growth. Emerging markets like ours, on
the other hand, face the risk of sudden capital outflows and / or a rise in funding costs, both of which could
jeopardise the stability of the domestic economy.
On the domestic front, the growth-inflation dynamics continue to unfold. Growth in 2011-12 is likely to
moderate while inflation and inflation expectations continue to remain elevated, although there are some recent
signs of easing of inflationary pressures. Elevated global energy prices continue to stress the country’s external
position. The sharp depreciation in the exchange rate has once again brought focus on the Reserve Bank’s exchange
rate policy. Fiscal slippages have added to the pressures confronting the domestic economy. The uncertain global
environment and domestic headwinds have contributed to increased volatility in domestic financial markets.
The Indian financial sector continues to be sound and resilient. Banks remain well capitalised and are not
excessively leveraged. Implementation of the Basel III provisions and migration of some of the larger banks to the
advanced approaches under Basel II are expected to improve the alignment of regulatory capital with the risk
profile of the banking sector. Some concerns were discernible on the asset quality front even though the NPA ratios
of Indian banks continued to compare favourably with those in advanced as well as emerging economies. The
Reserve Bank remains vigilant in respect of the underlying trends in asset quality, as well as exuberant credit
growth in select sectors and is working on a forward looking provisioning framework.
A year into the functioning of the Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC), the Sub Committee of
the FSDC has evolved as the primary operating arm of the Council while the Council continues to provide broad
oversight. The Sub Committee is focusing on issues impacting systemic stability while working towards improved
inter-regulatory coordination and greater financial inclusion and literacy in accordance with the mandate of the
Council.
This is the fourth issue of the Financial Stability Report (FSR). Each issue has evidenced substantive progress
in the assessment of risks to financial stability - both in terms of coverage and in analytical tools to measure and
quantify systemic risks.
This issue of the FSR represents, for the first time, the collective views of the Sub Committee of the FSDC on
risks to systemic stability and, therefore, hopefully, presents a more holistic assessment of the risks facing the
financial system than its earlier versions. The Report has benefitted from the contributions of other financial
sector regulators - SEBI, IRDA and PFRDA - and has been enriched by the comments of the members of the Sub
Committee of the FSDC.
Systemic risk assessment has been strengthened with the introduction of the Reserve Bank’s first Systemic
Risk Survey, capturing the views of a wide cross section of market participants and stakeholders. The earlier
analytics have been improvised - the network analysis model has been extended to cover non-bank entities; stability
indicators spread across different Chapters of the Report have been combined to arrive at a composite indicator
that provides direction of risks to financial stability; and a series of single factor sensitivity stress tests as well as
macro financial stress tests have been carried out to assess the resilience of the various segments of the financial
system.
The global financial crisis and its aftermath have demonstrated that ‘risk’ is all-pervasive and, often, the
point of its impact difficult to gauge beforehand. In an earlier issue of the FSR, I had likened the task of central
bankers to that of Sisyphus’ rolling a huge boulder up a steep hill, only to watch it roll down. I fall back on Sisyphus
once again - this time for his handling of his thieving neighbour, Autolycus*, by marking the bottom of the hooves
of his cattle, to track their passage through the muddy ground. So if the final resting place of risk is hard to observe,
we should try to track its path and passage in order to be alert to the risks on the way forward.
Dr. D. Subbarao
December 22, 2011
* Goodhart, C A E (2004): “Some New Directions for Financial Stability”
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Overview
The domestic financial system remains stable even as market participants and stakeholders reposed
their confidence in its stability and stringent stress testing certified the resilience of the system.
Some risks to financial stability have, however, emerged since the publication of the last Financial
Stability Report (FSR) in June 2011, amidst an uncertain global environment. The growing linkages
and integration of the Indian economy and its financial system with the world are testing the resilience
of the economy/system to the headwinds from the rapid aggravation of the sovereign debt crisis and
prolonged slowdown in the Euro area and the U.S.
Near term macroeconomic challenges have surfaced while financial markets have experienced
heightened volatility. Indian banks remain robust, notwithstanding a decline in CRAR and spurt
in NPA levels in the recent past. Increased capital needs and liquidity requirements under Basel III
will need to be carefully phased in. The network of the financial sector is found to be closely clustered,
leaving major lenders to banks vulnerable to any disturbance in the banking sector. The financial
market infrastructure continues to function without any major disruption.
The FSR reflects the efforts to strengthen the capabilities of quantitative assessment and measurement
of systemic risks through a range of models/indicators. Given the critical importance of supplementing
the assessment of systemic risks through wider consultation, a Systemic Risk Survey has been instituted.
The Indian financial system remains resilient…
Stakeholders confident about its stability
1. The respondents of Reserve Bank’s first Systemic
Risk Survey expressed their confidence in the stability
of the domestic financial system even as they were
concerned about the stability of the global financial
system and the impact of global developments on the
domestic economy. A series of macro financial stress
tests were used to assess the impact of macroeconomic
variables on the asset quality and capital adequacy of
the banking sector. Under severe stress scenarios, capital
adequacy levels remain above the regulatory
requirements. There remain, however, some risks to
financial stability, as also indicated by the dimensional
increase in risks as per the Financial Stability Map and
Indicator (Charts 1 & 2).
1 The Financial Stability Map and Indicator depicts the overall stability condition in the Indian financial system. The Financial Stability Indicator (FSI) is
based on the three major indicators, viz, Macro Stability Indicator (MSI), Financial Markets Stability Indicator (FMSI) and Banking Stability Indicator
(BSI). The FSI was derived using a simple  average of MSI, FMSI and BSI, each of which are presented in Chapters I, II and III of this Report respectively.
The methodologies are presented in the Annex to this Report.
Chart 1: Financial Stability Map
1
Note: Away from the centre signifies increase in risk
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Macro Stability
Banking
Stability
Financial
Market
Stability
Sep-10 Mar-11 Sep-11
Chart 2: Financial Stability Indicator
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Note: Increase in indicator values show lower 'stability’
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2Overview
Macroeconomic environment
Risks from the global macroeconomic environment
have increased …
2. The European sovereign debt crisis and global
slowdown have adversely affected global and domestic
conditions since the publication of the last FSR – as is
indicated by the Macroeconomic Stability Map and
Indicator. The uncertainty in the global macroeconomic
environment is expected to continue even as the
recovery remains sluggish across regions. The Systemic
Risk Survey also reflects the perception that global risks
were among the most significant risks facing the Indian
economy and financial system.
Growth rate of the Indian economy has moderated…
3. In an increasingly integrated global economic and
financial system, India’s growth performance has been
affected through the trade, finance, commodity and
confidence channels. Domestic demand has also
decelerated, weighed by global factors as well as domestic
headwinds including the cumulative impact of interest
rate hikes and of elevated inflationary pressures. The
slowdown in the industrial sector and deceleration in
private consumption may affect the future growth of
the services sector as well.
Inflationary pressures remain elevated but are easing
4. Inflation in India has remained at high levels.
Global commodity prices, including energy prices, are
contributing to inflation risks. As expected, however,
inflationary pressures have eased in December 2011 and
the baseline projection for WPI inflation for March 2012
is 7 per cent.
Risks on the external sector front aggravated
5. India’s external sector faces risks due to decreasing
growth in world trade volumes and weakening global
demand. The continued high oil prices and increase in
imports of bullion, machinery and electronics by India
have partially offset the recent buoyant export growth,
resulting in widening of the current account deficit
(CAD). Going forward, exports may moderate further if
the slowdown in advanced economies persists.
Fiscal manoeuvrability remains limited, while
corporate performance dips
6. A slowdown in revenue collections and increase
in the subsidies expenditure may make the achievement
of the budgetary target of a fiscal deficit of 4.6 per cent
of GDP for 2011-12 challenging. This reduces fiscal
manoeuvrability to address stress in other sectors. Indian
sovereign debt, however, is sustainable as it is held
mostly by domestic institutions, its average maturity is
high and costs less than the rate of growth of GDP.
7. The high costs of inputs, interest rates and
deceleration in domestic and external demand is also
getting reflected in the declining margins of the
corporate sector.
Financial Markets
Concerns over the sustainability of sovereign debt
levels were key drivers of global financial markets
8. The period since the release of the previous FSR
was characterised by uncertainty and higher volatility.
European debt levels and the rating downgrades have
caused some stress in international markets. The
European sovereign debt crisis which originated in
Greece appears to be spreading to core European
sovereigns. The key concerns of market participants were
the downward revisions to growth forecasts, leading to
corrections in asset prices, especially those sensitive to
growth. The movements were exacerbated by the
perception of weaker effectiveness of monetary and
fiscal backstops.
Potential contagion from sovereign credit risks to
financial markets and institutions persist
9. The downgrades in sovereign credit ratings of US
and in Europe have resulted in a knock-on impact on
international banks and their funding markets.
Sovereign debt problems affected banks through losses
on sovereign bond holdings and lower collateral values
for repo and central bank funding. Further, banks derive
reduced benefits from implicit and explicit government
guarantees. Contagion effects on the markets have been
observed in the form of falling turnover, rising costs
and decreasing maturity in inter-bank lending
markets.
Risk aversion dented sentiments for emerging market
assets
10. The above developments caused a reversal of
capital flows from emerging market assets like equity
and debt. Countries like India, with an external deficit,
faced a larger currency depreciation than the ones with
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a current account surplus. The current environment of
risk aversion and depreciation of the Indian rupee could
complicate the refinancing challenges faced by Indian
corporates with regard to their Foreign Currency
Convertible Bonds (FCCBs) and External Commercial
Borrowings (ECBs). FCCBs raised in pre-crisis years at
zero or very low coupons will need to be refinanced
through domestic sources at the higher interest rates
prevailing currently.
Liquidity conditions in the banking system were
generally within comfort zone
11. The banking system’s liquidity deficit which
generally remained within the comfort zone of the
Reserve Bank since the publication of the previous FSR,
tightened from the second week of November 2011.
Consistent with the stance of monetary policy and based
on the assessment of prevailing and evolving liquidity
conditions, the Reserve Bank started to conduct Open
Market Operations for purchase of government securities
in November 2011.
Evolving equity market microstructure issues warrant
monitoring
12. There is a rise in the volume of derivatives trading
not accompanied by changes in cash market turnover in
equities. The share of proprietary trading in derivatives
turnover is also rising. In the cash segment, the share of
non-institutional participants, including retail
participation, has fallen. There is a need to prevent
market dislocations arising from information asymmetry
and to ensure that there is adequate disclosure of private
pledging of shares by promoters. The evolving
microstructure of Indian equity market needs to be
watched carefully.
Financial Institutions
Direct impact of the Euro zone crisis on Indian banks
limited, but some funding constraints may emerge
13. Indian banks have negligible exposures to the more
affected European countries. Hence, the direct impact
of the Euro area sovereign debt crisis on Indian banks is
expected to be muted. However, funding constraints in
international financial markets could impact both the
availability and cost of foreign funding for banks and
corporates, some signs of which are already emerging.
Banks remain well capitalised though capital adequacy
ratios witnessed some decline
14. The Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio (CRAR)
and the core CRAR continued with their recent declining
trend. The banking system CRAR fell from 14.2 per cent
as at end March 2011 to 13.5 per cent as at end
September 2011, while the Core CRAR ratio dropped
from 10 per cent to 9.6 per cent during the same period.
However, both ratios remained well above the regulatory
requirement at nine per cent and six per cent
respectively. Leverage ratios continued to hover around
six per cent as against the Basel III requirement of a
minimum of three per cent.
Some deterioration in asset quality was evidenced;
however, NPA ratios continue to compare favourably
with those of other countries
15. Asset quality of banks deteriorated as growth in
slippages exceeded credit growth. The gross NPA ratio
increased from 2.3 per cent to 2.8 per cent between
March and September 2011. The Systemic Risk Survey
also identified deterioration in asset quality as one of
the most significant risks at the current juncture. A cross
country comparison of NPA ratios reveals that,
notwithstanding the recent deterioration, Indian banks
fared better than banks in other countries.
Impaired / restructured power and telecom assets
increased even as incremental credit growth to the
sectors outpaced aggregate credit growth
16. Restructured and impaired assets in the power and
telecom sectors – both important components of banks’
credit to the infrastructure sector – increased in recent
months. Restructured accounts in these sectors together
amounted to 8.5 per cent of total restructured accounts
of the banking sector in June 2011 as against 5.0 per
cent in March 2011. The fact that incremental credit to
these sectors was also high – higher than the aggregate
growth in banking sector credit – called for careful
monitoring of asset quality in these segments.
Profitability of banks under pressure, though efficiency
ratios showed some improvement
17. Higher interest expenses and higher provisioning
requirements put some pressure on banks’ profitability
even as efficiency ratios continued to improve. The
growth in net interest income (NII) decreased to 15.5
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per cent in September 2011, against 40.7 per cent in
September 2010 while growth in PAT decelerated to 2
per cent from 31 per cent a year ago. Operating expenses
also grew faster than the non-interest income. Going
forward, earnings may be further stressed due to the
impact of high deposit rates, potential slowdown in
credit growth and deterioration in asset quality.
The ‘network’ of the banking sector is tiered, but limits
on interbank exposures mitigate contagion risks
18. The network of the bilateral exposures in the
banking sector is ‘tiered’ rendering it less stable as failure
of the most connected banks  have a greater contagion
impact on the system. Potential contagion risks, if the
large borrowers were to fail, have risen, but regulatory
limits on interbank exposures help mitigate such risks.
Banks resilient but profitability could be affected in
severe stress scenarios
19. A series of stress tests assessed the ability of banks
to withstand different risks. The banking sector
remained resilient even under severe credit risk stress
scenarios though a few individual banks could come
under duress. Banks’ profitability was found to be
affected when sectoral NPAs were stressed though the
impact on capital adequacy was limited. Interest rate
risks in the trading book had a marginal impact; risks in
the banking book were higher but manageable. Liquidity
risks could pose some concerns, but the SLR portfolio
provides comfort.
Distress dependencies between banks continue to be
low
20. Banking stability measures, which attempt to
model the distress dependencies in the banking sector,
point to continued low levels of such dependencies
though a marginal uptrend is noticeable in case of the
Banking Stability Index.  The banking system’s Expected
Shortfall (i.e. the estimated loss of assets in the extreme
loss region) has also been declining continuously in
recent periods implying that the banking system would
be resilient even to the extreme systemic losses derived
from the model.
Stress testing shows resilience for the NBFC sector
though reliance on banks for funding could pose risks
21. NBFCs’ profitability improved though there was
some deterioration in asset quality. Credit risk stress
tests indicate that systemically important non deposit
taking NBFCs are in a position to withstand severe stress
scenarios. The sector, however, remains significantly
reliant on the banking sector for its funding. For the
year ended March 2011, the rate of growth of NBFCs’
borrowings from banks outstripped the rate of growth
of credit extended by the NBFCs. Such dependence could
pose risks both for banks and for the NBFCs. NBFCs could
face funding strains in case of any disturbances in the
banking system. During times of stress, NBFCs tend to
deleverage very fast which may, in turn, put strain on
banks.
Insurance and pension sectors act as ‘automatic
stabilisers’ but remain vulnerable to contagion risks
22. Internationally, the insurance and pension
segments are believed to contribute to financial stability
because of their typically long term-long-only investment
style. The Indian insurance sector is well capitalised but
significantly exposed to the banking system leaving it
vulnerable to contagion risks, as evidenced by an analysis
of the ‘network’ of the Indian financial system. The
ability to raise capital and adequate reinsurance capacity
in the sector are observed to be important determinants
of its continued stability.
Regulatory Infrastructure
The FSDC framework for oversight of systemic stability
is firmly entrenched
23. The Sub Committee of the Financial Stability and
Development Council (FSDC) has emerged as the
primary operating arm of the Council and its
deliberations have spanned across issues related to
financial stability, financial sector development, inter
regulatory coordination and financial inclusion and
literacy.
Transition to Basel III regime… Indian banks start
from a position of strength but many challenges lie
ahead
24. The Indian banks’ current capital base and liquidity
position are comfortable, as a starting point, vis-à-vis
the Basel III guidelines. Going forward, there will be
increased requirements for capital though precise
numbers are yet to be arrived at. Empirical studies
indicate that the impact of Basel III, through rise in
lending spreads, on growth rate will not be significant.
The Reserve Bank is in the process of finalising the
guidelines for Indian banks under Basel III - the timelines
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for implementation will be guided by a need to ensure a
non-disruptive transition.
Convergence with international accounting standards
on track, though IFRS 9 remains a moving target
25. A Reserve Bank Working Group is attempting to
facilitate a smooth transition to an IFRS converged
environment. But challenges remain as IFRS 9 is yet to
be finalised; differences persist between the IFRS and
current regulatory guidelines on classification and
measurement of financial assets; and there are
difficulties in the application of fair values for
transactions, where not much guidance is available in
India in terms of market practices or benchmarks.
Payment and Settlement Systems
Network of RTGS system stable but intra-day delays
in settling payments could lead to increased risks
26. The network of the Real Time Gross Settlement
System (RTGS) is stable with a relatively low level of
tiering. However, an analysis of the intra-day pattern of
settlement of payments in the RTGS System suggests a
certain degree of delay in settlement of transactions by
the members. This can increase the liquidity risk in the
system and can also magnify the impact of an operational
event, leading to credit and systemic risks. Such
settlement patterns need to be carefully monitored.
Counterparty credit risks in OTC derivative trades need
to be closely monitored
27. OTC derivative contracts add to the
interconnectedness between Indian banks, especially
those which are most active in the derivative markets.
This poses challenges for counterparty credit risk
management as ‘wrong-way risks’ in such derivative
contracts could assume systemic proportions, especially
during stress periods. Revised regulatory norms under
Basel III and introduction of central counterparty
settlement for OTC derivative transactions mitigate such
risks but there remains a need to carefully monitor the
risks, for example, through holistic stress tests which
include stringent scenarios.
CCIL resilient… stress testing needs to reckon
interconnectedness and systemic risks
28. A series of stress and back testing exercises reveals
that the Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL) is
reasonably resilient to shocks in different markets. Going
forward, CCIL needs to assess its resilience to situations
of generalised market failures and to take cognisance of
the impact of interconnectedness in financial markets
and amongst banks on its risk management
framework.
Concluding Remarks
29. There are undoubtedly risks, especially global risks,
to the stability of the domestic financial system. Some
risks have also intensified since the publication of the
previous FSR and these will need careful monitoring.
Emerging developments in the macro economy and in
the financial soundness indicators of the banking system
pose some concerns as do the sharp corrections
accompanied by high volatility in financial markets.
Overall, however, the system remains robust and well
equipped to face the headwinds of instability, including
those emanating from developments in the global
economy. The market participants also remain confident
about the stability of the system.
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Chapter I
Macroeconomic Outlook
Global risks have increased since the publication of the third FSR in June 2011. Heightened
uncertainties arising from the deepening sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area and slowdown in the
US pose downside risks for the global economy and for India through trade and finance channels and,
therefore, need to be monitored closely. External sector risks are likely to increase. Elevated oil prices
also pose downside risks to global recovery and have significant implications for domestic inflation.
The profit margin of the corporate sector has dipped, indicating its reduced pricing power in the face
of rising raw material and interest costs, domestic and global. The rise in housing prices, despite some
moderation, remains firm. Although some deterioration has been observed in the asset quality, delinquency
in the housing sector remains substantially below the peak levels reached after the global crisis.
Overall, since the last assessment in June 2011, there has been a rise in risks originating from the
macroeconomic environment.
1 For a brief on the methodology used for construction of the Macroeconomic Stability Map, please see Annex.
2 The relationship of household sector with the quality of assets in the banking sector is not clear and in view of low share of credit to household,
the sector has not been included in Macroeconomic Stability Indicator currently. The other individual risks specified in Chart 1.1 are combined into
a single Macroeconomic Stability Indicator using two methodologies. First, each risk is given equal weight in the index (MSI-HH). In the second
method, the weights are derived using Principal Component Analysis (MSI_PCA). Both the methodologies give similar results.
Macroeconomic risks have increased since the last
assessment
1.1 Since the assessment in June 2011, the risks
emanating from the macroeconomic environment have
increased (Chart 1.1). The global slowdown and
sovereign debt crisis have led to deterioration of global
risks and external sector vulnerability. Domestic growth
has weakened, while inflation risks have increased due
to elevated energy prices at the global level. The fiscal
outlook has deteriorated in view of the lower than
expected collection of revenue in the first half of the
current year. Declining profit margins have increased
the stress in the corporate sector. The household sector,
however, has recorded some improvement in risks
due to lower leveraging. Nevertheless, overall
macroeconomic stress has been increasing but remains
below the levels reached in the aftermath of the global
crisis (Chart 1.2).
Global
InflationFiscal
Corporate
Household External
Growth
March 2011 September 2011September 2010
Chart 1.1: Macroeconomic Stability Map
1
Note:
Source:
Away from the centre signifies increase in risk
RBI staff calculations
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Global recovery looks more protracted
1.2 Contrary to earlier expectations, recovery in
advanced economies may take longer. Since September
2011, different agencies have revised downwards their
growth forecasts for the US and the Euro Area. The US
economy is struggling with sluggish growth and
protracted unemployment. Downside risks have
increased with fiscal uncertainty, housing market
weakness, renewed financial stress and subdued
business and consumer sentiment. High public deficits
and debt, lower potential output and rising market
tensions are weighing on growth prospects in the Euro
Area. Weak household balance sheets, high
unemployment and persistent housing market
weakness has led to subdued private consumption and
easing in activities. The recent European Union (EU)
summit has failed to reverse the negative market
sentiments. Growth in China is also expected to be lower
than what was anticipated earlier. Forward looking
indicators like Purchasing Managers’ Indexes (PMIs)
have been declining, though there was a marginal uptick
in case of the manufacturing sector in the US where
better prospects of recovery have been further reinforced
by early Christmas shopping data and a drop in the
unemployment rate. By contrast, the European PMI has
slid down to contractionary level providing strong
indications of a recession in Europe in 2012, which many
forecasters also see. (Chart 1.3).
1.3 There has been some deterioration in the outlook
of sovereign ratings. A series of sovereign rating
downgrades among Euro Area countries is expected in
the near future. Some of them are expected to be further
downgraded in the longer term. This is likely to adversely
impact the confidence, raise the cost of borrowing for
these economies and prolong the economic slowdown.
Global imbalances, a major cause of crisis, continue
to persist at high levels
1.4 As mentioned in the last Report, the structural
causes of global imbalances have not been fully
addressed. The trade balance of China remains mostly
in high surplus zone. The trade deficit of the US, after
some moderation in the aftermath of the crisis, has been
US ISM MFG EU MFG PMI EU SRVCS PMI US ISM NONMFG
Source: Bloomberg
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increasing and continues to be very large (Chart 1.4).
The process of rebalancing has significant implications
for the growth of trade and the global economy. ‘…
successful rebalancing of the Chinese economy …would
generate positive spillovers for the global economy.’3
3 Christine Lagarde, MD, IMF , “ Challenges and Opportunities for the World economy and the IMF, “ C. Peter Series on International Economics, July
26, 2011
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High sovereign debt persists … may dampen global
recovery further
1.5 Both the sovereign debt as well as the borrowings
of several advanced economies continue to rule at high
levels (Chart 1.5). The interaction between markets and
governments has become more ‘complex and more
dangerous.’4 At the same time, the resolution of
sovereign debt problems appears to be more difficult
and may take longer than what was originally envisaged.
In view of the prolonged slowdown, reduction of debt
levels would entail structural measures which, in some
cases, may not be politically expedient. Both the
indebted and the ‘bailing-out’ countries have to
overcome some political resistance to take steps towards
effective resolution of the problem and prevent
credibility from weakening. At the same time, the high
debt levels restrict fiscal manoeuvrability in countering
the effects of possible slowdown at the current juncture.
For sovereign debt to be sustainable, economic growth
has to be strong. On the other hand, fiscal consolidation
measures, whenever implemented, may have adverse
implications for growth and further lower the demand
at the global level in the short-term. According to IMF, a
one percentage point cut in deficit could lower growth
by about half percentage point over two years. However,
reduction of debt raises output over longer term by
bringing down real interest rates and making room for
tax cuts.5 Credible fiscal consolidation measures may
have positive effects even in the short-run due to
improvement in confidence.
… leading to rise in risks in the external sector
1.6 The adverse global developments are reflected in
the external sector transactions in India. The external
sector vulnerability index (based on the movements in
current account deficit, ratio of current payments to
current receipts, share of short-term debt to total debt
and ratio of debt stock to GDP) has recorded an uptrend
in recent times indicating aggravation of risks from the
external sector (Chart 1.6).
1.7 Both the IMF and the WTO have projected a lower
growth in world trade volume, reflecting weakening
global demand. Though the depreciation of the Rupee
2008 Fiscal Balance 2009 Fiscal Balance 2010 Fiscal Balance
2011 Fiscal Balance 2008 Gross Debt 2009 Gross Debt
2010 Gross Debt 2011 Gross Debt
Chart 1.5: Sovereign Debt and Borrowings Remains High
Source: IMF, Fiscal Monitor
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will cushion Indian exports a bit, exports may moderate
in second half of 2011-12, if slowdown in advanced
economies, in turn, weakens growth prospects of
emerging market economies (EMEs) which have been
getting prominence as India’s export destinations.
Similarly, receipts on account of invisibles, particularly
the software sector, will depend on the severity of the
slowdown in the advanced economies. On the other
hand, higher oil prices and sharp increase in imports of
bullion, machinery and electronics have resulted in
continued buoyancy in imports. Recent data indicate
further widening of the trade balance. Consequently,
CAD which increased during Q1 of 2011-12 (Chart 1.7)
is expected to widen further. Larger CAD would
necessitate higher capital inflows. In this context, the
impact of risk aversion due to downward risk to
economic and financial conditions in the US and Euro
Area would be critical, particularly for FII flows to India.
1.8 Though the twin deficits are expected to widen
during the current year, it is the global developments
rather than fiscal slippage that is contributing to the
widening of CAD. Nevertheless, fiscal consolidation
could contribute to correction of CAD to some extent.
Pace of domestic growth takes a dip
1.9 Domestic growth is expected to be adversely
affected by transmission of the impact of the global
slowdown and sovereign debt problems through trade
and financial linkages and the cumulative impact of
rising domestic interest rates. The industrial sector, in
particular, may get adversely impacted by lower demand,
infrastructural constraints and higher cost of both
external and internal credit. Further, increased market
borrowings by the Government may crowd out private
sector investment.
1.10 Though the services sector recorded healthy
growth in Q2 of 2011-12, slowdown in the industrial
sector and deceleration in private consumption may
adversely impact its growth going forward (Chart 1.8).
The PMIs for services sector in September and October
2011 ruled below 50, indicating contraction but has
recorded some recovery in November. PMIs for the
industrial sector has recovered marginally from its 30
month low in September 2011 (Chart 1.9). The
moderation in the manufacturing PMI was primarily due
to a slowdown in new business received and contraction
Source: RBI
Chart 1.7: External Sector Stress
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of export orders in September 2011. The momentum in
the services sector eased further in October 2011 with
continued decline in business activity and deceleration
of new orders.
1.11 The Second Quarter Review of Monetary Policy
2011-12 revised the baseline projection of GDP growth
for 2011-12 downwards from 8.0 per cent to 7.6 per cent,
largely on account of slowing global growth and the
slackening of investment demand, reflecting slower
clearance and execution of projects, concerns about
inflation and rising interest rates.
Domestic demand too records deceleration
1.12 The prime driver of growth in India, especially
during the crisis, was domestic demand which is
showing some weakness in recent times. Its
components, viz. private consumption, government
consumption and investment, recorded deceleration in
the first half of 2011-12 (Chart 1.10). In view of
prolonged and slow global recovery, the sustainability
of growth of the domestic economy hinges on
resuscitation of domestic demand, especially
investment, for sustained growth.
… while domestic inflation remains at elevated
levels
1.13 The weaker global growth since Q2 has resulted
in only a small correction in international commodity
prices, particularly crude oil. Brent and Dubai Fateh
prices (which comprise the Indian basket) have declined
only modestly. Reflecting the above trend, headline
measures of inflation remained above the comfort
zones/targets in both advanced economies and EMEs.
In the case of EMEs and India, domestic demand added
to inflationary pressures (Chart 1.11). An analysis of
component-wise inflation at the global level reveals that,
while India has successfully moderated the volatility in
the prices of energy and food, they remain at elevated
levels (Chart 1.12).
1.14 The Second Quarter Review has observed that the
inflation path will be shaped by both demand and supply
factors, viz. extent of moderation in aggregate demand,
behaviour of global crude prices, supply response in
respect of those commodities where there are structural
imbalances and fuller pass-through of petroleum and
coal prices. Elevated inflationary pressures have started
Chart 1.10: Deceleration in Components of Domestic Demand
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Chart 1.11: Inflation in India and Abroad
Source: IMF, RBI.
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to ease from December 2011 and the baseline for WPI
inflation for March 2012 is projected at 7 per cent.
However, uncertainties about sudden adverse
developments remain and inflation risks continue to
be high.
1.15 Exchange rate depreciation has inflationary
implications through the increase in the cost of oil and
other imported goods which form inputs in overall
production. The impact of moderation in domestic
demand on inflation could get offset by the widening
of fiscal deficit. Further, the fiscal deficit may have
current account widening implications which, in turn,
may affect the exchange rate and have inflationary
implications. Persistence of supply shocks, especially
due to the periodic increase in petrol, diesel and
minimum support prices, having cascading effect on the
entire economy, seems to be neutralising the demand
moderating impact of the monetary policy measures.
Inflationary expectations, which continue to remain at
high levels, is also causing stickiness in the downward
movement of the price level.
1.16 From a longer term perspective, structural
imbalances in agriculture, infrastructure capacity
bottlenecks and distorted administered prices of key
commodities like oil and coal pose upside risks to
inflation.
1.17 Banks’ asset quality comes under pressure due
to the adverse impact of inflation on growth in addition
to various other macro and sectoral drivers. Stronger
the adverse output impact of high inflation, greater will
be the asset quality concerns. Depending on the manner
in which the monetary policy response and interest rate
cycle change in response to inflation, asymmetric
flexibility on asset and liability of banks could exert
pressure on earnings. High inflation and higher policy
interest rates could impact financial markets,
particularly exchange rate, bond and stock markets. Due
to mark-to-market accounting, depending on the bank
specific exposures, pressure on earnings and need for
higher capital and provisioning may also become a
possibility. While low and stable inflation alone is not
sufficient to promote macro-economic and financial
stability, it continues to be an essential pre-condition.
Rising fiscal stress adds to growth and inflation
concerns
1.18 Fiscal stress has increased in the recent past and
continues to rule at high level (Chart 1.13). The stress is
likely to aggravate as the risks of fiscal slippage have
increased during the current year. Slowdown in revenue
collections and the potential rise in food, fertilizer and
fuel subsidies may make attaining the budgetary target
of fiscal deficit of 4.6 per cent of GDP for 2011-12
challenging. Revenue receipts during the first seven
months of the fiscal year 20011-12 stood at 45.5 per
cent of Budget Estimates (BE) as compared to 65.6 per
cent in the same period of the previous year. During
the first half of 2011-12, expenditures may come under
pressure due to elevated inflation. Further, subsidies
and interest payments increased sharply by 22.0 per cent
and 19.2 per cent, respectively, over the corresponding
period of the previous year, while the growth in plan
expenditure was mere 4.8 per cent. The shortfall in plan
expenditure, particularly capital expenditure has
adverse implications for growth. Primary deficit during
April-September 2011 has exceeded the annual targets
while revenue and fiscal deficit during the first seven
months account for over 79 and 74 per cent of their
annual targets, respectively. The Government has
Source: RBI.
Chart 1.13: Uptrend in Index of Fiscal Stress
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announced increased market borrowings. The second
batch of Supplementary Demands for Grants for 2011-
2012 involving gross additional expenditure of `63,180
crore with net cash outgo at `56,848 crore was
announced in November 2011. Indian sovereign debt,
however, is sustainable as it is held mostly by domestic
institutions, its average maturity is high and costs less
than the rate of growth of GDP.
1.19 A number of factors seem to hinder fiscal
consolidation at the current juncture. Deceleration of
growth and demand would adversely impact the growth
of direct and indirect tax collections. With sticky oil
prices and increase in Minimum Support Prices (MSP)
of key rabi crops, subsidy expenditure is also likely to
be under pressure. Weak market conditions may also
jeopardise the divestment plan. Fiscal slippage could
increase the interest cost of borrowing of the
government which, in turn, could have a feedback effect
on the fiscal deficit and stress.
Effect of rising raw material and interest costs as well
as reduced pricing power is seen in the declining
margin of the corporate sector
1.20 Corporate margins have been declining in the first
two quarters. Ratio of profit after tax (PAT) to Sales
declined by over 200 basis points during Q1 and Q2 of
2011-12 as compared to their level in the last quarter of
2010-11, reflecting the rising input and interest costs
and deceleration in domestic demand (Chart 1.14). The
rising share of interest cost in sales as well as gross
profits so far, implies that the impact of monetary
tightening on the margins of the corporates are now
becoming visible.
1.21 The outlook of the firms shows signs of weakness
which can be attributed to rise in input prices, interest
rates, slackening demand and some infrastructural
constraints. Servicing of loans by them, therefore, may
come under stress. There was some moderation in
demand conditions as reflected in production, order
books, capacity utilisation, imports and exports in the
RBI Industrial Outlook Survey (Chart 1.15). The
moderation was more pronounced for small sized
companies.
Interest to Sales PAT/Sales Interest to Profits
Source: RBI.
Chart 1.14: Interest costs rise and profits decline
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Assessment Expectation
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Chart 1.15: Industrial Sector Outlook
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Chart 1.16: Growth in Retail Credit and Retail NPA ratio
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Even as cost of credit kept rising in sync with prices,
credit to household sector and quality followed suit…
only marginally
1.22 The impact of inflation and rise in cost of credit
on the growth in retail credit is marginal. Part of the
deceleration in retail credit, however, can be attributed
to the base effect. There has been some deterioration
in asset quality but NPA ratio remains substantially
below the peak levels reached in 2009 and 2010
(Chart 1.16).
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… and housing prices continue to rise
1.23 All-India housing price index based on weighted
average of Residex of 15 cities indicate firmness in
housing price7. Notwithstanding rising cost of credit and
reports of lower sales, house prices continued to rise
during the first half of 2011-12 (Chart 1.17).
1.24 In response to the rise in housing prices and
interest cost, the deceleration in housing credit was
more significant. There has been some deterioration in
asset quality but the NPA ratio in case of housing sector
too remains significantly below its earlier peaks of 2009
and 2010 (Chart 1.18).
Concluding Remarks
1.25 Global uncertainties have increased with
prolongation of slowdown, aggravation of sovereign debt
and lack of credible resolution mechanism at the current
juncture. The impact of these global developments is
felt in India through trade, finance, commodity and
confidence channels. Adverse global developments along
with domestic factors such as, persistent food inflation,
high energy prices, capacity constraints in certain sectors
and slackening investment activity are likely to pose
continuing challenges for sustaining a high growth. Both
industrial and services sectors are exhibiting signs of
weakness. The adverse impact on trade along with
deceleration in invisibles, higher oil imports and
buoyancy in imports of bullion, machinery and
electronics is also reflected in the widening of CAD.
1.26 Fiscal slippages during the first half of the year
added to the fiscal stress in the economy. Growth
slowdown, increase in MSP of some crops, high global
crude prices, elevated inflation, unfavourable market
conditions for disinvestment and high interest rates
make fiscal consolidation very challenging.
1.27 Inflation and inflation expectations continue to
rule at high levels and remain a primary concern at the
current juncture with upside risks from structural
imbalances in agriculture, infrastructure capacity
bottlenecks, distorted administered prices of key
commodities, exchange rate depreciation, and widened
fiscal deficit. Elevated inflationary pressures have
started to ease from December 2011 and the baseline
Chart 1.17 All India Housing Price Index
(Base 2007=100)
Source: NHB, RBI staff caculations
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Chart 1.18: Growth in Housing Credit and NPA ratioHousing
projection for WPI inflation for March 2012 is estimated
to be at 7 per cent. However, uncertainties about sudden
adverse developments remain.
1.28 Reflecting the deterioration in global and
domestic outlook, the corporate sector has been showing
signs of weakness and the outlook has moderated.
However, the continued high growth in retail credit
indicates the strength of the household sector. Some
deterioration in asset quality has been observed but NPA
ratio remains substantially below the peak levels reached
in 2009 and 2010.
1.29. Overall macroeconomic stress has been increasing
but seems to be still below the levels reached in the
aftermath of the global crisis.
7 Residex is the city-wise housing price index published by NHB. City-wise housing credit has been used as the weights in construction of all India
index primarily for two reasons: (a) the movements of housing prices are more pronounced, thereby highlighting changes more clearly than when
other weights (e.g. population, number of households, total deposits/credit) are used, and (b) performance of the housing loans is the main subject
of concern from the perspective of financial stability.
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Chapter II
Financial Markets
Systemic risks facing the global and domestic financial system have heightened of late. There is
significant deterioration in financial market conditions, for both sovereign and non-sovereign sectors,
as a result of downgrades by rating agencies and poor economic outlook. Funding markets for short
and long term finance in most currencies have become stressed with financial and non-financial
firms facing significant challenges in raising longer term funds. Financial markets are trading with
a downward bias on the belief that effectiveness of monetary and fiscal intervention is considerably
lower in advanced economies. High levels of volatility are unnerving market participants abroad.
The fallout of these developments is starting to impact overseas borrowings by financial and non-
financial firms in India. The Indian equity and foreign exchange markets witnessed large corrections
attendant with high volatility. The resultant impact on investor sentiment has been offset partially
through a recovery in Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) flows this year. Higher than expected government
borrowings, coupled with loss in growth momentum, could stress domestic financial markets though.
Rising concerns in financial markets
2.1 Financial markets were orderly in India but
conditions worsened during the period since the release
of the previous Financial Stability Report in June 2011.
Endogenous risks have risen moderately during this
period. However, external risks have escalated impacting
1 Financial Markets Stability Map is a visual depiction of increase in stress in various markets. A movement of the variable away from the center shows
that stress as measured through volatility is increasing. It takes into account conditions in equity, debt and foreign exchange markets. In addition,
funding conditions for banks is also taken into account in the Map.
2 The Financial Markets Stability Indicator takes into account changes in variables from the debt, foreign exchange equity markets and banking sector.
The design of the Indicator is based on a similar model by Bank of Canada which was meant for a developed economy. The Financial Markets Stability
Indicator used here has been customised to Indian market conditions. Higher value signifies more risk.
3 The methodologies have been described in the Annex to this Report.
Chart 2.1: Financial Markets Stability Map
Note:
Source:
Away from the centre signifies increase in risk
RBI Staff calculations
Foreign Exchange Market
Banking Sector
Debt Market
Equity Market
Dec-10 Jun-11 Dec-11
domestic market stability. Among domestic markets, the
foreign exchange and equity markets exhibited
significant stress. The Financial Markets Stability Map1
and Financial Markets Stability Indicator (FMSI)2 (Charts
2.1 and 2.2)3 which take into account not just market
variables but also funding liquidity conditions in the
Chart 2.2: Financial Markets Stability Indicator
Note:
Source:
Increase in indicator value shows lower stability
Jan 2012 to Mar 2012 are forecasted values indicated by the shaded region
RBI Staff calculations
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Indian financial system have started to reverse course.
A forecast of the FMSI suggets the continuance of the
current conditions until March 2012.
Global sovereign bond markets have strayed into
uncharted territory
2.2 The financial crisis caused considerable
deleveraging of private sector balance sheets and the
resultant slack was sought to be offset with fiscal
expansion. With the global economy entering its fifth
year since the start of the crisis, a faltering economic
recovery has further stressed public finances. Apart from
Greece; Portugal and Ireland have also availed bailouts.
In addition, Spanish and Italian sovereign bond markets
are witnessing excessive volatility (Chart 2.3). There are
indications that the European debt crisis which
emanated in its periphery is spreading to the core. Even
French and German Credit Default Swap (CDS) prices
reflect the rising costs of bailouts in Europe (Chart 2.4).
2.3 The markets for some European sovereign bonds
are dislocated and in case of Greece, practically shut.
The use of the European Financial Stability Fund is being
enhanced and the European Central Bank is using
nonconventional monetary tools in tackling the crisis.
In US, the downgrade of US treasuries ironically set-off
a slide in all markets except in US treasuries themselves.
US treasury bond yields have fallen to historically low
levels.
…Causing volatility thresholds to be breached
2.4 Rating action on sovereigns in Europe has
further deteriorated sentiment. As political consensus
eluded on how to achieve an orderly roll back of fiscal
expansion in the US and on the terms of further
bailouts in Europe, financial markets traded amidst
high volatility. VIX4, a measure of uncertainty (in US
equity markets), has risen sharply above the threshold
of 30 and dragged its counterparts in Europe and India
higher (Chart 2.5).
4 VIX is an index that reflects the market’s estimate of future volatility. It is based on prices of a wide range of strikes on options on the US S&P 500 stock
market index. Similarly, the EU VIX and India VIX used in the chart are based on prices of options on the European Eurostoxx and Indian Nifty indexes,
respectively. It is often referred to as “fear gauge”
VIX EU VIX INDIA VIX
Source: Bloomberg.
Chart 2.5: Equity Market based Indices of Volatility in
US, Europe and India
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Chart 2.3: Sovereign CDS Prices in 5-year Maturity
(in basis points)
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Chart 2.4: Sovereign CDS Prices in 5-year Maturity
(in basis points)
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Fiscal stress has permeated into health of banks…
2.5 Recent downgrades in US and Europe (Chart 2.6)
highlight the potential contagion from deterioration
in sovereigns’ credit quality and related market
pressures. Sovereign credit risk is having a knock-on
impact on banks and their funding markets in Europe.
During periods of increased sovereign credit risk, a
bank faces challenges in accessing capital markets to
raise term funding. This is because the credit quality
of a sovereign and its economic performance are key
inputs into the strength of a banking system. As a
result, bank stocks in Europe have corrected more
sharply than broad market indices (Chart 2.7).
Leading to disruptions in LIBOR markets …
2.6 As a result of the sovereign debt situation, banks
are considerably less inclined to lend to each other.
This is reflected in three aspects of the London Inter
Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) markets: amount, cost and
maturity of lending operations. The turnover in
the market has fallen, costs have risen and maturities
of interbank lending are becoming shorter. The LIBOR-
OIS (London Interbank Offered Rate - Overnight Indexed
Swaps) spread, in both US dollars and Euros, has
widened (Chart 2.8). Owing to the reduced appetite for
counterparty risk, banks are preferring to park their
surpluses with the ECB. Deposit balances with ECB are
growing rapidly (Chart 2.9).
Source: Bloomberg.
USD EUR
Chart 2.8: Libor-OIS Spreads on Euro and US dollar (in 3 months)
(in basis points)
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Chart 2.9: Deposit Balances with ECB
(in EUR billion)
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Chart 2.6: Sovereign Ratings of Europe by
Various Agencies
Source: Bloomberg.
Chart 2.7: European Broad and Bank Stock Indices
(normalised, January 03, 2011 = 100)
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… and US dollar funding becoming dearer for domestic
entities
2.7 Cross-country holdings of assets by banks are
sizeable and credit risks have spilled over to banks from
other countries, including India. Cross-border lending
for trade finance and capital investment to Indian firms
has fallen considerably. There is some anecdotal
evidence about difficulties faced by both financial and
non-financial firms in India in raising foreign currency
borrowings. European bank funding concerns could pose
challenge for Indian firms and banks in terms of raising
foreign capital for their operations. The Cross Currency
Basis Swap (CCBS) in EUR/US$ has been trading at
a large discount reflecting the escalation in costs of US
dollar funding for European banks. This additional cost
in the form of discount on the CCBS could be passed on
to Indian banks.
Downward bias owing to weaker fiscal and monetary
backstops in advanced economies
2.8 Monetary policy rates are already at or close to
their lower bounds and high debt levels leave little scope
for fiscal stimulus. Two rounds of efforts to stabilise
markets in Europe by ECB have not limited the spread
of contagion in European sovereign bond markets. In
the US, two programs of quantitative easing and a pre-
commitment to keep policy rates low for extended
periods have had a less than desired impact. Adding to
tensions in financial markets is the belief that the scope
for effective monetary and fiscal intervention has
diminished in advanced economies.
Investors flip from risk seeking to risk aversion
behaviour
2.9 Prior to the current round of sovereign and bank
stress, investors were in risk seeking mode. Low interest
rates in advanced economies earlier, spurred a search
for yield. There were signs of portfolios being oriented
towards earning higher return by investing in riskier
assets like leveraged loans, distressed debt and high yield
bonds. Backed by a stronger fiscal position and brighter
economic prospects, the higher yielding emerging
market assets like Indian bonds and equities were
beneficiaries of this trend. With rise in stress, investors
are reversing their actions fast (Charts 2.10 and 2.11).
Equity Debt US$/INR (RHS)
*Data till December 14, 2011
SEBI, BloombergSource:
Chart 2.10: FII Net purchase and Indian rupee 2011in
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
Ja
n
u
ar
y
Fe
br
u
ar
y
M
ar
ch
A
p
ri
l
M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
p
te
m
be
r
O
ct
o
be
r
N
o
ve
m
be
r
D
ec
em
be
r*
40
44
48
52
56
60
(in crore)`
Current Account Foreign Direct Investment Loans Banking Capital
Source: RBI
Chart 2.11: Current and Capital Account Net Flows
(in US$ million)
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
Q
1
2
0
1
0
Q
2
2
0
1
0
Q
3
2
0
1
0
Q
4
2
0
1
0
Q
1
2
0
1
1
Q
2
2
0
1
1
19
Financial Stability Report December 2011
Contagion risk in Indian government bond market
capped
2.10 The government bond market was considerably
more volatile in the recent months compared to the past.
The volatility in the bond market was driven, inter alia,
by greater-than-anticipated supply (Government
announced its borrowing calendar for H2 FY 2011-12 at
`2.2 lakh crore which was `52,872 crore more than the
budgeted amount) and uncertainty regarding the
trajectory of inflation. The unanticipated rise in
government borrowings for H2 2011-12, inter alia,
caused a large rise in interest rates with 10-year bond
yields moving close to 9 per cent (Chart 2.12). However,
this market is largely insulated from demand shocks
from abroad as there are caps on FII investments
(currently the cap is at US$ 15 billion for government
bonds with an outstanding of more than US$ 550 billion
for central and state government securities) and the debt
is mostly held by domestic entities, particularly, the
commercial banks.
ECB flows may be impacted
2.11 External Commercial Borrowings (ECBs) are
necessary to bridge the gap between domestic savings
and investment. High interest rate differentials between
domestic and overseas borrowings also incentivise firms
to borrow abroad resulting in high currency mismatches
on some corporate balance sheets. The recent tensions
arising from Europe may, however, potentially impact
the flows under ECBs.
Redemption pressure for FCCBs exists….sufficient
precautions taken
2.12 FSR for June 2011 had highlighted the risks faced
by many firms on account of Foreign Currency
Convertible Bonds (FCCBs) falling due for redemption
in the near future (Chart 2.13). It had also pointed out
the potential systemic risk arising from many firms
facing funding crunch as their equity valuations had
dropped considerably making redemption necessary.
Foreign sources of lending are getting reduced as a result
of rise in risk aversion (Following the European debt
crisis). Further, the Indian rupee has depreciated sharply
in recent months, thus raising the cost of redemption.
The FCCBs, raised in pre-financial crisis years carrying
10-Year 2-Year 6-Month
Source: Bloomberg.
Chart 2.12: Yields on Government Securities in Various Maturities
(in per cent)
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Chart 2.13: Maturities of ECBs and FCCBs
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zero or low coupons, would need to be replaced with
domestic borrowing, whose rates are much higher today.
To mitigate the hardships faced by FCCB issuers, the
Reserve Bank, in consultation with the Central
Government, has permitted the buyback of FCCBs at a
discount, extended the window for such buyback and
allowed firms to refinance from overseas borrowers
under the automatic route. Proposals for restructuring
of FCCBs not involving change in conversion price are
being considered under the approval route depending
on the merits of the proposal.
Net external liability position of the country has
risen…
2.13  Net claims of non-residents on India
(international financial assets less international
financial liabilities) stood at US$ 233.6 billion in the
quarter ended June 2011, an increase of US$ 14.2 billion
over the quarter ended March 2011.  This was due to a
large increase in external liabilities, mainly direct
investments and ECBs even though reserve assets and
direct investment abroad also increased (Chart 2.14).
Translation losses on unhedged portions of these
liabilities owing to depreciation of Indian rupee cannot
be ruled out.
…while foreign exchange reserves have remained
stable
2.14 Size of reserves is an important parameter in
gauging the ability to absorb external shocks. With the
changing profile of capital flows, the traditional
approach of assessing reserve adequacy in terms of
import cover needs to be broadened to include a number
of parameters which take into account the size,
composition and risk profiles of various types of capital
flows as well as the types of external shocks to which
the economy is vulnerable. The trend in some reserve
coverage ratios are presented in chart 2.15.
Exchange rate has moved out of an established range
2.15  Concerns over European debt sustainability have
led to broader issues like the future of the monetary
union itself. Further, the lack of political consensus on
tackling the rising sovereign debt and poorer growth
prospects in advanced economies caused a flight of
capital to safe havens, thus deteriorating sentiment for
emerging market currencies like the Indian rupee.
Currencies of emerging markets that have a current
account deficit like India, Turkey and South Africa, have,
Net IIP Assets Liabilities
Source: RBI.
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however, depreciated more than those with a current
account surplus (Chart 2.16). In a repeat of the
characteristic exhibited in the past, after a long period
of stability, the exchange rate has broken out of an
established range to touch historic highs. At times like
these, attention often shifts to developments taking
place in the offshore Indian rupee or non-deliverable
forward (NDF) market. The difference between the
prices of the onshore forward market and NDF market
for Indian rupee has been changing over a period of time
(Chart 2.17).
2.16 Market expectations about the path of the
exchange rate have been belied (Chart 2.18). The Reserve
Bank’s exchange rate policy has come into focus as a
result of the large swings in the exchange rate. It
has been clarified that the policy aims to manage
volatility in exchange rate and to ensure that exchange
rate volatility does not impair macroeconomic stability.
The sharp depreciation of the Indian rupee is driven by
global dynamics, and the extent and direction of its
movement will depend on credible resolution to
external situation, particularly, the sovereign debt
problem in Europe.
Concerns on unhedged corporate exposures being
addressed through preventive actions
2.17 In 2008, a break-out from established trading
ranges of the Indian rupee, similar to the recent
depreciation, had caught several firms with large
unhedged exposures unaware. Translation and
transaction losses on their derivatives exposures drove
many of them (in textiles for instance) into greater
difficulty. The Reserve Bank has since tightened foreign
exchange regulations to prevent the recurrence of such
incidents and sale of some complex derivative structures
has been barred. It has proposed6 that while extending
fund based and non-fund based credit facilities to
corporates, banks should rigorously evaluate the risks
arising out of unhedged foreign currency exposure of
the corporates and price them in the credit risk
premium. Banks may also consider stipulating a limit
on unhedged position of corporates on the basis of their
Board’s approved policy. At the same time, reporting of
data by banks in respect of unhedged exposures is being
strengthened.
Chart 2.16: Currencies with External Deficit and Broader
Currency Indices
5
(January 2011 = 100)
Source: Bloomberg.
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Chart 2.17: Difference Between Onshore and Offshore Forward Rate
of US$/INR in 3- and 6-month Maturity
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Chart 2.18: Range of Analyst Forecasts for US$/INR in end-July
(shaded area), Actual Path (in green) and its
Median Forecast at end-October (in red)
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5 DXY or US Dollar Index indicates the general value of the US dollar against major world currencies, ADXY stands for the Bloomberg – JP Morgan Asia
Dollar Index and is a trade and liquidity weighted index of the value of Asian currencies, Chinese yuan, Honk Kong dollar, Indian rupee, Korean won
etc. against the US dollar. Rise in chart implies depreciation except for DXY & ADXY where it denotes appreciation of US dollar and Asian currencies
respectively. ZAR is South African Rand and TRY is New Turkish Lira.
6 Second Quarter Review of Monetary Policy 2011-12, October 25, 2011.
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Exchange rate and equity market coupling may pose
problems
2.18 Fortunes of the Indian rupee and domestic equity
markets are intertwined. During times of risk aversion,
correlation between the two is much higher. FIIs’ selling
in equities is matched by their demand for US dollars
to repatriate capital to their own jurisdictions. This
externality that the equity market gyrations pose on a
macroeconomic variable like the exchange rate is not
conducive to financial or macroeconomic stability (Chart
2.19). The interaction between two of the biggest
institutional investors viz., FIIs and Mutual Funds is
also interesting, with the latter often being a foil for FII
activity (Box 2.1).
Dominance of derivatives trading in Indian equities
2.19 The Indian securities market has undergone
structural changes in both share and composition of cash
as well as the derivatives segment. The average daily
cash market turnover and delivery on stock exchanges
during the last two years have been declining. This is in
contrast to a rapid growth in value of traded contracts
in equity derivatives, where index options have replaced
index futures as the most traded contracts. The ratio of
cash market turnover to derivatives market turnover
has dipped in recent months (Chart 2.20). The
transformation in composition of trading activity is also
notable. While the share of institutions has remained
stable, that of non-institutional clients including retail
clients has fallen sharply in the cash segment (Charts
2.21 and 2.22). The share of proprietary trading in
GoI 10-Year Nifty US$/INR
Source: Bloomberg.
(in per cent, annualised)
Chart 2.19: Historical Volatility of Various Markets
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Chart 2.20: Cash Versus Derivatives Turnover in Equities
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Chart 2.22: Composition of Trading in Equity Derivatives
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Box 2.1 : Trading Behaviour of FIIs and Mutual Funds in Indian Equity7
An important aspect of development of securities market in
India in the last two decades has been the growing participation
of institutional investors, both foreign as well as domestic. FIIs
and Mutual Funds (MFs) together hold more than 10 per cent
of equity market capitalisation and contribute to more than 20
per cent of the total turnover (which translates to over 65 per
cent of delivery turnover as these institutions trade only on
delivery basis). A preliminary study of impact of trading by FIIs
and MFs revealed that equity markets are likely to be more
vulnerable to FII flows.
In light of the above, role played by MFs when there is
heightened market activity by FIIs and its impact on the market
was studied. During January 2010 - September 2011, there are
59 days when FIIs have sold more than ` 500 crore of equity on
a net basis. On these 59 days, MFs were net purchasers on 39
days, i.e. FIIs and MFs had opposite investment pattern. This
could possibly be attributable to the fact that whereas FIIs invest
across economies, MFs invest mostly in domestic markets and
hence the difference in investment perspective. The ratio of
Net MF investments to Net FII investments is only 0.22.
The Nifty returns posted on Top 20 per cent and Bottom 20 per
cent days, in terms of FII net sales and net institutional activity
(FII net sales are net of MF net activity, whether buy or sale) are
presented in charts 2.23 and 2.24 below:
It can be observed that in both of the cases, top 20 per cent
days post more negative returns than bottom 20 per cent,
indicating some degree of correlation between the FII net sales/
net institutional activity and Nifty returns. The difference
between the returns of top 20 per cent and bottom 20 per cent
days were more prominent in case of net institutional activity,
indicating that correlation between net institutional activity and
Nifty returns may be stronger than that between Nifty returns
and FII net sales alone.
Results of Spearman’s Rank Correlation Test to ascertain the
extent of correlation are tabulated below:
As can be seen, the co-efficient of correlation between Nifty
returns and net institutional activity is statistically significant
at 95 per cent confidence level whereas that between Nifty
returns and FII net sales alone is not statistically significant.
This preliminary analysis indicates that even on the days of
heightened FII net sales, MF net activity plays a considerable
role in price formation, although this finding needs to be
buttressed with greater statistical analysis. In India, however,
share of MFs in total financial assets is not substantial as brought
out in the Financial Stability Report of March 2010. Augmenting
the asset base of equity mutual funds, by encouraging more
participation from retail clients for whom the mutual fund
product was primarily designed, would deepen the institutional
participation in the market. This would facilitate MFs playing
more significant role in stability of Indian equity markets.
Top 20% days Bottom 20% days
Source: SEBI Staff Calculations
Chart 2.23: Nifty Returns (%) Versus FII Net Sales
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Chart 2.24: Nifty Returns (%) Versus Net Institutional Activity
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derivatives segment has gone up considerably from 35
per cent in 2008-09 to 48 per cent in 2010-11 whereas
the share of non-institutional clients has declined from
59 per cent to 42 per cent during the same period. In
the interest of financial stability, these micro-level
developments need to be monitored as potential sources
of systemic risk.
Risks from pledging of shares by promoters of Indian
companies
2.20 In India, most businesses are family-run and
promoters play an active role in managing the affairs of
firms. The average promoter holding in the listed
companies is around 48 per cent. It has been observed
Table 2.1 : Spearman’s Rank Correlation Analysis
Nifty Returns Nifty Returns and
and net institutional
FII net sales activity
Spearman’s Rank
Correlation Co-efficient 0.20 (1.60)* 0.43 (3.60)*
*Figures in bracket indicate the t-statistic
Source: SEBI Staff Calculations
7 Contributed by Systemic Stability Unit (SSU), SEBI.
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that the equity prices of many companies in which the
promoters had pledged significant portions of their
shares, fell faster than the broader market on account
of speculation about whether lenders were selling shares
after margin call failures. Such events affect the
confidence of investors and are, therefore, not conducive
to financial stability. In light of the same, SEBI has
prescribed disclosure requirements for promoters by
making it mandatory for them to disclose the details of
pledged shares and release or sale of pledged shares to
the company and the company shall, in turn, inform
the same to the public through the stock exchanges.
Recently, it has also widened the scope of such
disclosures to include encumbrances. Lack of
transparency regarding the pledging of shares by
promoters in respect of reasons for pledging, price at
which pledge has been made and conditions for margin
calls and sale by lender could contribute to uncertainty
in the market.
OIS markets being strengthened through guaranteed
settlements
2.21 India’s OTC (Over The Counter) interest rate swap
markets largely comprise Overnight Indexed Swaps
(OIS), and are used by banks, primary dealers and firms
(Chart 2.25). The significantly large outstanding notional
value of swaps in India (Chart 2.26) is being addressed
through ‘trade compression’ by the Clearing Corporation
of India Limited (CCIL). In addition, it has been proposed
that the settlement of cash flows would be guaranteed
by CCIL. This takes care of a large part of systemic risks
emanating from this market. CCIL would be collecting
an ‘initial margin’ for Potential Future Exposure on swap
positions and also ‘variation margin’ for changes in
mark-to-market positions of counterparts to a trade.
Concluding Remarks
2.22 Domestic financial markets remained orderly but
faced several headwinds from adverse developments in
global financial markets. The turmoil in sovereign bond
markets in Europe has spread to its banking system, a
major source of capital for domestic firms. Risk aversion
and flight to safety have replaced risk seeking behavior
among international investors on account of higher
counterparty risk perceptions and rating downgrades
of sovereigns and banks. This has resulted in a large
Volumes Number of Trades (RHS)
Source: CCIL
Chart 2.25: Volume (in 000 Crore) and Number of Trades in OIS`
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reversal of capital flows, including banking capital, and
consequent difficulties faced by Indian firms and banks
in raising foreign currency denominated borrowings.
They have also triggered a sharp fall in domestic equity
and exchange rate market accompanied by high
volatility. The domestic bond markets, meanwhile,
remained largely immune to these overseas
developments.
2.23 Depreciation of the Indian rupee, widening
current account deficit and rising net international
liability position, though not a cause for undue
immediate concern, have enhanced the vulnerabilities
of the external sector. The environment for carrying out
refinancing of FCCB (and ECB) liabilities by firms over
the next few quarters has worsened due to correction
in domestic equity markets, depreciation of the Indian
rupee and rise in domestic interest rates. Translation
and transaction exposures that remain unhedged could
cause hardships to some firms.
2.24 The structure of Indian equity market, the
composition and share of trading by its participants is
evolving over a period of time. The rise in share of
derivatives trading relative to cash market and higher
proportion of proprietary trading are developments that
need to be monitored from a systemic point of view.
Authorities need to prevent securities market
dislocations arising from information asymmetry. It
needs to be ensured that there is complete disclosure
of private pledging of shares by promoters, especially
in case of family run business.
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Chapter III
Financial Institutions: Soundness and Resilience
The current heightened global uncertainty on account of lingering Euro Zone crisis has implications for
emerging market economies (EMEs) including India. The recent regulatory prescriptions for European banks
have brought in fears of deleveraging. The direct impact on Indian banks, though, is expected to be limited.
The banking system remained sound with CRAR and core CRAR well above the regulatory minimum and
NPA ratios that compared favourably with the major advanced countries as well as peer EMEs. Continuous
decline in CRAR and deterioration in asset quality, however, indicated that the risks were rising for the
banking sector; even as credit growth decelerated and slippages outpaced credit growth. The major sectors that
contributed to the increasing trend in NPAs were the priority sector, retail, real estate and infrastructure. In
the infrastructure segment, the power and telecom sectors saw increased impairments and restructuring. The
banking stability map and indicator also depicted increase in vulnerabilities in the Indian banking sector.
Strain on asset quality was evident in the case of urban and rural co-operative sectors as well as NBFCs.
Pension funds have been covered for the first time in FSR and illustrates the countervailing role played by these
funds. Interconnectedness between the insurance and banking sectors could pose concerns. A number of single
factor sensitivity stress tests were conducted to test the resilience of the financial system. The stress test results
indicated that the system would be able to withstand a range of risk specific and sector specific shocks.
Sovereign risks and bank balance sheets caught in a
vicious feedback loop
3.1 Concerns over sustainability of sovereign debt
levels as well as lower growth prospects in US and
Europe, have weighed down the global banking system,
in the period since the previous FSR. Sovereign debt
and banking sector problems in the Euro area have
become more persistent than expected, even as the
European debt crisis spreads from the peripheral regions
to the core. The spill-over of sovereign risks to the
banking sector tends to get amplified through the
network of highly interconnected and leveraged
financial institutions.
3.2 There are several channels of contagion from
sovereigns to banks. Firstly, increase in sovereign risk
causes losses on banks’ government bond holdings,
thereby weakening their balance sheets. Banks have
been raising their level of sovereign bond holdings of
late in view of the preferential treatment for such
securities under the liquidity standards of Basel III.
Secondly, in repo markets, sovereign debt accounts for
the majority of collateral, and participants are sensitive
to changes in its riskiness. Rating downgrades, if large
enough, can exclude a government’s bonds from the
pool of eligible collateral. Moreover, counterparties
increase the haircuts on such securities, thus, raising
the cost of borrowings. The close connection between
sovereign credit risk and banking sector represents a
substantial macroeconomic threat for the global
economy, as the effects of sovereign debt problems in
one country spill over to the banks in other countries
through banks’ investments in foreign sovereign debt
and exposures to domestic banks and assets in the
affected foreign country.
3.3 The recent regulatory prescription1 raising the
capital requirements of European banks could lead to
significant deleveraging. As per the final estimates
released by the European Banking Authority, •114.7
billion is the amount of capital the region’s banks need
by June 30, 2012. Considering the prevalent conditions
1 In October, 2011, Euro zone leaders agreed on a package of measures designed to overcome the on-going problems due to the spiralling sovereign debt.
This included, inter alia, a proposal of 50 per cent loss or ‘haircut’ on Greek government bonds held by the financial sector, increasing the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to about •1 trillion and requiring European banks to have a significantly higher capital ratio (9 per cent of core Tier 1
capital relative to risk-weighted assets) after accounting for their losses on government debt.
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of the equity markets, banks will find it difficult to
raise capital from the market. Further, most
governments are not in their best financial health to
inject fresh funds. Sale of assets could prove
counterproductive as the losses on their sale would
tantamount to further erosion in regulatory capital.
Hence, the banks are more likely to scale down their
credit portfolio aggressively which would hurt the real
economy and potentially worsen the debt crisis in
Europe.
3.4 As the European banks deleverage, they may try
to export the pain of deleveraging further afield,
including to EMEs. This could lead to a downstream
impact on India, since European banks’ claims on India
constituted 8.6 per cent of India’s GDP (Chart 3.1). The
impact on Indian Banks, especially direct impact,
however, is expected to be limited (Box 3.1).
Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs)
3.5 The balance sheet size of the SCBs increased by
18.5 per cent (year-on-year) as at end September 2011,
marginally lower than the growth of 18.8 per cent as at
Box 3.1 : Euro Zone Crisis and Impact on Indian Banks
The first-order impact of the on-going Euro-zone debt crisis on
Indian banks may be limited, on account of negligible exposure
to the vulnerable countries. Firstly, there are only 37 branches
and three subsidiaries of Indian banks in the European Union,
none of which are in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain. Out of
the 37 branches, 30 branches are in the UK, 3 branches in
Belgium and 2 each in Germany and France while all of the 3
subsidiaries are in the UK. Their combined share in the aggregate
banking sector assets stood at 3 per cent as at end September
2011 (Chart 3.2).
Secondly, none of the Indian banks have any exposure to bonds
issued by Portugal, Greece and Spain while exposures to Italian
bonds are negligible. Outside these countries, investment
exposure (of a sample of the major Indian banks) to banks in
Ireland, Germany and France were not significant, even if
exposures to corporates in Germany and France are added.
Thirdly, outstanding nostro balances of Indian banks maintained
with banks in Europe have been falling over the last few months.
Funding dependence of overseas branches of Indian banks
(sample of five major banks) on European entities, except for
UK, is also not very significant.
There could, however, be second-order impact on the Indian
banks through various channels including trade. In the event
of the European crisis worsening through contagion and in
consequence, global financial markets, especially in Europe
freezing, funding constraints for Indian bank-branches operating
overseas may emerge. Besides, the cost of borrowing may also
rise. Some signs of market tightness are, in fact, already visible.
In such a case, both banks and corporates could face challenges
in refinancing their foreign currency liabilities. In addition,
domestic liquidity (of which the banking sector is a major
provider) would need to fill in to refinance the shrinking
overseas debt of Indian firms. This has been discussed in detail
in Chapter II of this Report.
Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics and IMF
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end March 2011. The credit growth (year-on-year)
remained strong at 19.2 per cent as at end September
2011, though it had decelerated from the robust
growth of 22.6 per cent as at end March 2011. This credit
growth was attained against a nominal GDP growth of
16 per cent during the secound quarter of 2011-12.
Deposits continued to constitute close to 80 per cent of
total liabilities of the banking system with the share of
CASA (current account and savings account) in total
deposits being around 33 per cent as at end September
2011, lower than the share of about 35 per cent as at
end March 2011. The deposits grew by 17.6 per cent
(year-on-year) as at end September 2011, marginally
lower than the 17.8 per cent growth rate as at end March
2011. Consequently, the credit to deposit (CD) ratio
declined to 73.4 per cent as at end September 2011 from
74.3 per cent as at end March 2011 (Chart 3.3).
3.6 The off-balance sheet exposures of the banking
sector continued to increase as at end September 2011.
Across the bank groups, foreign banks continued to hold
a disproportionate share in off-balance sheet exposures
vis-à-vis their on-balance sheet size (Chart 3.4).
Increasing derivatives exposure between banks has the
potential to cause systemic disruptions in stress
scenarios, as discussed in Chapter IV of this Report.
Banking Stability Map and Indicator2
Vulnerabilities in the banking sector increase…
3.7 The risks to banking sector have increased since
the previous FSR. The banking sector faced profitability
pressures due to higher funding costs and asset quality
pressures due to a slowing economy. This is testified
by the Banking Stability Map which revealed a
dimensional increase in risks emanating from
soundness, profitability and asset quality. Though the
soundness indicators showed a relative deterioration
vis-à-vis the position in previous periods, the ratios
continue to remain well above the regulatory
requirements. Similarly, an increase in vulnerability in
the banking sector was indicated by the rise in the
quarterly series of the Banking Stability Indicator starting
from the quarter ended June 2011. Further, a forecast
of the Indicator for the next two quarters shows a
2 For methodology and details, please refer to the Annex of this Report.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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continuing, albeit marginal, deterioration in the stability
of the banking sector (Charts 3.5 and 3.6).
…as capital slides due to disconnect between rate of
capital augmentation and risk profile
3.8 The Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio (CRAR)
and the core CRAR continued to slide, though they
remained well above the regulatory minimum under
both Basel-I and Basel II norms. CRAR fell from 14.5 per
cent as at end March 2010 to 14.2 per cent as at end
March 2011 and stood at 13.5 per cent as at end
September 2011. Core CRAR dropped from 10.1 per cent
as at end March 2010 to 10 per cent as at end March
2011 to 9.6 per cent as at end September 2011 A cross-
country comparison however, reveals that India lags
behind its peer group countries in this respect
(Charts 3.7 and 3.8).
3.9 Leverage ratio3 of SCBs exhibited a marginal decline
from 6 per cent as at end March 2011 to 5.9 per cent as at
end September 2011, though all banks except three
operated with Tier I leverage ratio of greater than 4 per
cent as against the Basel III requirement of a minimum
of 3 per cent.
…and asset quality deteriorates since slippages
outpace credit growth by a wide margin
3.10 Asset quality of SCBs has deteriorated. In fact,
the deterioration in asset quality has been identified as
the risk with the highest probability of occurrence by
Note:
Source:
Away from the centre signifies increase in risk
RBI Staff Calculations
Soundness
Asset
Quality
ProfitabilityLiquidity
Efficiency
Sep-10 Mar-11 Sep-11
Chart 3.5: Banking Stability Map
Chart 3.6: Banking Stability Indicator
Note: Increase in indicator value shows lower stability
Dec 2011 and Mar 2012 are forecasted values indicated by the shaded region
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
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the respondents of the first Systemic Risk Survey
(discussed in detail in Chapter V of this Report). The
gross non-performing assets (NPA) ratio of SCBs has
increased from 2.3 per cent as at end March 2011 to 2.8
per cent as at end September 2011. Similarly, the net
NPA ratio has increased from 0.9 per cent as at end March
2011 to 1.2 per cent as at end September 2011, while
slippage ratio increased from 1.6 per cent to 1.9 per cent
between March to September 2011.
3.11 The growth rate (year-on-year) of NPAs at 30.5 per
cent as at end September 2011 has outpaced credit
growth of 19.2 per cent. Slippages (i.e. fresh accretion
to NPAs) too have outpaced credit growth and grew at
92.8 per cent (year-on-year) as at end September 2011.
An analysis of the growth rate of NPAs shows that the
growth rate in the first half of 2011-12 at 25.5 per cent
is more than triple the average growth rate of 7.4 per
cent in the first half years during 2006-2011 (Charts 3.9
and 3.10).
3.12 Despite the recent spurt in NPAs, the impairment
levels in Indian banks compare favourably with the
banking sectors in both the major advanced countries
as well as peer economies. The provision coverage ratio
(PCR)4, howerver, has fallen short when benchmarked
against the peer group average of 90.7 per cent. The PCR
of the SCBs (excluding technical write-offs) was at 58.9
per cent as on June 30, 2011, which was slightly less
than the level (59.4 per cent) where it was as on March
31, 2011 (Charts 3.11 and 3.12).
4PCR is essentially the ratio of provisioning to gross non-performing assets and indicates the extent of funds a bank has provided to cover its loan losses.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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3.13 The major sectors that contributed to the
increasing trend in NPAs were priority sector, retail, real
estate and infrastructure. Their combined share in gross
NPAs of the banking sector stood at 85 per cent as at
end September 2011. The contribution of priority sector
and retail sector to aggregate NPAs of the banking system
at 48 and 23 per cent, respectively, was lower than their
contribution to total advances of the banking system at
31 and 19 per cent, respectively. Further, retail sector
saw an increase in NPAs after a decreasing trend since
March 2010 (Charts 3.13 and 3.14). In case of
infrastructure and priority sectors, the growth rate of
NPAs was much higher than that of their respective
outstanding. In the infrastructure segment, though the
NPAs as a ratio of outstanding remained low at 0.6 per
cent, power and telecom sectors saw a rise in
impairments and restructuring. However, going forward,
if growth slows down, there could be further impact on
the asset quality in this sector. The impact could be
much pronounced in the power sector, especially due
to the legacy losses in state electricity boards (Box 3.2).
3.14 There is an increased possibility of further
deterioration in asset quality as deceleration in credit
growth is expected on the back of a slowing economy.
In this context, a reference can be drawn to the empirical
study detailed in the previous FSR which revealed that
strong credit growth was synonymous with
improvement in asset quality, whereas slow down in
credit growth was followed by increase in impaired
assets. These trends could be further accentuated due
to recent developments in sectors like power, telecom
(discussed above) and aviation. A series of stress tests,
however, indicate that the banking sector would be able
to withstand NPA shocks, though a few individual banks
could face difficulty in case of large shocks (paragraph
3.40 to 3.42).
… causing a dent in profitability
3.15 Higher provisioning requirements, consequent
to higher non-performing assets and higher
interest expenses have put pressure on the banks'
profitability.
3.16  Interest income grew by 34.4 per cent (year-on-
year) as at end September 2011, while interest expenses
increased by 46.7 per cent. Net interest income (NII)
increased by 15.5 per cent (year-on-year) in September
Priority Sector Retail Real Estate Infrastructure
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 3.13: Sectoral Share in Aggregate Banking System Credit
and NPA - September 2011
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Chart 3.14: Growth Rate of NPA and Credit - September 2011
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Box 3.2 : Impairments and Restructuring Rise in Power and Telecom Sector
The growth rate of credit to power sector remained much
higher than the aggregate banking sector’s credit
growth, though credit to state electricity boards (SEBs) have
moderated sharply. In addition, concentration is discernible
in credit to power sector as projects for power generation
garnered 55 per cent share while SEBs/corporatised distribution
companies (Discoms) accounted for 25 per cent (Charts 3.18
and 3.19).
The risk that banks currently face on account of their exposure
to power sector is due to two reasons: rising losses and debt
levels in SEBs, and the shortage of fuel availability for power
generation.
As per the draft approach to the 12th Five Year Plan (August
2011), the current losses of distribution utilities before
accounting for State subsidy stood at approximately `70,000
crore. The accumulated losses of SEBs indirectly impact the
power producers since SEBs are the largest buyers of power in
the country.
Apart from poor financial health of SEBs, coal supply issues
plague the power sector. Further, some projects are stalled due
to environmental hurdles. Against this backdrop, there is
anecdotal evidence of many lenders being cautious in
extending loans to the sector.
With losses among SEBs and coal / delay issues of power
projects, high concentration of bank credit in power generation
and distribution (as discussed above) is a matter of concern.
Credit to the power and telecom sectors, as at end June 2011,
constituted the major share of bank credit to infrastructure
segment at 55 and 22 per cent, respectively. Their share in
aggregate bank credit stood at around 7 and 3 per cent,
respectively. In case of banks’ exposure to power sector, the
public sector banks (PSBs) accounted for the maximum share
followed by new private sector banks. Similarly, in the telecom
sector, PSBs held the majority exposure followed by foreign
banks (Charts 3.15 and 3.16).
Impairments and restructuring have increased in the power
and telecom sector as at end June 2011. Restructured accounts
in the two sectors together constituted 8.5 per cent of total
restructuring in the banking sector as at end June 2011
compared to 5.0 per cent as at end March 2011. Similarly,
impaired accounts as a share of aggregate banking sector NPAs
had risen from 0.4 per cent to 1.0 per cent (Chart 3.17).
Chart 3.17: Impaired and Restructured Accounts as a Share of
Outstanding Bank Credit to Power and Telecom Sectors
Note:
Source:
Sample size of 67 banks representing 85 per cent of banking sector assets
RBI Staff Calculations
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Chart 3.16: Distribution of Exposure Across Bank Groups
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Sample size of 67 banks representing 85 per cent of banking sector assets
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Chart 3.19: Growth Rate of Credit to Power Sector and Its Components
Note:
Source:
Sample size of 67 banks representing 85 per cent of banking sector assets
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2011 as against 40.7 per cent growth in September 2010.
Operating expenses too grew (year-on-year) at a rate
faster than the non-interest income - 15.2 per cent as
against 4.4 per cent, on account of decelerating fee
income and trading income.
3.17 As a result, growth (year-on-year) in earnings
before provision and taxes (EBPT) came down from 24
per cent in September 2010 to 10 per cent in September
2011 and profit after tax (PAT) increased by 2 per cent
as against 31 per cent growth in September 2010. During
the year 2010-11, EBPT increased by 21.8 per cent and
PAT by 19.7 per cent. Profitability ratios also indicated
deterioration amidst falling profit margins and rising
provisions (Chart 3.20 and Table 3.1).
3.18 Going forward, further stress on earnings of banks
could materialise on account of pressure on margins
due to sustained high deposit rates. An important
development in this context is the recent deregulation
of savings bank deposit rates, which could elevate
interest costs on retail deposits in the current high
interest rate environment (Box 3.3). Higher provisions
owing to further deterioration in credit quality of assets
(as elucidated in paragraph 3.14) on the back of a
possible slowdown in credit and the rising interest rate
scenario could also adversely impact the bottom-line of
the banks.
Borrower concentration risk was prominent in small
foreign banks
3.19 During the quarter ended June 2011, the top 10
borrowers, on an average, accounted for 10 per cent of
total assets of the banking system. There were, however,
a number of outlier banks (mostly small foreign banks)
where the top 10 borrowers constituted up to 40 per
cent of total assets, signaling some degree of
concentration risks in these banks (Chart 3.21)
Geographic concentration was significant for credit as
well as deposits
3.20 Both credit and deposits are distributed in a
skewed manner across the country. Demographic
distribution explains this disparity to a certain extent,
with regions having low population accounting for low
Interest Income Interest Expenses
Earnings before Provisions and Taxes
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 3.20: Growth Rate of Components of Earnings
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Chart 3.21: Top 10 Borrowers as per cent of Total Assets - June 2011
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Table 3.1: Profitability Ratios
Sep Sep Sep Mar
2009 2010 2011 2011
A Profit Margin (Earnings before
provisions and taxes as a per cent 1.2 1.2 1.1 2.3
of liabilities)
B Leverage (Liabilities as a per cent 11.6 11.7 11.9 12.2
of Equity)
C Return on Equity before provisions 13.4 14.3 13.6 27.8
and taxes (A * B)
D Provisions as a per cent to Equity 3.0 3.7 4.5 7.4
E Return on Equity before taxes (C - D) 10.4 10.6 9.1 20.3
F 1-tax rate 65.5 67.0 66.9 66.7
G Return on Equity-RoE (E * F) 6.8 7.1 6.1 13.6
Return on Assets-RoA 0.48 0.55 0.47 1.09
Cost Income Ratio (Efficiency Ratio) 46.1 45.0 46.1 46.1
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
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Box 3.3 : Deregulation of Savings Bank Interest Rates : an Analysis
A major attraction of savings deposits for banks is that it offers
a low-cost source of funds. This is evident from the fact that
bank groups with higher share of CASA deposits (of which
savings deposit is a major component) enjoy relatively low cost
of deposits (Chart 3.22).
However, the distribution of CASA deposits among banks is
not uniform. Competition in this space, which was non-existent
hitherto, could rise as banks with low CASA ratio could rush to
garner such deposits by raising rates. The effect is already visible
as a few of the banks have raised savings account interest rate
following the deregulation. The impact of such rate hikes on
banks’ profitability will need to be monitored carefully as already
the banks’ cost of funds have gone up and such rate hikes will
put additional strain on the banks’ net interest margin (NIM)
(Chart 3.23). The effect, however, may be muted, based on the
churn in customers and cost structure adopted by the individual
banks. A corollary to the event would be that in a falling interest
rate scenario, the savings bank deposit rates may also moderate
accordingly.
In a heightened competitive environment for retail deposits,
banks are likely to introduce innovative savings deposits, as
in Hong Kong, wherein new products such as combined
savings and checking accounts and Hong Kong Interbank
Offered Rate or HIBOR-linked savings products and tiered
structures of interest rates were introduced following the
deregulation of savings deposit interest rates. However, care
needs to be taken to avoid the potential of mis-selling
complex and opaque structured products which may not be
suitable for the general public. Further, banks are likely to
partially offset the impact of the increase in interest cost by
levying transaction and servicing charges and thus pass on
the additional costs to the customers.
A major component of the financial sector reform process
pursued by India was deregulation of a complex structure of
deposit and lending interest rates. On the deposit side, the only
interest rate that remained regulated was the savings deposit
interest rate. The interest rate on savings bank deposits had
remained unchanged at 3.5 per cent per annum since March 1,
2003. Cross-country experience shows that in most countries,
interest rates on savings bank accounts have been deregulated
and are now fixed by commercial banks based on the market
interest rates.
The changes in the interest rate of savings deposit were initiated
by the Reserve Bank with banks being advised to pay interest
on savings bank accounts on a daily product basis with effect
from April 1, 20105. Later, in May 2011, the rates on such
deposits were raised by 50 basis points to 4 per cent. Effective
October 25, 2011, the Reserve Bank deregulated the savings bank
account interest rates, wherein banks will have to keep a
uniform rate of interest for savings accounts with deposits up
to `1 lakh, while differential interest rates could be set for
savings bank deposits over `1 lakh. This move is expected to
improve the transmission of monetary policy. It is also expected
to enhance the attractiveness of savings accounts and encourage
thrift behaviour in the economy by bringing the savings deposit
rate in sync with the changing market conditions,
The opportunity cost between savings deposit and other liquid/
ultra short-term funds is expected to reduce henceforth, with
savings rate mirroring prevalent market conditions. Though the
penetration of such liquid and ultra short-term funds is limited
and hence substitutability may be questionable; after
deregulation, some churn in customers can be expected.
5 Prior to the introduction of a daily product method, the interest on savings deposit account was calculated based on the minimum balance maintained
in the account between the 10th day and the last day of each calendar month and credited to the depositor’s account only when the interest due was at
least `1/- or more.
6 The impact is calculated on the assumption that all banks raise their savings bank deposit rate by 100 bps, ceterus paribus.
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credit and deposits. However, development is clearly
the bigger reason in this regard. Maharashtra and NCR
Delhi (National Capital Region) account for more than
43 per cent of total bank credit, while these two regions
contribute to about 40 per cent of total bank deposits.
The states which have both low credit and deposit
counts are the North Eastern states, Jammu and Kashmir
and Chattisgarh. The Gini coefficient with regard to
credit distribution across the country over the last one
year remained at a high level of 74 per cent while this
coefficient for deposit distribution stood at 68 per cent
(Chart 3.24).
Concentration in high risk industries rises
3.21 The share of credit to high risk industries has
registered an increase as at end of September 2011 – 22
per cent as against 16 per cent as at end March 2011.
Within high risk sectors, commercial real estate garnered
the major share (Chart 3.25).
Liquidity risk was seen at a high level
3.22 The ratio of illiquidity (calculated as total
loans, mandatory CRR and SLR and fixed assets as a
percentage of total assets) stood, on an average, at a high
level of over 80 per cent for the banking sector (Chart
3.26). A stress test analysis revealed that in severe stress
scenarios, the SLR investments proved of help to
banks enabling them to mitigate the liquidity pressure
(paragraph 3.49 and 3.50).
Yield curve risk was found to be low
3.23 The ratio in this regard (calculated as the total
unmatched position across all time buckets as a
percentage of Risk Sensitive Assets and Liabilities)
declined from about 3 per cent in March 2011 to about
1.5 per cent in June 2011, signifying low risk.
Interest rate risk in the banking book has risen
3.24 Interest rate risk in the banking book as measured
from the earnings perspective (calculated as a percentage
decline in NII due to a shock of 200 bps over a twelve
month horizon) has risen from about 8 per cent in March
2011 to a high of almost 40 per cent as at end of June
2011. However, during the same period, based on the
Economic value perspective (calculated as a percentage
decline in capital funds due to a standardised shock of
200 bps over a twelve month horizon) an improvement
Chart 3.24: Lorenz Curve Representing Distribution of Credit and
Deposits Across All the States and Union Territories of India - June 2011
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Credit / deposit as % of total credit / deposit (cumulative)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
p
er
ce
n
ta
ge
sh
ar
e
o
f
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
(c
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
an
d
w
ei
gh
te
d
)
Low RiskModerate RiskHigh Risk
Chart 3.25: Bank Credit to Industries – Risk Wise
Sep-2011
Sep-2010
Sep-2009
0 20 40 60 80 100
per cent
Source: RBI Staff Calculations and CRISIL
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Chart 3.26: Ratio of Illiquidity - June 2011
Pe
r
ce
n
t
Note:
Source:
Sample size of 32 banks representing 51 per cent of banking sector assets
RBI Staff Calculations
Banking sector average Ratio of illiquidity
36
Chapter III Financial Institutions: Soundness and Resilience
was seen from a high risk zone of 10 per cent to a
moderate risk of around 6 per cent (Charts 3.27 and 3.28).
3.25 A stress test anlaysis has been done to examine
the impact of different kinds of shifts in yield curve on
the banking book, which revealed that most of the banks
were able to withstand interest rate shocks
(paragraph 3.43 and 3.44).
Urban Co-operative Banks (UCBs)
Strain on asset quality evident
3.26 The founding principles of co-operative banking
i.e. mutual aid, coupled with the objective of promoting
thrift and self help have helped to sustain the
prominence of UCBs through the years. UCBs are seen
as an important element in the programme of financial
inclusion. With an objective of encouraging entry of new
UCBs in regions where their representation is
inadequate, a Committee was set up for studying the
advisability of granting new urban co-operative banking
licenses under Section 22 of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949 [As Applicable to Co-operative Societies (AACS)].
The recommendations of the Committee which
included, inter alia, minimum entry point capital
depending upon the location of the proposed UCBs,
setting up two apex level organisations in the form of
umbrella organisations to provide payment and
settlement services and other services normally
provided by central banks as well as IT and training, are
under consideration of the Reserve Bank.
3.27 An analysis of the scheduled UCBs (SUCBs),
comprising 43.7 per cent of total assets of the sector,
indicated robust growth in deposits and advances as at
end June 2011 (Chart 3.29). While CRAR declined
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
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Chart 3.28: Decline in Capital Funds Due to a Shock of 200 bps
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marginally from 12.5 per cent at end March 2011 to 12.4
per cent in June 2011, Gross NPA ratio increased from
5.7 per cent as at end March 2011 to 6.9 per cent as at
end June 2011, indicating strain on asset quality. A stress
test on credit risk for SUCBs has been carried out and
the results suggest that the sector could withstand a
rise in NPA ratio by 50 per cent, but would come under
duress if NPA ratio doubled (paragraph 3.51).
Rural Co-operatives
Dominance of short term structure in rural credit
disbursement continued
3.28 The rural co-operative sector, comprising of StCBs,
DCCBs, PACS (short-term structures) and SCARDBs and
PCARDBs (long-term structures)7, formed 9.2 per cent
of total assets of the banking sector. DCCBs accounted
for almost 41 per cent of total outstanding loans of rural
co-operative banks, as at end March 2010, followed by
PACS and StCBs. At the same time, the share of long-
term co-operatives in total outstanding loans and
advances stood at 11 per cent, thus indicating the
continuing dominance of short-term structure in rural
credit disbursement. Deposits formed the major source
of resources for StCBs and DCCBs, while in SCARDBs
and PCARDBs, borrowings were the dominant source.
In terms of asset quality the short term structure fared
relatively better than the long-term one, except for PACS;
though the NPA ratios remained high (Chart 3.30).
Non Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)
Asset quality declined, even as profitability showed
improvement
3.29 Non-deposit taking NBFCs that are large and
systemically important i.e., having asset size of `100
crore and above are classified as NBFC-ND-SIs and
constituted about 80 per cent of total assets of the NBFC
sector. The financial soundness indicators of NBFC-ND-
SIs as at end September 2011, indicated that the asset
quality has deteriorated since March 2011, though it has
improved as compared to quarter ended June 2011.
Profitability indicators, however, remain strong (Chart
3.31). A stress test on credit risk for NBFC-ND-SIs has
Chart 3.31: Financial Soundness Indicators of NBFC-ND-SIs
Note: Leverage ratio = outside liabilities to own funds
Outside liabilities = total liabilities less own funds
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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been carried out and the results suggest that they could
withstand quite severe credit risk shocks (paragraph 3.52
and 3.53).
Significant reliance on banking system for resources
evident …
3.30 NBFC-ND-SIs exhibited high dependency on the
banking system for their resources, as evident from an
analysis of their sources and uses of funds. This could
pose risks for NBFCs if banks are not in a position or
unwilling to extend credit to the sector. It could also
pose concern for the banking sector as NBFCs typically
deleverage faster during times of stress. The recent
global crisis is a pointer in this direction. During the
year 2010-11, borrowings of the NBFC sector from the
banks increased by 54.7 per cent, while credit extended
by the NBFC sector grew by 30.4 per cent (Chart 3.32).
3.31 The growing interconnectedness of NBFCs with
the banks and the relatively less stringent regulation
governing NBFCs compared to banks, raised the
potential of arbitrage opportunities. These have been
highlighted in previous FSRs and many steps have been
initiated to plug avenues of such regulatory arbitrage.
Accordingly, a Working Group was set up by the Reserve
Bank in January 2011, to study the issues and concerns
in the NBFC sector. The Working Group has since
submitted its recommendations which pertain to, inter
alia, the rationalisation of existing regulatory
framework, prudential norms, regulatory convergence
between banks and NBFCs, reviewing supervisory
framework and corporate governance standards and
disclosures. These recommendations are being
examined.
Pension Funds8
... act as ‘automatic stabiliser’ with their long-term-
long-only investment style
3.32 The importance of pension funds in ensuring
stability is multi-fold. One, though pension funds are
termed ‘passive investors’ (because portfolio churning
is low) due to their ‘buy and hold’ strategy; with a
sizeable presence, they can ensure market stability, by
acting as a countervailing power in the face of large scale
sell-off. Two, pension funds being large shareholders
with a long-term investment strategy, they tend to play
an important role in bringing in the best practices of
RBI Supervisory ReturnsSource:
Chart 3.32: Share in Sources of Funds - NBFC-ND-SIs
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corporate governance in companies that get the
investments. Three, permitting pension funds to invest
in equity/ debt instruments can play a dual role in not
only providing better returns to its constituents but also,
at the same time, in developing the capital market.
Further, pension funds can be major stimulators of
financial innovation, as suggested by international
experience.
3.33 In India, the Pension Fund Regulatory and
Development Authority (PFRDA) has been mandated to
act as a regulator for the pension sector and is regulating
the ‘National Pension System’ or the ‘New Pension
System’ (NPS). The investment management guidelines
in NPS have been framed to mitigate credit and market
risk. Under this system, the pension fund managers
manage three separate schemes, consisting of three asset
classes, namely (i) equity, (ii) Government securities,
and (iii) credit risk- bearing fixed income instruments,
with the investment in equity subject to a cap of 50 per
cent.
3.34 The pension funds have two accounts, namely,
Tier-I and Tier-II. Tier-I account is a long-term
investment for the accumulation phase of pension fund
and meant for pay-out phase liabilities. On the other
hand, Tier-II account allows frequent (or, even
immediate) withdrawals and imposes a high reserve
requirement. Given a framework where investors have
a choice of liquidation, any sudden spike in redemption
pressure, provided the fund sizes are large in Tier II can
cause disorderly movements in securities markets and
can even pose stability risks.
Insurance Sector9
..interconnectedness remains an issue of concern
3.35 The Indian insurance sector is well capitalised,
as the solvency ratio10 exceeds the regulatory
requirements in all the cases with respect to life insurers.
However, recently this has become a matter of concern
for non-life insurers as the liability requirement and the
associated capital requirement for the mandatory motor
third party pool has increased and so have the
underwriting losses in the non-life sector.
3.36 Insurers underwrite risks if it can be backed by
internal capital or the availability of reinsurance capacity.
Reinsurance shares and allows diversification of
exposures and provides stability to the industry.
Currently, the reinsurance capacity is readily available
for most of the risks written in India and can support
the activity of the insurance business. Even, in case of
the failure of reinsurance industry, it would only
increase the price for getting the reinsurance cover.
3.37 Inter-linkages between insurance and banking
sector is a matter of concern, with many insurance
companies being part of financial conglomerates. Any
financial stability issue regarding the bank in the
conglomerate may have an amplifying effect on the
insurer. The contagion between the banking and
insurance sector will also depend on the insurance
companies’ overall exposure to banks. This has been
brought to the fore in the contagion analysis in
Chapter V.
Resilience of Financial Institutions - Stress Testing
3.38 A number of single factor sensitivity stress tests11
were carried out on scheduled commercial banks
(60 SCBs comprising 99 per cent of total banking sector
assets) as well as urban (scheduled UCBs) and NBFC
(NBFC-ND-SI) sectors to assess their vulnerabilities and
resilience under various scenarios. Based on the latest
supervisory data available, individual banks’ position
in terms of income/portfolio loss was examined by
applying shocks in respect of a single key variable
(holding other risk factors constant). The losses, thus
computed, were then related to an important financial
soundness indicator, typically the regulatory capital
adequacy ratio. The same analyses were also carried out
for the system as a whole by aggregating the impact
across individual banks.
3.39 The credit risk stress tests, assumed an overall
deterioration in asset quality. This test covered a set of
separate shocks on (i) aggregate NPAs (Gross Credit); (ii)
sectoral NPAs for selected sectors; and (iii) largest
individual exposures (concentration). In all these tests,
shocks are applied directly to NPAs (Gross NPA values
9 Source : IRDA
10 Solvency ratio (which is the ratio of the company’s available solvency margin to its required solvency margin) is a measure of the insurance company’s
risk-bearing capacity and must exceed 150 per cent for the company to be considered solvent from a regulatory perspective.
11 For details on stress tests, please refer to the Annex of this Report.
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as per banks’ balance sheet taken as gross of annual
average write-offs) with assumptions of increased
provisioning12. These tests assess the impact of
additional provisioning requirements (income losses)
on the overall capital adequacy of individual bank as
well as on the aggregated system. The total capital is
taken as per Basel-II requirements. The stress tests are
done in static mode, with shocks assumed to be
occurring instantaneously.
Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs)
The banking system is quite resilient to credit risk
shocks occurring in isolation
3.40 For the general NPA shocks, an increase in
NPAs by 50 percent, 100 per cent and 150 per cent
(shocks 1 to 3) were assumed. Another scenario assumed
that 40 percent of restructured advances would become
NPAs (shock 4). The results of these stress tests show
that the system is reasonably poised to withstand the
NPA shocks, but in case of large shocks a few individual
banks could come under duress (Chart 3.33 and
Table 3.2).
Profits may be impacted in case of large negative shock
in case of Sectoral NPAs
3.41 The exercise examined the credit risk of exposure
to the four sectors viz. agriculture, power, real estate,
and telecom. The assumed shock was an incremental
increase in NPA by 5 percentage points in each sector.
These tests are designed to capture the effect of a
negative shock affecting important sectors. The results
of sensitivity analysis reveal that the combined shock
would increase the system level NPA ratio significantly,
with the major contribution emanating from the real
estate and agriculture sectors. Further, the impact on
capital adequacy due to incremental increase of 5
percentage point in NPA ratio of priority sector would
not be significant (Table 3.3). The losses are limited since
banks typically diversify their sectoral exposure and also
have internal sectoral limits.
Most banks prove resilient to credit exposure
concentration
3.42  To assess concentration of exposures among the
largest borrowers, this test focused on the effect of one
or more top borrowers defaulting at the same time. The
Table 3.2 : Credit Risk: Gross Credit Commercial Banks
Falling Below Regulatory Capital Requirements under
Stress Conditions: September 2011
Impacted Banks Impacted Banks
(CRAR < 9 per cent) (Core CRAR < 6 per cent)
 Number of Share in Total Number of Share in Total
Banks Assets(%)  Banks Assets (%)
Baseline: 0 0.00 0 0.00
Shock 1: 1 0.10 3 19.70
Shock 2: 3 16.10 10 31.60
Shock 3: 12 27.50 20 46.20
Shock 4: 1 0.10 2 3.80
 Source: Supervisory Data and RBI Staff Calculations
12 Enhanced Provisioning norms assumed: standard assets 1 per cent, sub-standard assets 30 per cent, doubtful and loss assets 100 per cent
Chart 3.33: Credit Risk: Gross Credit - Impact on Capital and
NPAs of Commercial Banks under Various Stress Scenarios:
September 2011
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI Staff Calculations
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Table 3.3 : Credit Risk: Sectoral – September 2011
System Level
 CRAR Core NPA
CRAR Ratio
Baseline: 13.27 9.39 2.85
Shock: Additional 5 percentage point increase in NPA ratio in each sector
Combined Sector (Power +
Telecommunication + 12.92 9.02 4.90
Agriculture + Real Estate)
Priority Sector 13.20 9.31 4.59
 Source: Supervisory Data and RBI Staff Calculations
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tests consider a default of the top one, top two and top
three single borrowers (shocks 1 to 3); and also a default
of the largest group borrower (shock 4). The
concentration of advances at the system level appears
somewhat conservative, while it could be quite high in
an individual bank. The average group exposure at the
system level is only 6.5 percent of total advances, while
the highest group exposure for an individual bank is
19.1 percent of total advances (Chart 3.34 and Table 3.4).
The results reconfirm that the bank portfolios are well
diversified, given the regulatory/prudential cap on
single/ group exposures.
Interest rate risk in the banking book: risks appear
manageable
3.43 A range of tests were carried out to examine direct
interest rate risk, which reflects re-pricing mismatches
of interest bearing assets and liabilities. The examined
shocks include various shifts in interest rates, resulting
in shifts in the yield curve. The shocks assumed
(1) parallel upward shift in INR yield curve by 250 bps,
(2) parallel downward shift by 250 bps, (3) Steepening
of the INR yield curve : 0 to 100 bps linearly and
(4) Inversion of the INR yield curve : 250 to -100 bps
linearly. These tests were conducted for the banking
and trading books separately.
3.44 The total (net) impact on the banking book was
calculated by adding income losses/gains and portfolio
losses/gains13, and the resultant losses/gains were used
to derive the impacted CRAR. The valuation impact for
the tests was calculated under the assumption that the
HTM portfolio would be marked-to-market. The income
impact on the CRAR is assumed for one-year only, to
reflect the impact on the current year profit and loss
and income statement. The results suggest that the
largest impact came from the 250 bps upward parallel
shift of the INR yield curve (Table 3.5). Most of the banks,
except a few small banks, however, were able to
withstand the shocks due to the offsetting effect across
the different maturity buckets, which contained the
overall loss.
Interest rate risk in the trading book: banks could
withstand the shock relatively easily
3.45 The results suggest that the impact of direct
interest rate risk on the trading book would be small,
Chart 3.34: Credit Concentration Risk - Impact on Capital and
NPAs of Commercial Banks under Various Stress Scenarios:
September 2011
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI Staff Calculation
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Table 3.5 : Interest Rate Risk - Banking Book
System Level Impacted Banks Impacted Banks
(CRAR < 9 (Core CRAR <
per cent) 6 per cent)
 CRAR Core Number Share Number Share
CRAR of Banks in Total of in Total
Assets Banks Assets
(%) (%)
Baseline: 13.27 9.39 0 0.00 0 0.00
Net Impact on Banking Book (Earnings + Portfolio)
Shock 1 12.97 9.09 1 0.15 4 6.46
Shock 2 13.25 9.38 0 0.00 0 0.00
Shock 3 13.26 9.38 0 0.00 0 0.00
Shock 4 12.95 9.06 1 0.15 2 2.83
Income Impact on Banking Book (Earnings)    
Shock 1 13.27 9.39 0 0.00 0 0.00
Shock 2 13.25 9.38 0 0.00 0 0.00
Shock 3 13.27 9.39 0 0.00 0 0.00
Shock 4 13.26 9.38 0 0.00 0 0.00
Valuation Impact on Banking Book (Duration Gap Analysis)
Shock 1 12.85 8.97 1 0.15 4 6.46
Shock 2 13.27 9.38 0 0.00 0 0.00
Shock 3 13.26 9.38 0 0.00 0 0.00
Shock 4 13.01 9.13 1 0.15 3 4.42
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI Staff Calculations.
Table 3.4 : Credit Concentration Risk - Commercial Banks
Falling Below Regulatory Capital Requirements under
Stress Conditions: September 2011
Impacted Banks Impacted Banks
(CRAR < 9 per cent) (Core CRAR < 6 per cent)
 Number of Share in Total Number of Share in Total
Banks Assets (%)  Banks Assets (%)
Baseline: 0 0.00  0 0.00
Shock 1 1 0.01 0 0.00
Shock 2 1 0.01 3 19.70
Shock 3 1 0.01 4 20.90
Shock 4 1 0.01 3 19.70
 Source: Supervisory Data and RBI Staff Calculations.
13 Total (Net) losses/gain = Income (losses/ gain) + Portfolio (losses/ gain)
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demonstrating that the banks manage their interest rate
risk rather well (Table 3.6). This reflects the point that
the banks have well diversified bucket composition.
Impact of exchange rate movements on the banking
system would be extremely limited
3.46 Foreign exchange (FX) risk derives from exchange
rate changes that negatively affect the local currency
value of financial institutions’ assets, liabilities, and off-
balance sheet positions. The tests examined
banks’ exchange rate risk exposures, covering all
exchange-rate sensitive positions. Separate shock
scenarios assumed appreciation and depreciation of INR
by 10 and 15 per cent against all major currencies. The
potential impact of the shocks were evaluated against
banks’ individual net open bilateral currency positions.
The stress testing exercise estimated the impact of
shocks on banks’ individual foreign currency net
positions, and then expressed potential losses against
the CRAR.
3.47 The results of the stress tests show that under
stress scenarios, the CRAR for the overall system would
change slightly, though it would still exceed the
minimum requirement of 9 per cent. This virtually
negligible direct impact reflects a number of factors,
including (i) very low FX exposure and (ii) closely
monitored net open positions.
Impact of the equity price index drop is extremely
limited for the overall system
3.48 Under the equity price risk, impact of a shock of
a fall in the equity price index, by 40 per cent, on NPA
level and bank capital were examined. The system-wide
CRAR would decline by only 0.07 percentage point from
the baseline, while the average CRAR for the banks
remain well above 9 per cent. This is because the banks
typically have low proportion of capital market
exposures on their balance sheets, considering the
regulatory limit  prescribed on banks’ exposures to
capital markets.
SLR investments have a major effect on mitigating
liquidity risk
3.49 The sensitivity analysis covered liquidity risk-an
important source of risk highlighted in many financial
systems during the recent global financial crisis. The
analysis assumed that liquid assets are sold with a 10
per cent haircut in the open market, which corresponds
Table 3.6 : Interest Rate Risk - Trading Book
(Modified Duration Approach)
System Level Impacted Banks Impacted Banks
(CRAR < 9 (Core CRAR <
per cent) 6 per cent)
 CRAR Core Number Share Number Share
CRAR of Banks in Total of in Total
Assets Banks Assets
(%) (%)
Baseline: 13.27 9.39 0 0.00 0 0.00
Shock 1 11.91 8.02 7 5.25 7 5.25
Shock 2 13.11 9.23 3 2.08 1 0.17
Shock 3 12.86 8.98 5 2.80 5 2.80
Shock 4 12.03 8.14 7 5.25 7 5.25
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI Staff Calculations.
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to empirical observations over recent years. The stress
tests assume two scenarios: first scenario assumed that
the SLR securities would be available for use by lowering
the SLR requirements during a systemic deposit
withdrawal, while the second scenario assumed that
only excess SLR securities are liquid.
3.50 The maintenance of SLR securities is a special
feature in India. In order to capture its impact, the
liquidity risk analysis has been done with two
definitions of liquid assets. As per the first definition,
the liquid assets comprise of cash, excess CRR, all inter-
bank deposits and all SLR investments; which works
out to a liquid asset ratio of 24.7 per cent under the
baseline scenario. Whereas under the second definition
for liquid assets, cash, excess CRR, inter-bank-deposits-
maturing-within-1-month and investments-maturing-
within-1-month is considered; and the liquid asset ratio
is derived as 7.7 per cent under the baseline scenario.
The scenarios are constructed to test the ability of banks
to meet deposit runs using only their stock of liquid
assets under stress conditions, resulting in a widening
of the liquidity gaps and low liquidity ratios. Under the
stress scenarios, there were indications of deterioration
in the liquidity position (Table 3.7 and Chart 3.35). It is
reflected from the analysis that in severe stress scenario
the SLR investments would help banks to withstand the
liquidity pressure quite easily.
Urban Co-operative Banks (UCBs)
... exhibit resilience even on increase in NPA ratio by
50 per cent
3.51 Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on
Scheduled UCBs (SUCBs), one of the important segments
in UCB sector, using their asset portfolio as at end-June
2011. The results are based on single factor sensitivity
analysis. Impact of shocks on CRAR was tested under
three different scenarios, which assume (i) an increase
in NPA ratio by 50 per cent, (ii) an increase in NPA ratio
by 100 per cent and (iii) no profit earned by banks. It is
observed that SUCBs could withstand shocks assumed
under scenarios I and III easily. However, the sector
would come under some stress under scenario II
(Chart 3.36).
Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)
… able to withstand even five fold increase in gross
NPAs
3.52 A stress test on credit risk for NBFC-ND-SIs was
Table 3.7 : Impact on Liquidity position of banks under Stressed
Scenarios Liquid Assets Definition-1 : September 2011
Liquid Assets
Ratio ( per cent)
Baseline: 24.69
Shock 1: 10 per cent total deposit withdrawal in 30 days 17.05
Shock 2: 3 per cent deposit withdrawal each day for 5 days 13.92
Liquid Assets Definition-1 : Cash, Excess CRR, Inter-bank-deposits, SLR-Investments
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI Staff Calculations.
Liquid Assets Def-2 : Cash, Excess CRR, Inter-bank-1mon,Inv-1mon
Shock 1: 10 per cent total deposit withdrawal in 30 days
Shock 2: 3 per cent deposit withdrawal each day for 5 days
Chart 3.35: Liquidity Position of Banks under Stressed Scenarios
Banks Facing Deficits - Liquid Assets Definition-2 : September 2011
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI Staff Calculations
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Chart 3.36: Stress Testing SUCBs:
Impact of Shocks on Capital Position June 2011
Source: Supervisory Data and RBI Staff Calculations
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carried out based on end-March 2011 data under two
scenarios: (i) a two fold increase in gross NPA; and (ii) a
five fold increase in gross NPA. The assumed increase
in NPAs was distributed across sub-standard, doubtful
and loss categories in the same proportion as prevailing
in the existing stock of NPAs. The additional
provisioning requirement was adjusted from the current
capital position.
3.53 The results of the sensitivity analysis suggest that
the NBFC sector could withstand quite severe credit risk
shocks. Under both the scenarios, it was observed that
there was a shortfall in provisioning. However, the
overall impact on the CRAR was negligible, as the sector
had a high CRAR of 35.1 per cent, as against the
regulatory requirement of 15 per cent.
Concluding Remarks
3.54 The turmoil in Euro zone has fanned fears of
deleveraging by the European banks. Though Indian
banks are not expected to have any direct impact on
account of their negligible exposure to the troubled zone,
indirect impact on account of funding pressures could
be seen.
3.55 The Banking Stability Map and Indicator revealed
rise in vulnerabilities in the banking sector and a risk
to stability on account of dimensional increase in
soundness, profitability and asset quality risks.
3.56 Credit growth had decelerated from the robust
growth of 22.6 per cent as at end March 2011 to 19.2
per cent as at end September 2011. This credit growth
was attained against nominal GDP growth of 16 per cent.
CRAR, though well above the regulatory minimum,
continued its decline and fell from 14.5 per cent as at
end March 2010 to 13.5 per cent as at end September
2011. Whilst India’s current gross NPA ratio at 2.8 per
cent was broadly in line with the peer countries’ average,
the growth rate of NPAs at 30.5 per cent and slippages
at 92.8 per cent as at end September 2011, had outpaced
credit growth of 19.2 per cent by a wide margin. Priority
sector, real estate, infrastructure and retail sectors
contributed significantly to the increase in NPAs. Banks’
profitability has come under pressure as rising interest
rates resulted in growth rate of interest expenses
outpacing that of interest income, and consequent
deceleration in NII and EBPT.
3.57 Power and telecom sectors together accounted for
77 per cent of infrastructure credit and saw a rise in
impairments and restructuring. With power sector
advances being concentrated in generation and SEBs,
the risk was prominent due to financial ill-health of most
SEBs and coal supply/delays plaguing most power
projects.
3.58 With further slow-down in credit cycle expected
on the back of higher interest rate environment and a
slowing economy, deteriorating asset quality will emerge
as a challenge for the banking sector. The bottom-line
of the banks is expected to be affected adversely on
account of pressure on margins due to sustained high
deposit rates and higher provisions due to deterioration
in credit quality of assets.
3.59 The urban co-operative banking sector faced
significant pressure on asset quality, akin to the
scheduled commercial banks. The rural co-operative
sector revealed the prominence of short-term
structure in credit disbursement. The bank-NBFC
interconnectedness has been observed to be strong as
NBFCs relied significantly on bank borrowings for their
resources.
3.60 Pension funds can ensure market stability, by
acting as a countervailing power in the face of large scale
sell-off and can also play an important role in bringing
in the best practices of corporate governance in
companies where they invest in. Given the framework
of NPS where investors have a choice of liquidation, any
sudden spike in redemption pressure, can cause
disorderly movements in securities markets. The Indian
insurance sector is well capitalised with the solvency
ratio  being well above the regulatory minimum
prescribed. However, the interconnectedness with the
banking system remains a matter of concern and calls
for further monitoring.
3.61 The stress testing exercises provided important
insights into the resilience of the banking system.
The single-factor sensitivity calculations suggest that the
system would be able to withstand a range of risk specific
and sector specific shocks occurring in isolation,
and the impact of interest rate risk, foreign exchange
risk and equity price risk would not be significant. The
liquidity stress test results indicated that the SLR
investments enabled the banks to withstand quite
severe deposit runs. The credit risk stress tests on
scheduled UCBs and NBFC-ND-SIs revealed that the
impact on CRAR under different scenarios would not
be shocking.
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Chapter IV
Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure
 Indian banks will migrate to Basel III from a position of strength relative to their counterparts
globally. Nonetheless, the new standards may require banks to raise additional capital which may
result in their adjusting the lending spreads that will in turn impact GDP. Banks in India may
struggle to meet the new liquidity standards, if their SLR investments are not counted for calculating
liquidity ratios. Some calibration may hence be required. The progress in respect of migration to the
advanced approaches under Basel II has not been very encouraging so far. No Indian bank is likely to
emerge as a global SIFI, but a keen eye will need to be kept on international policy developments as
the SIFI monitoring mechanism is adapted for domestic SIFIs. The FSDC and its Sub Committee
are working towards narrowing the regulatory gaps that have been in existence in the financial
system. The resolution regime in the country will need to be fortified to deal with bank failures in an
orderly manner. The payment and settlement systems remained robust but trends in intraday liquidity
may need to be monitored. Global developments in the OTC derivatives markets call for data aggregation
and the establishment of legal entity identifier to monitor the markets. Different access configurations
for access to CCPs are emerging. In India, access is largely direct, though concentration risks are
posed by designated settlement banks. ‘Wrong-way risks’ in OTC derivatives will need to be carefully
managed and CCIL’s stress testing updated to take cognisance of systemic risks and interdependencies
in payment systems.
Regulatory Infrastructure
4.1 Weak regulatory arrangements and ineffective
oversight have been blamed to be one of the factors
leading to excessive build up of risks in the financial
system that ultimately caused the global financial crisis.
The Reserve Bank’s first Systemic Risk Survey also
features ‘regulatory risks’ as one of the important risks
facing the financial system (Chapter V). Post crisis,
international policy makers unveiled an array of reform
measures to address the lessons of the crisis. These have
been discussed in some detail in the previous issues of
this Report.
The transition of banks in India to Basel III will be
from a position of relative strength…
4.2 With the reforms to the global bank capital and
liquidity standards being finalised, the focus has shifted
to the smooth implementation of these reform
measures. As discussed in previous FSRs, scheduled
commercial banks in India will be able to move into
Basel III from a position of relative strength. Commercial
banks in India migrated to Basel II with effect from
March 31, 2009 and the preparations for migration to
the advanced approaches are underway. The liquidity
position of Indian banks is comfortable and their
leverage ratio is well above the minimum stipulated
under Basel III. The exposures of Indian banks to
complex off balance sheet positions are not very
significant and there are in-built regulatory safeguards
for securitisation exposures. Also, the banks start with
strong capital bases (Tier 1 capital of Indian banks
currently stands at over 9 per cent). There may not, thus,
be a need for substantial structural adjustments in the
Indian banking system though additional capital may
be required.
…but banks will need additional capital
4.3 Preliminary estimates show that significant
amounts of additional capital will be required by banks
as Basel III is implemented, though a precise calculation
of the additional requirements is yet to be attempted.
Further, banks will also be required to adjust the
unamortised portion of their pension and gratuity
liabilities in the opening balance sheet on April 01, 2013
on migration to International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS). Also, capital requirements are likely
to be stretched given the inter linkages between bank
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credit and GDP growth, the demands of financial
inclusion and increase in loan requirements from the
more credit intensive sectors such as infrastructure.
4.4 The actual quantum of the additional capital
requirements of domestic banks on account of
implementation of Basel III will depend upon the level
of minimum capital requirements and the time period
for full implementation of Basel III prescribed by the
Reserve Bank – options on which are still under
consideration (as discussed in paragraph 4.12 and 4.13
of this Chapter). However, factors like the current levels
of equity capital available with banks; growth projections
of GDP; earning capacity of banks in the medium-term;
impact of various regulatory adjustments/deductions
prescribed under Basel III; and impact of additional
capital charges in the trading book for market risk and
counterparty credit risk will definitely have a bearing.
Higher capital requirements could increase the cost
of capital for banks and their lending spreads…
4.5 In any case, the higher capital requirements may
increase the cost of funds for banks, increasing their
lending spreads with downstream impact on the
economy. The cost of funds of Indian banks, to the
extent that domestic banks rely on foreign funding, may
also get impacted due to rising spreads in international
markets as a result of implementation of the Basel III
guidelines in the advanced countries.
… with some impact on growth
4.6 The primary concern expressed at the
international level with Basel III has been with relation
to the potential impact of the reforms on the cost and
availability of financial services. The extended
implementation time frame provided by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) serves to
mitigate the risk of resultant constraints on supply of
credit.
4.7 Quantitative studies1 assessing the impact of
higher capital requirements on the lending spreads of
banks in India suggest that an increase of 100 basis
points in the capital adequacy ratio2 would increase
lending spreads of the banking industry, on an average
by about 10 basis points. Plugging in these estimates
into different internally developed macro models
suggests only a marginal reduction in the growth rate
of GDP. However, if banks were to raise additional capital
(either due to the implementation of Basel III or for
supporting higher credit growth), the impact on lending
spreads would be commensurately higher as would be
the downstream impact on the growth rate. The impact
on GDP due to the implementation of Basel III can,
however, be expected to be balanced by the long term
output gain arising from the reduced probability of crisis
occurrence. Emerging market economies like India will
also gain from the indirect effects of the reduced
probability of default of financial institutions in the
advanced economies.
The impact on lending spreads will depend on the
starting level of capital
4.8 The increase in lending spreads differs across
different banks with the impact assessed to be the
highest for the public sector banks (Chart 4.1). Again,
the actual increase in lending spreads and impact on
GDP consequent to the implementation of Basel III will
depend on the starting levels of capital adequacy of
banks, which are also significantly different across
banks.
Meeting liquidity requirements under Basel III may
place Indian banks at a competitive disadvantage…
4.9 Meeting the Basel III liquidity requirements will,
however, be considerably more challenging even though
Indian banks follow a retail business model and do not
rely much on short term/overnight wholesale funding.
If the securities held in lieu of the extant Statutory
1 The analysis is based on the methodology used in “Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 844, Patrick
Slovik and Boris Cournede. The basic premise of the analysis is that a bank’s total earnings in the form of interest and non interest income equals its
total interest and non interest expenses and cost of capital. The cost of capital is generally more than the cost of deposits and other outside liabilities.
Assuming other things remaining constant, an increase in capital will subsequently increase the cost for a bank, and this can be offset only by adjusting
the lending rates, since the price of all other assets are essentially market determined. For the purpose of the analysis, 54 banks have been taken
representing more than 95 per cent of total banking sector assets.
2 The above analysis has been carried out on the assumption of additional 100 basis points of effective increase in capital adequacy due to Basel III given
the current Tier 1 capital ratio of banks in India and the fact that the bulk of this capital comprises core equity. The actual requirement of capital is yet
to be estimated and will depend on the time frame for implementation adopted and will differ from bank to bank.
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Liquidity Requirements (SLR) are not permitted to be
reckoned for the purpose of calculation of the liquidity
ratios, a number of Indian banks may not meet the
requirement of 100 per cent Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(LCR). Asking them to maintain higher level of liquid
assets may place Indian banks at a competitive
disadvantage and a final view will need to be taken as
to what extent of SLR securities can be reckoned towards
the Basel III requirements for holding liquid assets.
…even as savings bank rate deregulation and increased
interest on small savings schemes may constrain
raising higher retail deposits
4.10 Regardless of the treatment of SLR securities, the
Basel III requirements apply run-off rates on wholesale
funding that are significantly higher than that for retail
deposits reflecting the assumption of higher sensitivity
of wholesale funding to changes in interest rates and
perceived credit risk. This may incentivise banks to
source more stable retail deposit funding. However,
recent developments viz., deregulation of the savings
bank interest rate (which may well increase the
sensitivity of retail deposits to interest rates) and
increase in interest rate on postal and other public
deposits may constrain the ability of the Indian banking
sector as a whole to mobilise greater amounts of retail
deposits. Liquidity positions can also be shored up
through other funding sources, such as issuance of long-
term senior debt for banking institutions, but this is
likely to be more costly than retail deposits.
Data requirements for liquidity stress scenarios also
pose their own challenges…
4.11 The other major challenge for Indian banks in
implementing the liquidity standards is to develop the
capability to collect the relevant data accurately and
granularly, and to formulate and predict liquidity stress
scenarios with reasonable accuracy and consistent with
their own situation, as discussed in the previous FSR.
Since Indian financial markets have not experienced the
levels of stress akin to advanced economies, predicting
the appropriate stress scenario is going to be a complex
judgment call, though the stress levels assumed in the
liquidity coverage ratio may act as the base level scenario.
The Basel III guidelines will be issued shortly…
4.12 Work relating to implementation of Basel III
prescriptions in the country, including the liquidity
prescriptions, is underway and the Reserve Bank will
shortly issue the relevant guidelines, along with the
proposed sequencing and timelines of implementation,
for public consultation. The Basel Committee has
outlined an extended time frame until 2018 for the
implementation of the new requirements to provide
continued support for the global economic recovery
process.
… necessitating decisions on the timing and manner
of implementation
4.13 A key question in this regard relates to the speed
of implementation of the Basel III prescriptions, i.e.
Source: RBI Staff calculations
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whether or not an accelerated implementation will be
favoured in India and whether some of the current more
stringent capital requirements will be retained (at
present, Indian banks have to maintain a capital to risk
weighted asset ratio of 9 per cent against the Basel
Committee prescription of 8 per cent). A number of
countries (e.g. UK and Switzerland) have announced
accelerated/more stringent implementation of Basel III
guidelines. Regulators in some other countries (viz.,
Sweden) have also announced similar intentions. In the
Indian context, a final decision on these issues will be
based on the need to ensure that the standards are
implemented at a speed and manner that does not
disproportionately disrupt the financial system or the
broader economy.
Advanced approaches under Basel II: Migration of large
banks is desirable...
4.14 The timetable for migration of banks to advanced
approaches under Basel II has been announced3. From a
stability perspective, migration of banks, especially larger
banks having sizeable assets and international presence,
is important. Migration to the advanced approaches
entails adoption of advanced risk measurement and
management systems which are integrated into the
banks’ business processes and can be expected to help
achieve closer alignment of regulatory capital
requirement with the risk profile of individual banks,
thereby adding to the resilience of the financial
institutions. Further, non-adoption of advanced
approaches could also have reputational connotations
for the larger banks.
…notwithstanding some issues and difficulties
4.15 As the schedule for the implementation draws
closer, the response from banks has not been very
enthusiastic. The reasons for this are not very difficult
to ascertain. First, the advanced approaches are far more
complex than the standardised approaches (Chart 4.2).
This poses relatively more binding hurdles for Indian
banks vis-a-vis their counterparts in advanced economies
as Indian banks are new to the concepts of quantitative
techniques which form the basis of the Basel II advanced
approaches. Therefore, they will need to put greater
effort to develop comfort in applying the new
quantitative techniques for capital adequacy under Basel
II. This will require adequately trained staff and banks
may have to take major steps to ensure skill building
within their organisations.
Forward looking provision may need to be adopted in
India
4.16 After the financial crisis, pro-cyclicality of capital
and provisioning requirements have attracted
considerable attention. Consequently, efforts at
international level are being made to introduce counter-
cyclical capital and provisioning buffers. In India, an
Investment Fluctuation Reserve (IFR) was introduced
to enable banks to manage the impact of volatility in
interest rates well before the financial crisis. A few
countries such as Spain introduced dynamic
provisioning rules (Box 4.1). Essentially, these
approaches ensure build-up of provisions in good times
which can be drawn down in bad times to enable banks
to continue to lend despite low profitability. Looking
ahead, forward looking provisioning for credit risk may
have to be adopted in India also.
A set of proposed policy reforms for SIFIs has been
put in place…
4.17 International policy initiatives in recent period
have focused on developing a policy framework for
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs),
3 The timetable has been set out in Box 6.1 of the Financial Stability Report, March 2010
(http://rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?UrlPage=&ID=586#CH6)
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especially globally Systemically Important Bank
(G-SIBs) (Box 4.2).
...including international standards for orderly
resolution
4.18 Key amongst the policy measures aimed at
addressing the risks posed by SIFIs is that of the
consistent reform of national resolution regimes to
ensure that any financial institution can be resolved
without significant disturbance to the financial system
and without burdening the fiscal. To this end, the FSB
has designed a set of international standards in the form
of Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes which
are aimed at addressing gaps in legal frameworks and
tools for effective intervention in failing systemic firms,
including those that operate in multiple jurisdictions,
and to remove impediments under existing national
laws to cross-border resolution.
Implementation requires legislative changes and cross
border co-operation
4.19 The achievement of the stated objectives of
smooth resolution of a SIFI will, however, require
legislative changes in many jurisdictions. Different
jurisdictions will also need to co-operate on a much
larger scale than at present to prepare feasible and
credible G-SIFI resolution plans. They will also need to
strengthen their supervisors’ resources and mandates
so that the supervisors have sufficient independence
to act and a full suite of powers to proactively identify
and address risks.
A framework for monitoring FCs is in place
4.20 In the Indian context, there is a well established
framework in place for the monitoring of Financial
Conglomerates (FCs). Previous FSRs (December 2010 and
June 2011 issues) discussed the framework as well as
recent attempts to strengthen it. The Sub Committee of
the Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC),
whose mandate includes monitoring of FCs, is also
debating steps to further fine tune the supervisory
processes in place for these large financial institutions.
Extant provisions for bank resolution may not comply
with the ‘Key Attributes’
4.21 The legal basis for resolution of domestic banks
rests in Part III and Part IIIA of the Banking Regulation
(BR) Act, 1949 which provide for the suspension of
business and winding up of a banking company as also
special provisions for speedy disposal of winding up
Box 4.1: Dynamic Provisioning
 Under historic cost accounting, provisions are made for losses
recognised at the balance sheet date. However, experience shows
that some advances which are in fact impaired at the balance
sheet date, are recognised as non performing only sometime in
the future for certain technical reasons. To cover the impaired
advances which will only be identified as such in the future, a
general provision should be made. One alternative approach to
the current method of measuring bank loan losses and income
is ‘dynamic provisioning’. The rationale for dynamic
provisioning is related to the statistical probability of losses
attached to any credit portfolio, and is therefore incurred at the
time the loan is granted although it may (or may not) materialise
later. The fundamental principle underpinning dynamic
provisioning is that provisions are set against loans outstanding
in each accounting time period in line with an estimate of long-
run, expected loss. Generally, the level of provisioning on this
basis would be less subject to sharp swings stemming from the
strength of economic activity than the current approach. Loan
losses would impinge on banks’ profit and loss accounts and
balance sheets more smoothly than at present, because of the
primacy of expected, rather than actual, losses in a dynamic
provisioning approach.
The Spanish dynamic provisioning method, also referred to as
the statistical provisioning, involves two types of provisions –
general and specific. The general provision has two parameters,
α and β. The dynamic provisioning model takes the form of ;
Change in General Provision
t  
=
 
α* ∆ C
t 
+ β*C
t 
– ∆ Specific
Provision,
Where Ct is stock of loans,  α covers the latent or inherent loss
in each unit over the cycle and β is the average specific
provisioning rate over a long estimated period. Both the
parameters are based on historical data on credit impairment.
During periods of strong credit growth and low levels of specific
provisions, the beta component is positive because it recognises
the increase in incurred losses, and during recessions those
losses quickly translate into specific losses and so the beta
component becomes negative. Though backward looking in
nature, dynamic provisioning is a transparent rule based
approach that can work as a countercyclical tool.
References:
(a) Dynamic Provisioning  - The experience of Spain, Jesus
Saurina
(b) Turner Review – A regulatory response to the global banking
crisis, FSA
(c) Dynamic Provisioning – issues and application, Fiona Mann
and Ian Michael
(d) The Spanish Approach – Dynamic Provisioning and other
tools, Santiago Fernandez de Lis and Alicia Garcia Herrero
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proceedings. The provisions may not, however, meet
all the requirements of the aforesaid Key Attributes.
4.22 Also relevant in this connection is the role of the
Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation
(DICGC), which functions only as a ‘pay box’ system
with a limited mandate to pay the claims of depositors
and does not have a mandate for bank resolution.
4.23 The Financial Sector Legislative Reforms
Commission (FSLRC) may need to address these
issues as it reviews the entire set of financial sector
legislations.
No Indian bank is a G-SIB… but international policy
initiatives need to be watched
4.24 An Indian bank is unlikely to be classified as a G-
SIB in the near term. But the domestic policy makers
will need to be alive to international policy changes as
attention is focused on developing a policy framework
for domestic SIBs as well as for non-bank financial
Box 4.2: The Set of Proposed Policy Reforms for G-SIBs
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee
have finalised a set of proposals for managing crises at SIFIs
and reducing their impact4. The policy measures include:
• A new international standard as a point of reference
for reforms of national resolution regimes, to
strengthen authorities’ powers to resolve failing
financial firms in an orderly manner and without
exposing the taxpayer to the risk of loss;
• Requirements for resolvability assessments, recovery
and resolution plans and institution-specific cross-
border co-operation agreements for G-SIFIs;
• Requirements for additional loss absorption capacity
above the Basel III minimum for G-SIBs; and
• More intensive and effective supervision through
stronger supervisory mandates and higher supervisory
expectations for risk management functions, risk data
aggregation capabilities, risk governance and internal
controls.
The Basel Committee has proposed a methodology for
identifying G-SIBs and prudential safeguards designed to
decrease the probability of distress and failure by increasing
their loss-absorbing capacity. The indicators selected reflect the
size of banks, their interconnectedness, their degree of
substitutability (i.e. the presence or lack of readily available
substitutes for the services they provide), their global (cross-
jurisdictional) activity and their complexity. The methodology
was applied initially to a set of 73 banks and an initial group of
29 has been identified as global systemically important (the list
has since been published by the FSB). Going forward, the list of
G-SIFIs will be updated each year in November.
The G-SIBs identified by these parameters will then be divided
into four categories (‘buckets’) in increasing order of systemic
importance and subjected to capital surcharges ranging from 1
per cent for the first category to 2.5 per cent for the fourth. A
fifth ‘bucket’, currently empty, is also envisaged with a surcharge
of 3.5 per cent, to provide an incentive for banks to avoid
becoming more systemically important. The judgement of the
supervisory authorities plays a role in the banks’ classification,
but only in exceptional cases can such judgement override the
indicator-based measurement approach.
The additional loss absorbency requirement must be met out
of common equity tier 1 capital only. However, contingent capital
instruments can be used to meet any national loss absorbency
requirements set above the global level at the national
supervisors’ discretion.
The new rules on the surcharge will come into effect in January
2019 following a transition period beginning in 2016. These
will be applicable to those banks identified in November 2014
as G-SIFIs. The resolution-related requirements will, however,
be applicable to the initial set of 29 banks and will need to be
met by end-2012.
entities, e.g. systemically important insurance
companies.
Convergence with IFRS, not adoption, the preferred
route in India
4.25 As the date for the migration of scheduled
commercial banks to the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) (i.e. April 01, 2013)
approaches, the banks face several issues and challenges
in implementation. In particular, certain conceptual
differences as well as a different prevailing
business environment have resulted in India choosing
the convergence route rather than the adoption
route.
IFRS 9 a moving target even as conceptual differences
between IASB and FASB continue
4.26 The proposal by International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) to replace IAS 39, the accounting
standards pertaining to financial instruments, with a
4 The proposals are contained in a series of consultation papers released on November 4, 2011 (http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/
pr_111104cc.pdf)
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new standard IFRS 9, is of critical importance to the
financial sector. The replacement project of IAS 39 is
still underway, with the impairment provisions and
hedge accounting requirements of IFRS 9 yet to be
finalised. This has made the convergence process akin
to chasing a fast moving target. Besides, at the
international level, the two main standard setting
bodies, the IASB which frames the IFRS and the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) of the USA have not
been able to make significant progress on a common
approach to the standard on financial instruments. In
India, there are differences between the IFRS and current
regulatory guidelines on classification and measurement
of financial assets. IFRS focusses on the business model
followed by banks as compared to the relatively rule-
based approach being currently adopted. This poses
significant challenges to banks as it requires judgement
to be exercised by management, based on the principles
enunciated in the standard. Further, application of fair
values for transactions, where not much guidance is
available in India in terms of market practices or
benchmarks, has its own difficulties. Banks are also
required to be prepared for changes in certain areas,
such as measurement and recognition of financial
liabilities, consolidation and derecognition as also more
and detailed disclosures. The IT systems as also the MIS
of banks would need to be changed to cater to the
requirements of IFRS.
4.27 The Reserve Bank, on its part has already taken
several measures to assess the situation, promote skill
development, engage stakeholders and monitor
developments. A Working Group to Address
Implementation Issues in IFRS is attempting to facilitate
a smooth transition to an IFRS converged environment.
The FSDC Sub-Committee has emerged as the primary
operating arm of the FSDC
4.28 After about a year of its constitution, the
modalities of functioning of the FSDC and its Sub
Committee have gradually taken shape. The Sub
Committee of the FSDC has emerged as the primary
operating arm of the Council while the Council provide
broad oversight.
4.29 The FSDC met thrice since its inception and
discussed the state of the economy in each of its
meetings. It underscored the importance of developing
the corporate bond market and the need to immediately
establish Infrastructure Debt Funds (IDFs) to provide a
fillip to infrastructure funding. The Sub Committee,
which is required to meet quarterly, met five times since
its first meeting in March 2011. The Sub Committee’s
deliberations spanned across the entire remit of the
Council (Chart 4.3).
4.30 The Sub Committee discussed the blueprint for
putting in place the necessary modalities for setting up
IDFs - the modalities of setting up IDFs as mutual funds
or as NBFCs have since been issued by SEBI and the
Reserve Bank, respectively while the Reserve Bank has
also issued the necessary guidelines for banks or NBFCs
sponsoring IDFs. The Sub Committee has been
deliberating on the risks to the system arising out of
the operations of the government sponsored NBFCs and
on the need to strengthen the regulatory framework for
wealth management services. It is working to strengthen
the mechanism of oversight of the FCs and to put in
place a robust crisis management system.
4.31 In order to strengthen the mechanism for inter
regulatory coordination in various areas of functioning
of the Sub Committee, two Technical Groups have been
established (Chart 4.4).
Chart 4.3: Remit of the FSDC
Financial
Stability
Financial
Sector
Development
Macro
prudential
surveillance of
the economy
Financial
literacy and
financial
inclusion
Inter-regulatory
coordination
Chart 4.4: Technical Groups of the FSDC Sub Committee
FSDC Sub Committee
Financial Stability Development Council
Technical Group on
Financial Inclusion and
Financial Literacy
Inter Regulatory
Technical Group
52
Chapter IV Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure
Macroprudential tools a sine qua non in the post crisis
policy construct
4.32 The FSR of December 2010 highlighted the
importance of macroprudential policy for the calibration
of financial policies/regulatory and supervisory
arrangements from a systemic perspective rather than
from the perspective of individual institutions.
4.33 A cross country analysis presented in an IMF
Working Paper5 evaluates the effectiveness of
macroprudential instruments in reducing systemic risk
over time and across institutions and markets. The
analysis suggests that among the most frequently used
instruments, many are effective in reducing pro-
cyclicality and that the effectiveness is sensitive to the
type of shock facing the financial sector. However, as
the paper also acknowledges, there are costs, including
that of lower growth, involved in using macroprudential
instruments and the benefits of macroprudential policy
should be weighed against these costs.
Use of macroprudential instruments in India has
achieved a reasonable degree of success
4.34 In the Indian context, macroprudential tools have
been extensively employed especially since the last
decade. A range of specific macroprudential policy tools
including provisioning and risk weights were
preemptively and proactively used both before and since
the crisis, with a reasonable degree of success (Charts
4.5 to 4.7).
Lacunae in extant regulation of wealth management
services will need to be plugged…
4.35 The previous FSR flagged the need to revisit the
extant regulatory prescriptions for wealth management
services (WMS). In this context, the Reserve Bank
conducted a survey in respect of WMS being provided
by banks. The objective was to ascertain the market
practices in this regard and identify risks and regulatory
lacunae, if any.
4.36 A study of global best practices and the results of
the Survey threw up several areas which need to be
addressed if a robust regulatory framework for WMS is
5 Macroprudential Policy: “What Instruments and How to Use Them? Lessons from Country Experiences”, C. Lim, F. Columba, A. Costa, P. Kongsamut,
A. Otani, M. Saiyid, T. Wezel, and X. Wu, October 2011.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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to be put in place, viz., mandatory professional
qualifications and periodic training and skill upgradation
for officials offering these services, code of conduct for
both the institution and officials offering the service,
well documented policies/processes for product
approval, client risk profiling and product
appropriateness and suitability, strengthening of
internal systems and controls, establishment of a robust
grievance redressal system, etc. The Sub Committee of
the FSDC and its Inter Regulatory Technical Group are
examining these issues.
…and conflict of interests in distribution of financial
products need to be resolved
4.37 A framework for WMS will need to address issues
regarding conflict of interest in the distribution of
financial products. Such conflicts arise among the
originators of financial products (e.g. banks, mutual
funds, insurance companies, etc) and the distributors
who sell these products (e.g. agents, financial advisors,
financial planners, etc.). Conflicts arise on account of
dual role played by distributors as an agent of investors
as well as of the originators. They may also arise where
distributors are marketing similar products of different
originators and are likely to be partial to, and sell more
products of the originator who is the best paymaster.
While such conflicts can exist in any market, they are
particularly critical in the case of financial products given
the fact that products are intangible and conceptually
more difficult to understand and that the pay-offs are
Chart 4.8 Segments of the Indian Financial System
Source: Various regulators
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often in the distant future. The issue assumes further
seriousness in the light of the low levels of financial
literacy and awareness in India.
Shadow banking, per se, does not exist in India…
4.38 As has been discussed in the previous FSR,
shadow banking (Box 4.3) as is understood in the west,
does not exist in India as NBFCs which are loosely
identified with shadow banking, are under Reserve
Bank’s regulatory perimeter. Apart from NBFCs, other
residual finance companies like chit funds, nidhi
companies, mutual funds and micro finance companies
could be broadly considered as part of the shadow
banking system in India (Chart 4.8).
…nonetheless, there exist certain regulatory gaps
which cannot be left unattended
4.39 NBFCs are regulated by the Reserve Bank. There
are, however, some regulatory gaps which leave scope
for regulatory arbitrage. Some of these have been
highlighted in previous FSRs and attempts are underway
to address these regulatory gaps in a manner which
harmonises the specialised character of NBFCs while at
the same time introduces appropriate prudential
regulations to address risks and bridge arbitrage
opportunities.
4.40 The Working Group on Issues and Concerns in
the NBFCs Sector has, inter alia, addressed the gamut
of these issues. The recommendations are being
examined.
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Payment and Settlement System
Performance of the payment and settlement
infrastructure remained robust
4.41 The payment and settlement system infrastructure
in the country continued to perform without any major
disruptions in the period since the publication of the
previous FSR in June 2011(Charts 4.9 and 4.10).
A series of DR drills revealed some vulnerabilities,
which are being addressed
4.42 A series of disaster recovery (DR) drills were
conducted during the period since the previous FSR.
Various drills were conducted from the DR site of the
central systems and /or the DR sites of the members.
The DR drills largely testified the resilience of the system
to operational failures though some vulnerabilities e.g.
DR sites of some members not being operational,
constraint regarding bandwidth, connectivity issues in
connecting to the central site, etc., were noticed, which
are being addressed.
Access criteria for payment systems have implications
for risks in the systems
4.43 Access criteria are critical for the management of
risks arising out of payment and settlement systems.
They are particularly important in case of high value
payment systems where ‘weak’ participants can be an
Box 4.3: Shadow Banking
The FSB defines shadow banking as credit intermediation
involving activities and entities outside the regular banking
system. Shadow banks raise funds from suppliers (e.g.
households, corporate, financial institutions) through deposit
like liabilities which are short-term in nature. These funds are
then used to create assets such as mortgages, auto loans and
other longer term assets which are essentially less liquid. Banks
also perform the same functions, the only difference being that
shadow banks use non-deposit liabilities while banks basically
use deposit liabilities. However, like deposit liabilities used by
banks, non-deposit liabilities resorted to by shadow banks are
also short term and highly liquid in nature.
Many of the shadow banks have also been found to be highly
leveraged. This maturity / liquidity transformation along with
high leverage makes them susceptible to bank-like runs. A
withdrawal of such short term deposit-like instruments from
the system may have systemic repercussions. In addition to
these considerations, the interconnections of shadow banks
with regular banks also raise systemic considerations. The
leverage built up in the shadow banks may also raise issues of
procyclicality. It is also often the case that shadow banks
although perform bank-like functions, are outside the ambit of
regulatory constraints imposed on banks. The resulting
regulatory arbitrage may also undermine banks and may lead
to build up of high amount of leverage and risk in the system.
During the pre-crisis period, many banks had parked their riskier
activities in vehicles or structures that were not consolidated
with them but when the crunch came, banks had to take on
these risks to their balance sheets. Further, unlike the banks
which enjoy the regulatory / public support guarantee in form
of lending of last resort / discount window from the Central
Banks, deposit insurance facilities, etc, shadow banks lack any
such kind of liquidity support. As such they are outside the
ambit of regulatory support system which adds to their
vulnerability and may enhance their contribution to systemic
risk in times of crisis or when some or one of them begins to
face solvency issues.
Some of the examples on the types of entities / activities which
were considered to be conforming to the definition of a shadow
bank are finance companies, asset-backed commercial paper
(ABCP) conduits, limited-purpose finance companies,
securitisation vehicles - structured investment vehicles,
securities firms (broker-dealers), investment firms, mortgage
insurance companies, other credit insurance companies, credit
hedge funds, money market mutual funds, securities lenders,
certain government-sponsored enterprises etc.
Chart 4.9: Trends in Value
M
ar
-1
0
A
p
r-
1
0
M
ay
-1
0
Ju
n
-1
0
Ju
l-
1
0
A
u
g-
1
0
Se
p
-1
0
O
ct
-1
0
N
o
v-
1
0
D
ec
-1
0
Ja
n
-1
1
Fe
b
-1
1
M
ar
-1
1
A
p
r-
1
1
M
ay
-1
1
Ju
n
-1
1
Ju
l-
1
1
A
u
g-
1
1
Se
p
-1
1
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
`
th
o
u
sa
n
d
cr
o
re
RTGS CCIL Operated Systems Retail Electronic Plus Cards
MICR Non MICR
Source: RBI
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
M
ar
-1
0
A
p
r-
1
0
M
ay
-1
0
Ju
n
-1
0
Ju
l-
1
0
A
u
g-
1
0
Se
p
-1
0
O
ct
-1
0
N
o
v-
1
0
D
ec
-1
0
Ja
n
-1
1
Fe
b
-1
1
M
ar
-1
1
A
p
r-
1
1
M
ay
-1
1
Ju
n
-1
1
Ju
l-
1
1
A
u
g-
1
1
Se
p
-1
1
in
la
k
h
RTGS CCIL Operated Systems Retail Electronic Plus Cards
MICR Non MICR
Chart 4.10: Trends in Volume
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important source of systemic risks. These criteria are
also an important factor in determining the degree of
‘tiering’ in the payment system. Internationally, access
patterns to high value payment systems vary widely
across systems, with very few direct members and
correspondingly high level of tiering at one end of the
spectrum (e.g. CHAPS in the UK) and systems with
almost zero tiering at the other end (e.g. Hong Kong
RTGS System). A highly tiered payment system ensures
that only the least risk participants become direct
members of the system. In such cases, direct participants
internalise many payments of indirect participants in
their own books (where such systems do exist, these
are termed as ‘quasi systems’). This could result in
increased risks as any credit or operational failure of a
customer or second tier bank could disrupt the
operations of the first tier or correspondent bank.
Systemic consequences could arise as a result, especially
if customers are large relative to the correspondent bank
or the aggregate system.
Access criteria has recently been revised enabling
wider direct access
4.44 In the Indian context, well defined access criteria
have been in place for all payment and settlement
systems in the country, with the criteria being relatively
more stringent for access to the electronic payment
systems, especially the large value systems. The access
criteria for all payment systems have recently been
revised to enable wider access to the system while
ensuring that risks emanating from the participants are
not aggravated. The revised access criteria for both
centralised and decentralised payment systems are
(a) Minimum CRAR of 9 per cent; (b) Net NPA ratio below
5 per cent as per the latest audited balance sheet; and
(c) Recommendation of the regulatory department
concerned. Centralised payment systems have
additional criteria of minimum net-worth of `25 crore.
The revised access criteria will, in particular, enable more
banks, especially Regional Rural Banks and Urban
Cooperative Banks, to participate in pan-India
centralised payment systems like the Real Time Gross
Settlement (RTGS), the National Electronic Funds
Transfer (NEFT) and National Electronic Clearing Service
(NECS) systems.
The network of the RTGS system is relatively stable …
4.45 An analysis of the network of the RTGS system
on different dates spanning a year (Chart 4.11 presents
representations on two separate dates) indicates a
relatively low level of network tiering in the RTGS
System particularly as compared to the network of inter
bank exposures6. The network structure effectively
demonstrates only two tiers. The banks that are in the
core are the larger participants in the system and these
core participants have remained mostly the same over
the period. As discussed in Chapter V of this Report,
the structure of the network has important implications
for financial stability with a less tiered network structure
being relatively more stable.
Source: RBI Staff calculations
Chart 4.11: Network of Banks in the RTGS System
(two separate dates)
6 Please see Chapter V of this Report for a full discussion on network tiering structures and their implications for the stability of the network.
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Postponement of settlement of transactions in RTGS
systems engender credit, operational and systemic
risks…
4.46 RTGS systems typically introduce an intraday
funding need to bridge the gap between gross receipts
and payments. Intraday liquidity management, thus,
becomes an important part of banks’ settlement
operations. As intraday credit is costly7, participants have
incentives to postpone processing payments to the latter
part of the day or even to await the settlement of others’
payments (i.e. their receipts) before processing their
payments. ‘In the extreme, banks may adopt a ‘receipt-
reactive’ strategy, only making outgoing payments using
liquidity received from incoming payments’8. Such
strategic behaviour by participants of an RTGS System
can lead to delays by one or more participants leading
to delayed settlement in the payment system as a whole.
This can increase the liquidity risk in the system and
can also magnify the impact of an operational event (e.g.
if a large number of payments are unsettled when an
7 Typically central banks around the world provide participants in the RTGS System with intraday credit against collateral though some central banks
provide it for a price. Intra day credit is therefore costly - either explicitly as fees or implicitly as the opportunity cost of collateral.
8 “Intraday liquidity: risk and regulation, Alan Ball, Edward Denbee, Mark Manning and Anne Wetherilt, Financial Stability Paper No. 11, Bank of
England, June 2011.
9 The analysis is based on daily transactions data from the RTGS System for a period of one quarter (July – September 2011) excluding Saturdays. The
analysis includes the transactions of all members of the system except institutional entities such as the Reserve Bank, DICGC and CCIL.
Source: RBI Staff calculations
Chart 4.12: Pattern of Intra-day Payments in the RTGS System (Value and Volume)
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operational event affects the system/participants),
leading to credit and systemic risks.
… indications of some such trends in the domestic
RTGS system warrant monitoring
4.47 In this context, a study9 of the pattern of intraday
payments in the RTGS system in the country (Chart 4.12)
revealed that nearly 30 per cent of average daily
payments (both by value and volume) were settled after
3:00 p.m. and nearly 50 per cent of the payments were
settled in the second half of the day. The study indicates
a certain amount of delayed settlement by the members
of the RTGS system though the pattern is, to some
extent, affected by timing of customer payments, over
which banks typically have little control. There are also
significant differences in payment behaviour across
banks (Charts 4.13 and 4.14). The trends need to be
monitored with a view to avoiding system-wide
postponement of settlement of transactions to the end
of the day.
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Exposure of equity clearing corporations to banks
needs to be monitored
4.48 Clearing corporations offering guaranteed
settlement typically maintain a Settlement Guarantee
Fund (SGF) in addition to collecting transaction based
margins from the members. Clearing Corporation of
India Limited (CCIL), which functions as the central
counterparty (CCP) for the government securities market
and foreign exchange market in India, primarily accepts
government securities as contribution to the SGF. In the
case of equity clearing corporations, however,
contribution to SGFs and margins are also accepted in
the form of bank guarantees and securities (which may
in turn be issued by banks). This exposes the clearing
corporations to the banks issuing such guarantees /
securities, both directly and indirectly. The associated
risks could assume systemic proportions in case of bank
failures. Exposure norms in this context have been
prescribed by SEBI and also internally by the National
Stock Clearing Corporation. Nonetheless, the trends in
this respect warrant monitoring.
OTC Derivatives Market
Initiatives afoot for aggregation of data will assist in
monitoring OTC derivative transactions…
4.49 Previous FSRs have reported the set of
international initiatives underway to reform the OTC
derivatives markets. A key shared priority amongst
international policy makers is to ensure, inter alia,
reporting of all OTC derivative products to a trade
repository so that the information in respect of trades
can be used to assess emerging systemic risks. In this
context, data aggregation is a key for effective
monitoring of the derivatives market.
… but will necessitate addressing issues related to
methodology and mechanism
4.50  There are difficulties in aggregating data across
different trade repositories both within the same asset
class and across different asset classes. There will be a
need for a global consensus in this regard and legislative
changes about data sharing are likely to be required.
Issues related to the protocol of sharing the data and
confidentiality arrangements will also need to be
addressed.
LEI may facilitate data aggregation…
4.51 A major challenge for data aggregation is the lack
of a unique identifier for a financial entity which acts
as a major hindrance in the aggregation of data reported
to trade repositories. In this context, the concept of a
Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) has been proposed as a
useful tool for aggregation of OTC derivatives data. An
LEI is a unique global identifier for each legal entity
operating in financial markets which can help in
identifying participants in different trading, clearing
and settlement systems and thus facilitate aggregation
of exposures and identification of linkages across
markets as well as institutions, both domestic as well
as global. The feasibility of migrating to the LEI system
in the country is being examined and the Reserve Bank
has given its concurrence to the concept of LEI to the
Bureau of Indian Standards.
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 (RHS)
Bank 5 (RHS) Bank 6 (RHS) All Members Average (RHS)
Source: RBI Staff calculations
Chart 4.13: Intraday Payment Patterns of Select Banks
(value in crore)`
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Chart 4.14: Intraday Payment Patterns of Select Banks
(Number of Transactions)
9
:2
0
9
:4
0
1
0
:0
0
1
0
:2
0
1
0
:4
0
1
1
:0
0
1
1
:2
0
1
1
:4
0
1
2
:0
0
1
2
:2
0
1
2
:4
0
1
3
:0
0
1
3
:2
0
1
3
:4
0
1
4
:0
0
1
4
:2
0
1
4
:4
0
1
5
:0
0
1
5
:2
0
1
5
:4
0
1
6
:0
0
1
6
:2
0
1
6
:4
0
1
7
:0
0
1
7
:2
0
1
7
:4
0
1
8
:0
0
Time of the day
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
0
50
100
150
200
250
58
Chapter IV Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure
an increasing number of OTC derivative transactions to
CCP arrangements will aid in addressing associated
counterparty risks. The Basel Committee has also
extended benefits of lower capital requirements to
exposures settled through CCPs.
… but the need for holistic stress tests with
stringent assumptions will remain critical
4.55 Going forward, for risks from counterparty
exposures in off-balance sheet transactions to be
managed, it would be important to take adequate
cognisance of how the financial system as a whole
operates when building up stress tests. In particular,
the need for extensive use of holistic stress tests
incorporating more extreme assumptions to assess
individual counterparties as well as systemic risks is
critical.
Derivative contracts add to the interconnectedness
of Indian banks
4.56 In the Indian context, derivative contracts add to
the interconnectedness among banks (as indicated by
the thickness of the lines between the banks in the inner
and mid core of the tiered network of off-balance sheet
exposures in Chart 4.15)13. The interconnectedness is
particularly marked in case of the top 20 banks (in the
Counterparty credit risks in OTC derivatives:
lessons from the crisis, regulatory reforms and
remaining concerns…
4.52 Financial derivatives play an important role in
transferring risks from one counterparty to another.
Even while it performs as intended, an OTC derivatives
contract exposes its holders to the risk of loss in two
ways: through the performance of the underlying asset
and through the potential default of the counterparty.
Counterparty credit risk is thus a major consideration
for participants in the OTC derivatives market.
Counterparty credit risks in derivative contracts may
have systemic implications…
4.53 The crisis demonstrated that the increased
use of derivative contracts increases the
interconnectedness between banks, which could result
in the build-up of systemic risks. The problem of inter-
connectedness is further exacerbated by the lack of
transparency in inter-bank transactions and due to
weaknesses in the banks’ risk management framework
for counterparty credit exposures, particularly in the
areas of back-testing, stress testing and monitoring of
‘wrong-way risks’10. Consequently, during episodes of
systemic stress, a contract which is perceived as one
providing insurance has a significant conditional
probability that the insurance provider is not able to
pay out11.
… which the post crisis regulatory reforms are
attempting to address
4.54 Prior to the crisis, the extant regulatory structure
did not take sufficient cognisance of the aforesaid
systemic risks. In particular, while the Basel II standard
covered the risk of a counterparty default, it did not
address ‘CVA risk’12. Post crisis, the Basel Committee has
introduced measures to strengthen the capital
requirements for counterparty credit exposures arising
from banks’ derivatives, repo and securities financing
activities. Also, initiatives to migrate the settlement of
10 Wrong-way risk occurs when exposure to a counterparty is adversely correlated with the credit quality of that counterparty. The wrong-way risk arises
in a generalised form when the credit quality of the counterparty may for non-specific reasons, be held to be correlated with other macroeconomic
factors that may also impact the exposure of open derivatives transactions.
11 “Tail risks and contract design from a financial stability perspective”, Paul Fisher, Executive Director, Bank of England, September 2011.
12 The Credit Value Adjustment (CVA) is a measure of diminution in the fair value of derivative position due to deterioration in the creditworthiness of
the counterparty.
13 See Chapter V of this FSR for a detailed discussion on tiered network structures and their implications for financial stability.
14 Based on bilateral interbank derivative exposures data as on June 30, 2011. Forward contracts settled through CCIL are excluded from the analysis.
Source: RBI Staff calculations
Chart 4.15: Network Structure of Derivative Exposures Between Banks
14
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inner and mid core) raising the potential for systemic
disruptions in case of stress scenarios (Chart 4.16). This
warrants monitoring in the light of the recent trend of
increasing off-balance sheet exposures of banks (as
discussed in Chapter III of this Report). The proposed
changes relating to the counterparty credit risk
framework are likely to have capital adequacy
implications for some Indian banks having large OTC
bilateral derivatives positions.
Introduction of CCP arrangements for OTC
derivatives could mitigate these risks
4.57 This underscores the importance of enlarging the
derivatives transactions coming within the scope of a
multilateral settlement mechanism through CCPs. At
present, forward foreign exchange contracts are settled
on a guaranteed basis while interest rate derivatives are
settled centrally on a non-guaranteed basis15. Central
clearing requirements for foreign exchange options are
expected to be phased in a gradual manner while
guaranteed settlement for Credit Default Swaps can be
envisaged only once a critical amount of market activity
and liquidity have been achieved.
Alternative access configurations to CCPs present their
own macrofinancial implications
4.58 Efforts to migrate standardised OTC derivatives
to centralised clearing have led to a debate on the
manner of market participants’ access to CCPs. There
are various alternatives for such access configurations
ranging from increasing access to global CCPs through
direct or indirect membership, to setting up local CCPs
in individual jurisdictions to cater to the requirement
of domestic financial institutions. Each alternative has
associated macrofinancial implications and trade offs
between stability and efficiency.
4.59 Expanding direct access to CCPs may increase
competition and reduce the concentration risks arising
out of the dominance of a few global dealers in
derivatives settlement but will require substantial
upgradation to the risk management systems of CCPs
for dealing with a larger set of direct members. Domestic
CCPs could strengthen the ability of local authorities to
exercise oversight on derivatives trading activity in their
own jurisdictions, but a large network of domestic CCPs
Source: RBI Staff calculations
Chart 4.16: Network Structure of Derivative Exposures
Between 20 Core Banks
15 Interest Rate Swaps (IRS) will shortly be migrated to a guaranteed settlement platform. Together, forex forwards and IRS comprise the bulk of the
derivatives market in India.
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could lead to greater system-wide demand for collateral
assets and to fragmentation of trading and financial
positions. Again, as links between CCPs are established
to reap the benefits of increased multilateral netting,
distinct risks, particularly operational and legal
challenges as well as associated credit and liquidity risks,
can get created.
Domestic CCPs- the appropriate alternative in the
Indian context
4.60 CCIL has well defined access criteria which
promotes direct access to the CCP, and where not
feasible, through a system of designated settlement
banks (DSBs). There are risks associated with both direct
membership as also concentration risks arising from the
DSB mode of settlement, which will need to be
continuously monitored.
4.61 CCIL caters to domestic markets with domestic
players and the collateral accepted is also largely
domestic sovereign paper. The domestic currency is also
not fully convertible. At the current juncture, therefore,
it is felt that the domestic CCP option may best serve
the needs of the economy.
Concentration risk in DSB model evidenced…
4.62 The previous FSR recognised the risks arising out
of, inter alia, institution based inter-dependencies in
payment and settlement systems. Of particular
importance in this connection are the concentration
risks arising out of the multiple roles played by a few
select entities as liquidity backstop providers, settlement
banks and large participants in different market
segments.
4.63 Important in this context is the system of
settlement of transactions of associate members of CCIL
through DSBs (the transactions of direct members of
CCIL are settled in the Reserve Bank). The distribution
of associate members with different DSBs (Table 4.1)
points to evident concentration risks as any failure of
settlement in a DSB (for example, due to liquidity or
operational problems of the associate members) could
have market wide repercussions. The risks are
exacerbated as the DSBs themselves are large
participants (with proprietary positions) in both the
CBLO and securities segments.
Portfolio Compression offered by CCIL has evoked
positive response…
4.64 The previous FSR reported that CCIL was in the
process of developing trade compression services for
the rupee interest rate swap (IRS) derivatives market.
CCIL has since commenced portfolio compression
services. The first live run of the service comprising 14
participants achieved a compression ratio of over 94 per
cent. Some finer issues relating to the threshold for
identifying trades eligible for compression and ensuring
that uniform valuation conventions are followed by
participants (so that different MTM values are not
reported for the same transaction by the counterparties)
are being addressed.
CCIL resilient to stress and back testing exercises…
4.65 CCIL has put in place a system of both back testing
and stress testing on a periodic basis for various market
segments. Back testing results  indicate the adequacy of
CCIL’s margining process. Stress test results indicate that
the potential losses in all cases were adequately covered
by the resources available to CCIL.
… assessment of resilience in more extensive stress
scenarios may be warranted
4.66 Going forward, the adequacy and efficacy of the
stress tests would need to factor in the limitations of
using historical data to design stress scenarios along with
difficulties posed by the limited availability of historic
data. Further, the stress tests will need to assess the
impact of a more generalised failure (two or more large
players or a systemic failure) and of stress on availability
of liquidity. The risk management framework in CCIL
would also need to assess the ability of CCIL to
withstand stress in view of the interdependencies in
the payment and settlement systems (e.g. risks from
settlement failure of DSBs or of banks which are liquidity
providers to CCIL) and the prevalence of
interconnectedness in the inter-bank and the broader
financial sector.
Table 4.1: Settlement Members with RBI/DSBs
No. of No. of No. of associate members
members direct
members DSB1 DSB2 DSB3 DSB4 DSB5
G-Sec 163 131 21 6 2 2 1
CBLO 200 112 61 17 5 3 2
 Source: CCIL
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Concluding Remarks
4.67 Banks in India are well capitalised and the
regulatory requirement of 6 per cent of Tier I capital
will hold them in good stead as the system prepares for
a transition into Basel III. Nonetheless, the new
standards may require raising of additional capital that
may in the process lead to increase in banks’
lending spreads. Empirical analysis shows that the
impact of the increased lending spreads on GDP will be
moderate and outweighed by the longer run benefits of
reduced probability of failure. The treatment of
SLR investments under the new international standards
may be a tricky issue. In the event of them being not
allowed for the purpose of calculating the liquidity ratio,
banks will find it difficult to comply with the new
standards.
4.68 No Indian bank is likely to qualify as a global SIFI.
However, there is a need to reflect on international
developments as the SIFI framework is adapted to
domestic systemically important banks. Guidelines for
adopting advanced approaches under Basel II have
already been issued, yet the response of banks in this
regard has not been very enthusiastic. Going forward,
the Reserve Bank may need to explore the prescription
of forward looking provisions for the banking sector.
The date for convergence with IFRS for banks is nearing,
but IFRS 9 remains a moving target.
4.69 The Sub Committee of the FSDC has emerged as
the Council’s main operating arm. In its one year of
existence, a range of issues concerning financial stability,
financial sector development, inter regulatory
coordination, financial inclusion and financial literacy
have been reviewed.
4.70 Regulatory gaps between the NBFC and banking
sectors are being addressed. The recommendations of
the Working Group on Issues and Concerns in the NBFC
Sector are being examined in this context. The
provisions of the BR Act may not meet all the
requirements for effective and orderly bank resolution
and may need to be revisited as part of the FSLRC’s
review of all financial sector legislations.
4.71 The payment and settlement system functioned
in a robust manner in the period since the previous FSR.
An analysis of intra day settlement patterns in the RTGS
system evidences some tendencies on the part of
participants to delay settlements to the second half of
the day, which needs to be carefully monitored. Data
aggregation and the establishment of legal entity
identifier that will assist in the monitoring of OTC
derivatives are being mulled over. Counterparty credit
risks are being addressed in the OTC derivative reforms
measures but wrong-way risks will need to be carefully
monitored through robust stress testing. As measures
to increase centralised clearing of OTC derivatives are
implemented, the pros and cons of global CCPs versus
domestic CCPs are under discussion. In India, portfolio
compression has been initiated to address risks in OTC
derivative markets. Concentration risks remain in CCIL,
including in DSBs while stress testing and back testing
by CCIL may need to be further enhanced.
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Chapter V
Systemic Risk Assessment
The need for assessing build up of systemic risks has emerged, in the post crisis world, as a critical
part of any framework for macroprudential surveillance. Central banks around the world are engaged
in developing tools and techniques to accurately assess such risks to the financial system. In India too,
upgrading technologies and adding to its existing toolkit for identifying and measuring systemic
risks is a continuing endeavour. Simultaneously, there is a realisation that systemic risks are complex
and measuring them with precision may be challenging - exercise of judgement is hence
critical
A Systemic Risk Survey has been instituted by the Reserve Bank to get the views of market participants
and stakeholders to supplement its own assessment and that of the financial sector regulators and
policy makers (as represented in the Sub Committee of the FSDC).
A series of stability indices and maps (as presented in various Chapters of this Report) have been
devised to assess movements in the various risk dimensions which have a bearing on the macro economy,
the financial markets, the fiscal segment, the banking sector and the entire financial system. A
Systemic Liquidity Indicator attempts to measure the build up of stress scenarios in the availability
of various types of liquidity in the system. A network model of inter-bank and intra financial sector
exposures attempts to analyse contagion risks arising from an initially idiosyncratic problem that
becomes more widespread in the cross section of the banking sector and the financial sector. Banking
stability measures attempt to model the distress dependencies in the banking sector, among specific
groups of banks and that associated with an individual bank. Finally, a series of macrofinancial
stress tests focus on the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the financial system.
1 “Seeing Both the Forest and the Trees-Supervising Systemic Risk”, José Viñals, IMF Financial Counsellor and Director, Monetary and Capital Markets
Department Opening Remarks at the Eleventh Annual International Seminar on Policy Challenges for the Financial Sector Washington D.C.,
June 2, 2011.
5.1 The recent financial crisis presented a stark
example of the consequences of build up of systemic
risks. It demonstrated that if systemic risks have
gradually accumulated up to a point, then even a
relatively small shock can amplify and lead to
widespread consequences for the stability of the
financial system.
5.2 Post crisis, there emerged a clear consensus that
in order to avoid such episodes of financial instability,
financial authorities need to better identify, assess and
manage the systemic risks prevailing in the financial
sector. Simultaneously, there emerged a realisation that
identification of systemic risks is a task which is far
from straightforward given that systemic risks per se
are complex and multifaceted. There was also increasing
realisation that in order to see “both the forest and
trees”1 effectively, there is a need to have a wide range
of measures and tools covering different aspects of
systemic risks.
5.3 A host of new quantification measures have, post
crisis, emerged in academic literature, while central
banks, in their quest for maintaining financial stability,
are developing tools and techniques which will help
identify and measure systemic risks. The broad objective
is to support macro-prudential surveillance of the
financial system.
5.4 With the establishment of the Financial Stability
Unit in the Reserve Bank in 2009 with a mandate
for, inter alia, “conduct of macro-prudential surveillance
of the financial system on an ongoing basis”,
a series of systemic risk assessment measures and
projects are being undertaken. The objective is
to develop tools and methodologies which could
be used to identify, assess and monitor potential
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threats to the stability of the domestic financial
system.
5.5 The efforts at systemic risk assessment are aimed
at capturing various dimensions of systemic risks
through different models. A series of stability indicators/
maps attempt to capture the different risks dimensions
which affect the stability of different segments of the
economy [the macro economy, financial markets, the
fiscal, the banking sector] as well as the entire financial
system. Movements in these dimensions are then used
to assess whether or not risks to stability are emerging.
The signals thrown up by these indicators/maps have
been presented in the appropriate Chapters of this
Report. The different Sections of this Chapter present
the results of broad based attempts to assess and capture
the movements of systemic risks per se. The analytical
assessment of the indications for the emergence of such
risks based on a series of initiatives/models adopted by
the Reserve Bank add to the overall assessment of risks
to financial stability in this issue of the Financial
Stability Report.
Systemic Risk Survey
Systemic Risk Survey as an additional tool to assess
build-up of risks…
5.6 The Reserve Bank instituted, in October-
November 2011, its first Systemic Risk Survey with a
view to gauge perceptions of market participants and
other stakeholders about the key sources of risk to the
Indian financial system. The Survey will be a biannual
exercise. The endeavour is expected to complement
Reserve Bank’s own assessment of risks to financial
stability.
The Survey captured the views of a wide range of
market participants and stakeholders…
5.7 The Survey respondents included a group of
about 100 select individuals from banks, financial
institutions, insurance companies, asset management
companies, non-banking financial companies, primary
dealers and broking firms. The respondents also
included representatives from industry associations,
rating agencies, clearing corporations as well as select
academicians and thinkers.
…both on specific risks and the degree of confidence
in the stability of the system
5.8 The Survey attempts to capture the views of
market participants and other stakeholders on the
specific systemic risks facing the financial system, as
also their assessment of the probability of high impact
events affecting the global financial system and the
Indian financial system, both in the short and the
medium run. A separate set of questions elicited the
respondents’ degree of confidence in the stability of the
global and domestic financial system and also how it
has changed due to the events unfolding over the last
six months.
Asset quality – the risk with the highest probability
of occurrence
5.9 The majority of the respondents identified
deterioration in the asset quality of banks as the most
significant risk to the financial system followed by risks
from heightened market volatility, including exchange
rate volatility, global risks, risks from high inflation and
high interest rates. Other risks identified included fiscal
risks, risks from excessive or slow regulatory responses
and corporate risks including risks of corporate
governance. There was the odd mention of risks from
slow credit offtake, rating downgrade of the country and
of domestic banks, terrorism, asset price bubbles,
technology risk like cyber crime, failure of payments
infrastructure, risks from the prevailing political
situation, etc (Chart 5.1).
Chart 5.1: Specific Risks Identified by Respondents of
Systemic Risk Survey
2
2 The bars in the chart represent the weighted aggregate of the number of respondents who have identified the corresponding risk, the weights
representing the probability assigned by the respondent to the occurrence of the risk.
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Risks from high inflation most difficult for the country
to manage
5.10 The Survey respondents assessed that the risks
from high inflation will be most difficult for the country
to manage. The impact of global risks and increased
market volatility would also be difficult for the system
to manage as would risks from deterioration in asset
quality (Chart 5.2). Participants from financial
institutions felt that funding risks, risks from
deterioration in asset quality, interest rates and from
increased market volatility would be most difficult for
their respective institutions to manage (Chart 5.3).
Probability of a high impact event occurring in the
global financial system high... could impact the
domestic financial system
5.11 Over half the Survey respondents felt that the
probability of a high impact event occurring in the global
financial system was “High” in the short term, but were
relatively more sanguine about the Indian financial
system. In the medium term, the probability of a high
impact event occurring in the global financial system
was also high, though not as high as the short term
(Chart 5.4). The probability of a similar event occurring
in the domestic financial system was assessed to be
lower. However, the majority of the respondents felt
that the global developments would affect the Indian
financial system, with over 40 per cent expecting the
impact to be significant (Table 5.1).
5.12 The survey also reveals that the market
confidence in the stability of the Indian financial system
is significantly higher as compared to stability of the
global financial system. Over 50 per cent of the
respondents had little or no confidence in the stability
of the global financial system, whereas more than 90
per cent of the respondents were ‘very’ or ‘fairly’
confident of the stability of the Indian financial system.
The confidence of the respondents in the stability of
the global financial system has largely decreased over
the previous six months whereas it has remained
Chart 5.2: Risks Most Difficult for Country to Manage
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Chart 5.3: Risks Most Difficult for Financial Institutions to Manage
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Table 5.1 The impact of a global event on the
domestic financial system (per cent)
Very No
High High Moderate Low Impact
9 35 46 10 0
Chart 5.4: Probability of a High Impact Event (per cent)
Very High
High
MediumLow
Very low
Short Term (Global) Medium Term (Global)
Short Term (India) Medium Term (India)
Note: Distance from the centre represents the number of participants who felt
that the probability of a high impact event occurring was very low/low/
medium/high/very high
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substantively unchanged as far as the Indian financial
system is concerned (Chart 5.5 and Table 5.2).
The Survey added to and mirrored the Reserve Bank’s
assessment of systemic risks
5.13 Overall, the findings of the Risk Survey mirrored
the Reserve Bank’s own assessment of systemic risks as
outlined in the various chapters of this Report. The
findings also attested to the confidence in the stability
of the domestic financial system, though the degree of
confidence in the global financial system was low and
deteriorating.
Systemic Liquidity Index (SLI)3 for India
Liquidity has many forms
5.14 Liquidity is commonly understood as being of two
types: funding and market liquidity. Funding liquidity
refers to the ability of institutions to raise money from
banks or in term money/ commercial paper markets or
by repo-ing out existing securities to meet a cash outflow.
Market liquidity refers to the ability to sell assets to raise
cash with low impact costs. When firms sell assets, their
balance sheet leverage does not increase whereas raising
liquidity in money markets involves increasing their
balance sheet size. The distinction between the two is
important from the financial stability perspective.
During the financial crisis, counterparty credit concerns
led firms to rely on sale of assets (shrinking of balance
sheets) since term money markets had frozen.
Deleveraging eventually caused the turmoil in financial
markets to spread to the broader economy in US and
Europe causing a global recession.
5.15 Systemic liquidity for the purpose of the index is
defined as the funding liquidity scenario in the banking
sector, non-banking financial sector, the corporate sector
and prevailing foreign currency liquidity. Current needs
for liquidity are also influenced by expectations about
availability of funds and their rates in future. So the
index also uses a forward looking parameter.
Multiple indicators for measuring liquidity are
preferred
5.16 In order to measure liquidity, it is preferable to
go in for a multiple indicator approach, which would be
able to better capture the liquidity from a variety of
dimensions. A SLI that measures liquidity conditions
in the market has several uses. Firstly, it measures the
Table 5.2: Confidence in the stability of the Global and
Domestic Financial Systems (per cent)
Confidence Complete Very Fairly Not very No
in confidence confident confident confident confidence
The Global
Financial 0 1 45 52 2
System
The Indian
Financial 0 39 58 3 0
System
Chart 5.5: Change in the Degree of Confidence
in the Stability of Financial Systems
Increased
Unchanged
Global Financial System Indian Financial System
Decreased
Note: Distance from the centre represents the number of participants whose degree
of confidence in the stability of the system increased/decreased/remained unchanged
3 The methodology is given in the Annex to this Report.
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level of liquidity and gives a quantitative assessment of
its current level. Secondly, the time series of the index
enables us to compare the improvement or otherwise
in liquidity conditions vis-à-vis past levels.
5.17 The SLI uses the following four indicators
representing various segments of the market.
1. Weighted Average Call Rate – RBI Repo Rate
The weighted average call rate adjusted for the RBI
repo rate captures information about the levels of
funding stress in the banking system. The weighted
average call rate has been adjusted to neutralise the
impact of changes in the Reserve Bank’s policy or repo
rate on it as a rise in the latter does not automatically
imply tougher liquidity conditions.
2. 3 month Commercial Paper (CP) Rate – 3 month
Certificate of Deposits (CD) Rate
Liquidity conditions for the commercial sector
could be affected through amount, cost and maturity of
credit that is extended. The SLI uses CP rates as an
indicator of cost of funds for the commercial sector. This
is important as stress in banking as well as non-banking
sector’s funding markets is sought to be covered under
the SLI. The CP rate is reduced by the cost of banks’
funds to extract the additional rise in cost for the
commercial sector.
3. 3 month CD Rate – 3 month Implied Deposit Rate
The SLI also uses the difference between 3 month
CD Rate and 3 months Forward Implied Deposit Rate as
an indicator. The reason for using this indicator is to
increase the coverage of funding markets. Banks often
use FX swaps to raise Rupee funds. The ones that do
not maintain large buffers over and above the SLR of 24
per cent find this source of funding convenient. The FX
swap frees them from the need of holding the less liquid
SLR securities. The difference between domestic deposit
and foreign exchange market implied deposit rates is a
sign of stress in foreign exchange market based funding
liquidity.
4. Weighted Average Call Rate - 3 Month Overnight
Indexed Swap (OIS) Rate
The SLI uses a forward looking indicator like 3
month OIS rate which points to market expectation
about the future course of the overnight rate. For
instance, the OIS market might be pricing a policy rate
hike near term but several cuts subsequently. Interbank
borrowing and lending has to take into account such
expectations about future course of policy rates. At times
of liquidity stress, the overnight rates go up but
expectations about the longer term do not change if the
factors driving the overnight rates are believed to be
temporary. The flattening or steepening of the OIS yield
curve gives clear signals about liquidity conditions and
the perceptions about whether they are temporary or not.
5.18 The index has been constructed after
experimenting with four different methodologies4 and
the ‘standard normal’ or ‘variance-equal weighted’
method has been accepted as most appropriate. A value
above zero would indicate above normal levels of stress
in liquidity.
Liquidity tightness remains elevated but acceptable
5.19 The liquidity deficit, which witnessed some stress
in June 2011 due to quarterly advance tax payouts, eased
in early July 2011, reflecting the drawdown of Central
Government cash balances and transition to Ways and
Means Advances (WMA)/Over Draft (OD). Average
Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) injections, which
were around `49,000 crore in the first quarter of 2011-
12, dropped marginally to around `47,000 crore in the
second quarter of 2011-12. After a gap of nearly five
months, the LAF window went in to absorption mode
in the beginning of October 2011. However, the liquidity
conditions tightened again from October 7, 2011 with
the decline in the level of WMA/OD and rise in currency
in circulation due to festive season currency demand.
The SLI tracks these and related developments in other
funding market segments (Chart 5.6).
4“Measuring Financial Stress in a Developed Country: An Application to Canada”, by Mark Illing and Ying Liu (2006).
Source: RBI Staff calculations
Chart 5.6: Systemic Liquidity Index
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Network Analysis5
5.20 The previous FSR presented the results of the
network analysis of the Indian banking system
undertaken with a view to gauge the interconnectedness
in the banking system and to assess the risks arising
out of possible contagion. The analysis has been carried
forward to assess the interconnectedness in the entire
financial system and to probe further into the nature of
the network of the banking system and of the financial
system. The purpose is to explore the implications that
the structure of the network may have for the stability
of the system and vulnerabilities presented by the
random failure of one or more different entities in the
system. Continuous monitoring of changes in the
network structure over time form a critical part of the
toolkit for macroprudential surveillance.6
The interbank market grew, but activities of foreign
banks fell sharply….
5.21 The interbank market grew by more than 20 per
cent over the one year since September 2010 (Charts
5.7 and 5.8). However, there were some significant
changes in the nature of the market, particularly with
respect to the activities of the different segments of the
market. The quantum of lending and borrowing by
foreign banks fell sharply, while that of the other
segments increased. The increase in the quantum of
interbank borrowing by the new private sector banks
was much sharper than the increase in the quantum of
their interbank lending.
…leading to a fall in their share in the market
5.22 The share of foreign banks in total interbank
borrowing and lending activity fell sharply between
September 2010 and September 2011, while that of
public sector banks increased. There was only a marginal
increase in the share of the private sector banks, both
old and new (Charts 5.9 and 5.10).
Source: RBI staff calculations.
PSBs Old Pvt banks New Pvt banks Foreign banks
Chart 5.7: Bank Group Wise Activity in the Interbank Market
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Chart 5.8: Percentage Change in Activity Over the Last One Year
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Chart 5.9: Inter-Bank Market Share: September 2010
PSB
43%
Old Pvt
4%
New Pvt
16%
Foreign
37%
Source: RBI staff calculations.
5 The network analysis has been conducted based on data in respect of bilateral fund based and non-fund based exposures between banks, asset
management companies, insurance companies, NBFCs, financial institutions and urban cooperative banks on different dates. The transactions where
the settlement takes place through a central counterparty have not been reckoned.
6 The Network model used in the analysis has been developed by Professor Sheri Markose (University of Essex) and Dr. Simone Giansante (Bath
University) in collaboration with the Financial Stability Unit, Reserve Bank of India.
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The Indian inter-bank network remains clustered
and is also distinctly tiered …
5.23 The previous FSR had found the Indian financial
system to be closely connected and clustered. The
Cluster Coefficient and Connectivity Ratio in the
banking system have consistently remained at over 42
per cent and 28 per cent respectively over the last one
year, signifying a high level of interconnectedness in
the system. In addition, similar to most interbank and
inter-financial systems globally, the network of the
system also displays a distinct tiered structure (Box 5.1),
which is also persistent over the period (Charts 5.11
to 5.13).
… with implications for the stability of the network
though regulatory limits on interbank exposures
mitigate contagion risks
5.24 A tiered network structure has financial stability
implications. The contagion loss to the system from
failure of a bank in the inner core will be more significant
than the loss arising out of the failure of the bank in a
less tiered network. In the Indian case, however,
regulatory limits in interbank exposures mitigate such
contagion losses, as was discussed in the previous FSR.
Tiered network structure also observed in the
interbank derivatives market…
5.25 The network of inter-bank derivatives market also
shows a distinct and persistent tiered structure with
the major participants in this market being the foreign
banks (Charts 5.14 and 5.15). This has been discussed
in further detail in Chapter IV of this Report.
Chart 5.12: Network Structure of the Indian Banking System
(March 2011)
Source: RBI staff calculations.
Chart 5.13: Network Structure of the Indian Banking System
(September 2011)
Source: RBI staff calculations.
Chart 5.11: Network Structure of the Indian Banking System
(September 2010)
Source: RBI staff calculations.
Chart 5.10: Inter-Bank Market Share:
September 2011
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Source: RBI staff calculations.
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Box 5.1 Network Analysis Concepts
As was discussed in the previous FSR, matrix algebra is at the
core of network analysis – an analysis of bilateral exposures
between entities in the financial sector. Each institution’s
lending and borrowings with all others in the system are
plotted in a square matrix and are then mapped in a network
graph. The nodes (balls) in the graph represent the institutions
or entities, with the red balls representing the net borrowers
in the system and the blue balls representing the net lenders.
The links (in the form of arrows) between the nodes represent
the net exposure between any two nodes. Each node or entity
in the system is linked to one or more entity/entities. If the
node represents a net lender then the link is represented by
an arrow in the inward direction (called in degree); whereas if
it is a net borrower the link is represented by an arrow in the
outward direction (called out degree). The size of the nodes
represents the net outstanding position of the entity in the
system. The thickness of each link is weighted according to
the net position between two entities connected by the link.
A series of statistical tools are then used to gauge the level
of interconnectedness and activity that exist in the
system. Chief among them are (a) Measure of connectivity;
(b) Cluster Coefficient; and (c) Eigenvector measure of
centrality.
(a) Measure of connectivity: This is a statistic that measures
the extent of links between the nodes relative to all possible
links in a complete graph. For a directed graph, denoting the
total number of out degrees to equal K =∑
=
N
i
ik
1
 and N as the
total number of nodes, connectivity of a network is given as
)1( −NN
K
.
(b) Cluster Coefficient: Clustering in networks measures how
interconnected each node is. Specifically, there should be an
increased probability that two of a node’s neighbours (banks’
counterparties in case of the financial network) are also
neighbours to each other. A high clustering coefficient for the
network corresponds with high interconnectedness prevailing
in the system.
(c) Eigenvector measure of centrality: Eigenvector centrality
is a measure of the importance of a node (bank) in a network.
It describes how connected a node’s neighbours are and
attempts to capture more than just the number of out degrees
or direct ‘neighbours’ a node has.
Tiered network structures:
Typically, financial networks tend to exhibit a tiered structure.
Simply speaking, a tiered structure is one where different
institutions have different degrees or levels of connectivity
with others in the network. In the present analysis, the most
connected banks (based on their eigenvector centrality) are in
the inner most core (at the centre of the network diagrams in
Charts 5:11 to 5:13). Banks are then placed in the mid core,
outer core and the periphery (the respective concentric circles
around the centre in the diagrams), based on their level of
relative connectivity. The range of connectivity of the banks is
defined as a ratio of each bank’s in degree and out degree
divided by that of the most connected bank. Banks that are
ranked in the top 10 percentile of this ratio constitute the inner
core. This is followed by a mid core of banks ranked between
90 and 70 percentile and a 3rd tier of banks ranked between
40 and 70 percentile. Banks with connectivity ratio of less than
40 per cent are categorised as the periphery.
The colour coding of the links in the tiered network diagram
represents the borrowing from different tiers in the network
(for example, the green links represent borrowings from the
banks in the inner core). The network diagrams show up the
peculiar features of a tiered inter bank network in the country.
The bulk of the activity takes place between banks in the inner
core and the mid core. These banks are closely connected with
each other. The banks in the periphery, on the other hand, are
connected with the banks in the inner and mid core but have
limited exposures to other banks in the periphery.
The tiered structure has important implications of financial
stability. More concentrated networks like tiered networks are
typically less stable. A tiered network structure means that
contagion impact of the failure of any bank in the inner or
mid core will be much more severe than in the case of a more
complete and less concentrated network.
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Chart 5.14: Share in the Derivatives Market ( in crore)`
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Chart 5.15: Derivative Network – September 2011
Source: RBI staff calculations.
Potential contagion losses increased over the last year
signifying heightened systemic importance of the large
borrowers
5.26 The contagion tools used to analyse the impact
of the random failure of one or more banks were
presented in the previous FSR. An analysis of the
contagion loss caused to the system by the failure of
the top five net borrowers (one at a time) shows that
the percentage of the banking system’s capital wiped
out by the failure of three of these five banks had
increased over the last one year. This could be a pointer
to greater interconnectedness in the system and also
that the systemic importance of the large borrowers may
have increased (Table 5.3)7.
Mapping the entire financial system…insurance
companies and mutual funds are the liquidity
providers, public sector banks the major borrowers…
5.27 The network of the entire financial system
(including select insurance companies, asset
management companies(AMCs), NBFCs, urban banks,
financial institutions and scheduled commercial banks)
is also tiered and expectedly throws up close
interconnectedness especially among the banking,
insurance and the mutual funds segments of the
financial system. When the entire financial system is
mapped, the largest liquidity providers in the system
(i.e., the largest net lenders) are the insurance companies
and the AMCs while the public sector banks (which are
the largest net lenders in the interbank network) emerge
7 The five banks on each date discussed above are the top five net borrowers on that particular date.
Table 5.3: Total capital loss (as percentage of banking system
capital) due to the failure of the top five net borrowers:
September 2010 March 2011 September 2011
Bank 1 7.9 11.7 14.8
Bank 2 4.2 8.5 7.6
Bank 3 4.0 4.9 6.4
Bank 4 3.8 4.7 6.1
Bank 5 3.5 3.6 2.2
Source: RBI Staff calculations
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as the largest net borrowers in the system accounting
for nearly 50 per cent of all borrowing (Table 5.4 and
Charts 5.16 and 5.17).
… leaving the liquidity providers vulnerable to any
disturbances in the banking system
5.28 The degree of interconnectedness in the financial
system (as discussed above) clearly means that the
potential contagion loss to the entire financial system
arising out of the random failure of one or more large
net borrowers in the system would be significantly larger
than that of the loss to the banking system alone. In
particular, the random failure of a bank which has large
borrowings from the insurance and mutual funds
segments of the financial system may have significant
implications for the entire system. A contagion analysis
simulating the failure of one such large borrower (Chart
5.18) could cause distress to ten other institutions,
including three insurance companies8.
Chart 5.16: Network of the Indian Financial System
Source: RBI staff calculations.
Table 5.4: Inter sector exposures
 March 2011 June 2011
` in crore  Lending Borrowing Lending Borrowing
PSBs 396080 639731 409427 574048
Old Pvt Sector Banks 38744 40675 36862 42767
New Pvt Sector Banks 115747 218894 108224 236468
Foreign Banks 178695 173640 155829 170525
UCBs 4286 1782 5514 1832
FIs 68238 55104 70587 47385
AMCs 126576 15377 141011 26785
Insurance Companies 261692 4706 207620 4531
NBFCs 59719 99870 60813 91548
TOTAL 1249778 1249778 1195888 1195888
Source: RBI Staff calculations
Chart 5.17: Network Structure of the Financial System
Source: RBI staff calculations.
Chart 5.18: Contagion Due to the Failure of the Largest
Net Borrower Bank
9
Source: RBI staff calculations.
8 Distress conditions for banks and NBFCs are defined based on their capital adequacy ratio, while for insurance companies it is based on the
solvency ratio. Conceptually an AMC will not fail as such due to a contagion event, since it will simply pass on the losses to all the unit holders.
9 Colour code:
Trigger and Distressed institutions : Black;
Institutions which are affected but not distressed:
(i) Green: Institutions which are affected by the failure of the trigger/distressed institutions but which are able to absorb the shock.
(ii) Yellow: Banks which are affected by the failure of the trigger/distressed banks and whose capital adequacy falls below 9 per cent but core capital ratio
remains above 6 per cent
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Banking Stability Measures and Estimation of
Expected Shortfall
5.29 During times of distress, the fortunes of banks
typically decline concurrently through direct or indirect
links which include mark-to-market asset values, inter-
bank lending and information asymmetries. In this
section, the results of modelling distress dependencies
among banks are presented. For the purpose, the
financial system has been conceptualised as a portfolio
of a specific group of banks (Segoviano and Goodhart,
2009). In particular, the Banking System’s Portfolio
Multivariate Density (BSMD)10, which characterises both
the individual and joint asset value movements of the
portfolio of banks, is recovered from Probabilities of
Distress (PoDs) of the banks under analysis. The PoD is
observed empirically based on 99.5 per cent Value at
Risk (VaR) of banks’ daily equity price return.
Common distress in the system: JPoD and BSI
5.30 The probability of distress of entire banking
system, as measured by Joint Probability of Distress
(JPoD), is observed to be very low during the recent
period. The other measure of common distress in the
banking system is the Banking Stability Index (BSI)
(which measures the expected number of banks that
become distressed given that at least one bank becomes
distressed). The BSI has been hovering around one since
April 2010 implying that the banking system has very
weak inter-dependency at present. However, it may also
be observed that BSI, which was flat during last year,
has again started showing a marginal upward movement
in the current year (Chart 5.19).
Distress among specific banks: Toxicity and
Vulnerability Index
5.31 The distress among the specific banks is
measured based on Toxicity Index (TI) and the
Vulnerability Index (VI). The TI is the average probability
that a bank under distress may cause distress to another
bank in the system. Toxicity of banks declined
significantly from around 60 per cent registered during
the crisis to 5 per cent in the recent period. It may also
be mentioned that the TI which had registered a
marginal increase during first half of 2011 has shown a
downward trend since August 2011 (Chart 5.20).
10 Details are in FSR-June 2011.
Chart 5.19: Movement of JPoD and BSI
Source: Supervisory & Bloomberg data and RBI staff calculations
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Chart 5.20: Movement of Toxicity Index: Select Banks
Source: Supervisory & Bloomberg data and RBI staff calculations
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5.32 The VI, which quantifies the vulnerability of a
bank given distress in other banks in the system, was
high during the financial crisis of 2007-09. The highest
probability was about 30 per cent during the crisis, which
declined substantially and is hovering very close to zero
since June 2010. Of late, VI has shown a little upward
movement (Chart 5.21).
Distress in the System Associated by Distress in a
Specific Bank: Cascade Effect
5.33 Distress in the system associated by distress in a
specific bank, representing the likelihood that the entire
system becomes distressed is useful to quantify the
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Source: Supervisory & Bloomberg data and RBI staff calculations
Chart 5.21: Movement of Vulnerability Index: Select Banks
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Chart 5.22: Movement of Cascade Effect: Select Banks
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systemic importance and ‘domino’ effect of a specific
bank’s distress. At present, domino impact for failure
of the entire banking system is quite low (Chart 5.22).
Expected Shortfall
5.34 The banking system’s Expected Shortfall (i.e. the
estimated loss of assets in the extreme loss region) has
been declining continuously in recent periods – from
around 6.6 per cent of total assets of banking system in
March 2009 to only 1.8 per cent in December 2011
implying that the banking system would be able to
withstand the extreme systemic losses as derived from
the model (Chart 5.23).
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Macrofinancial Stress Testing
5.35 Two sets of macro testing exercises were
conducted: one based on multivariate regression and
the other on vector autoregressive (VAR) model. The
former allows evaluating the impact of a particular
macroeconomic variable on the banking system’s capital
and non-performing advances (NPA) ratio. The latter
reflects the impact of the overall economic stress
situation on the banks’ capital and NPA ratio taking into
account the feed-back effect. The impact on systemic
risk is judged through various models to understand
the impact of macroeconomic variables from different
but complementary angles.
The stress scenarios
5.36 The macro stress tests used a baseline and three
adverse macroeconomic scenarios; low risk, medium risk
and severe risk (Table 5.5), for which projections were
based on the data till Q2: FY2011-12. These shocks have
been calibrated based on historical data.
Modeling credit risk using a series of econometric
models
5.37 Credit risk was one of the key focus areas for the
macro-stress tests. Credit risk stress tests have been
designed using several econometric models11 that relate
banking system aggregates to the macroeconomic
variables, such as (i) multivariate logit regression on
aggregate systems’ NPA data; (ii) multivariate regression
in terms of the slippage ratio (inflow of new NPAs);
(iii) aggregate VAR using slippage ratios; (iv) multivariate
panel regression on bank wise slippage ratio data,
which was later aggregated into bank-groups; and
(v) multivariate regressions for aggregate sectoral NPAs.
The banking system aggregate includes current and
lagged values of aggregate NPAs (NPA ratio) and inflow
of new NPAs (slippage ratio), while macroeconomic
variables include GDP growth, short term interest rate
(call rate), WPI inflation and export-to-GDP ratio. Risk
scenarios are constructed from the above table, where
the shocks in the major macroeconomic parameters
occur simultaneously. The stress tests were run on the
unconsolidated balance sheet data of banks for their
domestic operations.
5.38 The stress tests models were built on the
quarterly data from June-2001 to Sep-2011. The
11 The methodology is given in the Annex to this Report.
Table 5.5: Macroeconomic Scenario Assumptions
(Percent )
 Dec-11 Mar-12 Mar-13
GDP growth*
 Baseline 7.5 7.5 7.9
 Low Risk 7.0 7.0 7.4
 Medium Risk 4.5 4.5 4.9
 Severe Risk 3.5 3.5 3.9
WPI Inflation
 Baseline 7.7 7.4 6.2
 Low Risk 8.7 8.4 7.2
 Medium Risk 9.2 8.9 7.7
 Severe Risk 9.7 9.4 8.2
Short-term interest (Call) Rates
 Baseline 8.5 8.4 8.2
 Low Risk 10.0 9.9 9.7
 Medium Risk 11.0 10.9 10.7
 Severe Risk 12.0 11.9 11.7
Export/ GDP ratio
 Baseline 16.1 16.3 17.6
 Low Risk 15.1 15.3 16.6
 Medium Risk 14.6 14.8 16.1
 Severe Risk 14.1 14.3 15.6
* Real GDP at market price
The macroeconomic shocks have been assumed to occur in Q3: F2011-12.
Chart 5.23: Expected Shortfall: System Level
Source: Supervisory & Bloomberg data and RBI staff calculations
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dependent variable for the aggregate multivariate and
bank wise panel regressions, as well as VAR was the
slippage ratio, whereas, the dependent variable for logit
regression and sectoral data was NPA ratio.
System level credit risk tests: Projected NPA increases,
impact on CRAR is contained
5.39 The results of the aggregate credit risk exercise
provide a broad indication of potential impacts. The
gross NPA ratio projections through different models
(Table 5.6) suggest that the aggregate banking system
gross NPA ratio, which is expected to be between 3.2 to
3.5 per cent by March 2013 under baseline scenario as
projected by different models, may attain a high level
of 4.7 to 5.8 percent under severe risk scenario. The
projected level of NPAs based on VAR is more than that
based on multivariate regression, as the VAR model also
takes into account feed-back effect and in addition, the
initial shock will remain in the system for the six
quarters’ horizon, unlike the multivariate regressions,
where it dies out gradually. However, the impact on
CRAR is contained (Table 5.7).
Bank group level credit risk: Foreign banks most
impacted, but CRAR is resilient
5.40 The effect of the risk scenarios varies by bank
groups. The maximum impact on NPAs is observed for
foreign banks, because of their relatively small and fewer
commercial loans. There is a big difference in NPAs of
these banks in the baseline and severe risk scenario
compared with other bank groups (Table 5.8).
5.41 Aggregate credit risk, as measured by the change
in CRAR, shows that foreign banks are affected the most,
followed by other bank groups (Table 5.9). In the severe
risk scenario, the average CRAR of foreign banks declined
by 287 basis points in the next six quarters to 13.4 per
cent, but remains well above the regulatory requirement.
Public sector banks and old private banks would also
experience similar impact in their loan portfolios under
severe stress scenario, which may bring down the CRAR
of these groups. However, the CRAR remains above the
regulatory requirement even under the severe risk
scenario.
Table 5.7: Projected CRAR using Different Models
(Percent of total advances)
 Dec-11 Mar-12 Mar-13
Multivariate Logit Regression
Baseline 13.19 12.57 11.09
Low 13.19 12.57 11.03
Medium 13.19 12.57 10.91
Severe 13.19 12.57 10.86
Multivariate Regression
Baseline 13.21 12.59 11.11
Low 13.21 12.58 11.06
Medium 13.21 12.57 11.00
Severe 13.21 12.57 10.96
VAR
Baseline 13.21 12.59 11.08
Low 13.21 12.58 11.01
Medium 13.21 12.57 10.92
Severe 13.21 12.57 10.85
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations
Table 5.8: Bank-group-wise Projected NPAs
(Multivariate Panel Regression)
(Per cent of total advances)
Dec-11 Mar-12 Mar-13 Dec-11 Mar-12 Mar-13
Public Sector Banks Old Private Sector Banks
Baseline  2.86 2.97 3.25  2.39 2.56 3.24 
Low  2.92 3.11 3.80  2.45 2.70 3.79 
Medium  2.95 3.23 4.39  2.48 2.82 4.38 
Severe  2.97 3.32 4.78  2.51 2.91 4.77 
New Private Sector Banks Foreign Banks
Baseline  2.82 2.83 3.03  2.76 3.15 4.48 
Low  2.88 2.97 3.57  2.82 3.29 5.00 
Medium  2.91 3.09 4.15  2.85 3.41 5.57 
Severe  2.94 3.18 4.53  2.87 3.50 5.94 
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations
Table 5.6: Projected Gross NPA Ratios using Different Models
(Percent of total advances)
 Dec-11 Mar-12 Mar-13
Multivariate Logit Regression
 Baseline 2.89 3.05 3.37
 Low 2.89 3.05 3.85
 Medium 2.89 3.05 5.00
 Severe 2.89 3.05 5.49
Multivariate Regression
 Baseline  2.72 2.97  3.19
 Low  2.73 3.07 3.75
 edium  2.74 3.14 4.39
 Severe  2.75 3.16 4.73
VAR
 Baseline  2.71 2.96 3.46
 Low  2.71 3.03 4.26
 Medium  2.71 3.05 5.17
 Severe  2.71 3.08 5.78
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations
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Table 5.10: Projected Sectoral NPA
 (Per cent of total advances)
Sectors Mar-12 Mar-13
Baseline Low Risk Medium Risk Severe Risk Baseline Low Risk Medium Risk Severe Risk
Agriculture 4.06 4.11 4.20 4.32 3.70 3.89 4.24 4.72
Food Processing 5.82 6.31 7.13 8.29 6.81 8.40 12.18 15.75
Construction 2.64 2.66 2.81 3.01 3.00 3.09 3.63 4.35
Cement 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 3.27 3.78 5.12 6.95
Infrastructure 0.67 0.71 0.80 0.91 0.72 0.88 1.43 2.16
Iron and Steel 3.69 3.95 4.38 4.99 4.43 5.42 7.28 9.87
Engineering 3.36 3.63 4.09 4.73 3.80 4.82 6.65 9.13
Automobiles 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 2.03 2.37 3.19 3.94
Others 3.03 3.11 3.24 3.42 3.08 3.38 3.98 4.80
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations
Sectoral credit risk: Impact on Food Processing,
Engineering and Iron & Steel sectors relatively high
5.42 Sectoral credit risk, as measured by changes in
NPAs, revealed that among eight main sectors, Food
Processing, Engineering and Iron & Steel sectors appear
to be affected the most (Table 5.10). The effect on NPAs
in Agriculture in this macro stress test analysis seems
to be marginal. Similar effect is observed for the NPAs
in infrastructure.
Table 5.9: Bank-group-wise Projected CRAR
(Multivariate Panel Regression)
(Per cent)
Dec-11 Mar-12 Mar-13 Dec-11 Mar-12 Mar-13
Public Sector Banks Old Private Sector Banks
Baseline 12.05 11.41 10.06 12.85 12.12 10.83
Low 12.04 11.40 10.01 12.84 12.10 10.76
Medium 12.04 11.38 9.95 12.84 12.09 10.67
Severe 12.03 11.37 9.91 12.83 12.07 10.62
New Private Sector Banks Foreign Banks
Baseline 16.28 15.67 13.76 15.61 15.35 13.52
Low 16.28 15.65 13.70 15.61 15.34 13.48
Medium 16.27 15.64 13.63 15.60 15.33 13.44
Severe 16.27 15.63 13.58 15.60 15.32 13.41
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations.
Concluding Remarks
5.43 The series of measures put in place to assess
systemic risks in the financial system are aimed at
capturing the different types of systemic events and risks
through a variety of modeling frameworks.
5.44 The Systemic Risk Survey provided the inputs of
a large cross section of market participants on risks to
systemic stability. The respondents identified
deterioration in the asset quality of banks as the most
significant risk to the financial system followed by risks
from heightened market volatility, including exchange
rate volatility, global risks, risks from high inflation and
high interest rates. They remained, however, reasonably
confident about the stability of the Indian financial
system. The Systemic Liquidity Indicator shows that
liquidity conditions have become tighter in recent
months. The network of the Indian banking and
financial system have a tiered structure but limits on
inter bank liabilities mitigate contagion risks. Distress
dependencies between banks continued to be low.
5.45 The series of systemic risk assessment initiatives
set out in this FSR are a critical part of the overall system
of macroprudential surveillance which attempts to
identify, measure and manage, including, if necessary,
through pre-emptive policy action, burgeoning
vulnerabilities and excesses. However, this is easier said
than done both because of the intrinsic complexities of
systemic risks and also since the theoretical and
empirical research on systemic risk is still in its early
developmental stage. All of this indicate that it would
be un-realistic to expect a single measure of systemic
risks to cater to all kinds of risks or even to a single
kind of risk with precision at all times. This, in turn,
creates the need for macroprudential authorities to
"build up, from scratch, a wide range of measures and
tools covering different aspects of systemic risk in
different parts of the financial system, with each tool
having its specific purposes, advantages and caveats that
must always be borne in mind when interpreting its
results" 12. The series of models / measures presented
in this Chapter as well as the series of stability indictors/
maps presented in the other Chapters of this Report
represent the efforts within the Reserve Bank to assess
systemic risks from different dimensions and
perspectives.
12 “Implementing a macroprudential framework: Blending boldness and realism” Claudio Borio. Bank for International Settlements, July 2010.
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Annex
Methodologies
Financial Stability Map and Indicator
The Financial Stability Map and Indicator depict the overall stability condition in the Indian financial system. The
Financial Stability Indicator (FSI) is based on the three major indicators namely, Macro Stability Indicator (MSI),
Financial Markets Stability Indicator (FMSI) and Banking Stability Indicator (BSI). FSI was derived using simple
average of MSI, FMSI and BSI.  The methodologies for calculation of MSI, FMSI and BSI are described below.
Macroeconomic Stability Map and Indicator
The Macroeconomic Stability Indicator (MSI) is based on seven sub-indices, each pertaining to specific area of
macroeconomic risk. Each sub-index on macroeconomic risk includes select parameters representing risks in that
area. These sub-indices have been validated by assessing their appropriate impact on macroeconomic or financial
variable such as GDP, inflation, interest rates or the quality of assets of the banks. The seven sub-indices of the
overall macroeconomic stability index and their components are described below:
Global Risk Index
The Global Risk index is based on real output and the prices in the advanced economies. In respect of real output,
a composite index based on the weighted average of the growth rate of GDP of U.S., Euro Area and Japan has been
constructed. Using the similar procedure, index for inflation in these advanced economies was also constructed.
GDP index is ranked in ascending order while that of inflation is ranked in descending order. Global Risk Index is
a composite index of these indices having equal weights for each.
External Vulnerability
The index of external vulnerability is based on current account deficit/GDP, current payments/current receipts,
average monthly imports/reserve, share of short term debt in total debt, debt stock - GDP ratio and debt service
ratio.
Fiscal Vulnerability
Initially, an index of fiscal stress is constructed based on the gross primary deficit (GPD), gross fiscal deficit (GFD)
and the total liabilities of the centre and state governments. This is based broadly on the methodology suggested
in two IMF Working Papers by Baldacci, McHugh and Petrova (2011) and Baldacci, Petrova, Belhocine, Dobrescu
and Mazraani (2011). The weights in respect of GFD and GPD so obtained were applied to recent data on GPD and
GFD provided by the Office of the Comptroller General of Accounts to assess the change in fiscal risks.
Growth
For obtaining the outlook on domestic growth, the relationship of growth with a number of variables were attempted,
viz. exports/GDP, growth of core industry, GFCF/GDP, real bank credit, PMI and yield curve (difference between
the ten-year and one-year yield). Amongst these variables, the yield curve and PMI Manufacturing were found to
be the most appropriate indicators of growth.
Inflation
The outlook for inflation is based on the changes in international oil prices, exchange rate, and world Inflation.
Corporate Sector
The health of the corporate sector is captured through profit margin. The risks emanating from the sector is
inversely related to it.  In order to capture the relationship of the corporate sector with the financial sector, the
share of interest in sales is also captured in the index for the corporate sector.
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Household Sector
In the absence of frequent data on indebtedness of household, the outstanding credit from the bank to the
household sector, viz. retail credit, is taken as a proxy for household indebtedness. Further, in view of the delay in
availability of data on personal disposable income, private final consumption expenditure (PFCE) is used as its
proxy. Based on these two variables, the index for household sector attempts to capture the risks originating from
the household sector.
Financial Markets Stability Map and Indicator
With the objective to measure stability of the financial market, Financial Markets Stability Indicator (FMSI) has
been prepared based on the indicators of four sectors/markets, namely, banking sector, foreign exchange market,
equity market and debt market. The indicators selected from various sectors/market are followings; i) Banking
Sector: Banking Beta of CNXBANK Index and NIFTY Index, CD Rate and CD rate minus Implied Forward rate, ii)
Foreign Exchange Market: CMAX of daily Rupee-Dollar exchange rate, which is defined as X
t
/Max(X
i
, i=1,2,..upto
one year). Where, X
t 
is Rupee-Dollar exchange rate at time t, and 25 Delta Risk Reversals of foreign exchange rate,
iii) Equity Market: Inverse of NIFTY CMAX and India VIX, and iv) Debt Market: Corporate bond which is average
return of corporate bonds rated A, AA, and AAA, 10-years Government bond yield and CP Rate.
To aggregate all the indicators, variance-equal transformation has been used.
At first level, four indicators for the four selected sectors/markets were prepared based on simple average of
elementary indicators and thereafter FMSI was derived based on simple average of the four indicators derived at
first level. FMSI was estimated based on daily data.
Further, projection of FMSI was done based on monthly FMSI, which is monthly average of daily FMSI, credit
growth, WPI-Manufactured Products inflation and REER using following regression equation:
FMSI
t
= α + β
1 
 * FMSI
t - 1 
+ β
2 
* FMSI
t - 2 
+ β
3 
* Credit Growth
t - 1
 +
                         β
4  
* Inflation(Manufactured Products)
t - 1 
+ β
5 
 * DL(REER) 
t - 4 
+ u
t
Banking Stability Map and Indicator
The Banking Stability Map and Indicator (BSI) were introduced in FSR December 2010 to present an overall
assessment of changes in five dimensions that have a bearing on stability of the banking sector. The methodology
was further enhanced by including other variables for each of the five dimensions, which were presented in FSR
June 2011. The following ratios are used for construction of each composite index:
Table :  Indicators used for construction of Banking Stability Map and Banking Stability Indicator
Dimension Ratios
Soundness CRAR Tier-I Capital to Leverage ratio as Total-Assets to
Tier-II Capital Capital and Reserves
Asset-Quality Net NPAs to Gross NPAs to Sub-Standard- Restructured-Standard-
Total-Advances Total-Advances advances to gross NPAs Advances to Standard-
Advances
Profitability Return on Assets Net Interest Margin Growth in Profit
Liquidity Liquid-Assets to Customer-Deposits to Non-Bank-Advances to Deposits maturing
Total-Assets Total-Assets Customer-Deposits within-1-year to
Total Deposits
Efficiency Cost to Income Business (Credit + Deposits) to total employees
The five composite indices represent the five dimensions of Soundness, Asset-quality, Profitability, Liquidity and
Efficiency. Each index, representing a dimension of bank functioning, takes values between zero (minimum) and
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1 (maximum). Each index is a relative measure during the sample period used for its construction, where a high
value means the risk in that dimension is high. Therefore, an increase in the value of the index in any particular
dimension indicates an increase in risk in that dimension for that period as compared to other periods. For each
ratio used for a dimension, a weighted average for the banking sectors is derived, where the weights are the ratio
of individual bank asset to total banking system assets. Each index is normalised for the sample period as ‘Ratio-
on-a-given-date minus Minimum-value-in-sample-period divided by Maximum-value-in-sample-period  minus
Minimum-value-in-sample-period’. A composite measure of each dimension is calculated as a weighted average of
normalized ratios used for that dimension, where the weights are based on the marks assigned for assessment for
CAMELS rating. Based on individual composite indices for each dimension, the Banking Stability Indicator is
constructed as a simple average of these five composite sub-indices.
For the current map and indicator, the sample period for assessment was taken from March 2006 to September
2011. Projection of BSI was done using Auto Regressive Moving Average (ARMA) method.
Single Factor Sensitivity Analysis – Stress Testing
As a part of quarterly surveillance, stress tests are conducted covering credit, interest rate, equity price, foreign
exchange and liquidity risk. Resilience of the commercial banks in response to these shocks is studied. The
analysis covers all scheduled commercial banks. Single factor sensitivity analysis on credit risk of scheduled urban
co-operative banks and non-banking financial companies are also conducted.
Credit Risk
To ascertain the resilience of banks, the credit portfolio was shocked by increasing NPA levels, for the entire
portfolio as well as for select sectors, along with a simultaneous increase in provisioning requirements. For testing
the credit concentration risk, default of the top individual borrowers and the largest group borrower is assumed.
The estimated provisioning requirements so derived were first adjusted from the profit of the banks and the
residual provisioning requirements, if any, were deduced from banks’ capital.
The analysis was carried out both at the aggregate level as well as at the individual bank level, based on quarterly
supervisory data for September 2011. The scenario assumed increase in the existing stock of NPAs by 50, 100 and
150 per cent and enhanced provisioning requirements of 1 per cent, 30 per cent and 100 per cent for standard,
sub-standard and doubtful/loss advances, respectively. The assumed increase in NPAs was distributed across sub-
standard, doubtful and loss categories in the same proportion as prevailing in the existing stock of NPAs. The
additional provisioning requirement was applied to the altered composition of the credit portfolio.
Equity price, foreign exchange and interest rate risk
The fall in value of the portfolio or income losses due to change in equity prices, appreciation/ depreciation of
INR, shifting of INR yield curve are accounted for as the total loss of the banks because of the assumed shock. The
estimated total losses so derived were first adjusted from the profit of the banks and the residual provisioning
requirements, if any, were deduced from banks’ capital.
For Interest rate risk in the Banking Book, two kinds of approaches were considered: (1) Income Approach, which
impacts the earnings of banks because of shift in INR yield curve and (2) Duration Gap Analysis, which computes
the valuation impact (portfolio losses). The income losses, on interest bearing exposure gap, are calculated for
one  year for each time bucket separately. The portfolio losses, on interest bearing exposure gap, are calculated for
each time bucket, using duration gap analysis. For interest rate shocks in trading book, the valuation losses are
calculated for each time bucket on the interest bearing assets using duration approach.
Liquidity Risk
The aim of liquidity stress tests is to assess the ability of a bank to withstand unexpected liquidity drain without
taking recourse to any outside liquidity support. The analysis is done as at end-September 2011.  The scenario
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depicts different proportions (depending on the type of deposits) of unexpected deposit withdrawals on account
of sudden loss of depositors’ confidence and assesses the adequacy of liquid assets available to fund them. Two
different definitions of liquid assets have been assumed.
• As per the first definition, liquid assets consist of cash funds, excess CRR balances with the Reserve Bank,
balances with other banks and all SLR investments.
• The second definition assumes that the liquid assets would include cash funds, excess CRR balances with the
Reserve Bank, balances with other banks payable within one month and investments maturing within one
month.
• It is assumed that banks would meet stressed withdrawal of deposits through sale of liquid assets.
• The sale of investments is done with a hair cut of 10 per cent on their market value.
• The stress test is done on a static mode.
Urban Co-operative Banks – Credit Risk
Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on Scheduled Urban Co-operative Banks (SUCBs) using their asset portfolio
as at end-June 2011. The tests were based on single factor sensitivity analysis. The impact on CRAR was studied
under three different scenarios.  The assumed scenarios were as under:
Scenario I:
• Shock applied: 50% increase in gross NPAs.
• Provisioning requirement is increased by 50%.
• Capital (Tier I & II) is reduced by additional provisions.
Scenario II:
• Shock applied: 100% increase in gross NPAs.
• Provisioning requirement is increased by 100%.
• Capital (Tier I & II) is reduced by additional provisions.
Scenario III:
• Shock applied: Loss or Zero profit by all SUCBs due to adverse macroeconomic conditions.
• Capital (Tier I & II) is reduced by amount of profits in respect of those banks that reported profit (no change
if reported loss).
Non-Banking Financial Companies (ND-SI) – Credit Risk
Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on Non-Banking Financial Companies (Non-Deposit taking and Systemically
Important) using their asset portfolio as at end-March 2011. The tests were based on single factor sensitivity
analysis. The impact on CRAR was studied under two different scenarios.  The scenario assumed increase in the
existing stock of NPAs by 200 and 500 per cent. The assumed increase in NPAs was distributed across sub-standard,
doubtful and loss categories in the same proportion as prevailing in the existing stock of NPAs. The additional
provisioning requirement was adjusted from the current capital position.
Systemic Liquidity Index
The SLI uses the following four indicators representing various segments of the market:
1. Weighted Average Call Rate – RBI Repo Rate
2. 3 Month Commercial Paper (CP) Rate – 3 Month Certificate of Deposits (CD) Rate
3. 3 Month CD Rate – 3 Month Implied Deposit Rate
4. Weighted Average Call Rate - 3 Month Overnight Index Swap (OIS) Rate
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In order to create the Systemic Liquidity Index (SLI), four different methodologies viz., Relative Distance, Standard
Normal, Principal Component Analysis, Percentile Ranks, were considered. The Standard normal or Variance-
equal weighted method has been found to be most suitable for India.
Macrofinancial Stress Testing
To ascertain the resilience of banks, the credit risk was modeled as functions of macroeconomic variables.  Credit
risk stress tests have been computed using several econometric models that relate banking system aggregates to
the macroeconomic variables, such as (i) multivariate logit regression on aggregate systems’ NPA data; (ii) multivariate
regression in terms of the slippage ratio (inflow of new NPAs); (iii) aggregate VAR using slippage ratio; (iv) multivariate
panel regression on bank wise slippage ratio data, which was later aggregated into bank-groups; and (v) multivariate
regressions for aggregate sectoral NPAs. The banking system aggregate includes current and lagged values of aggregate
NPAs (NPA ratio) and inflow of new NPAs (slippage ratio), while macroeconomic variables include GDP growth,
short term interest rate (call rate), WPI inflation, exports-to-GDP ratio ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
GDP
Ex  and REER.
The Modeling Framework
The following multivariate models were run to estimate the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the aggregate
NPA (npa) / slippage ratio (SR): 1
• Aggregate banking system multivariate logit2 regression:
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• Aggregate banking system multivariate regression:
The analysis was carried out on slippage ratio at the aggregate level for the commercial banking system as a
whole.
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• Vector Autoregression (VAR):
In order to judge the resilience of banks on various macroeconomic shocks, Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 3
approach has been adopted. The advantage of VAR model is that, it allows to fully capture the interaction
among macroeconomic variables and banks’ stability variable. It also captures the entailed feedback effect.
In notational form, mean-adjusted VAR of order p (VAR(p)) can be written as
y
t
 = A
1
y
t - 1
 + ..... + A
p 
y 
t - p
 + u
t 
; t = 0,1,2,3,...
Where,  '1( ,......, )t t Kty y y=  is a (K×1) vector of variables at time t, the iA  (i=1,2,…p) are fixed (K×K)
coefficient matrices and '1( ,......, )t t Ktu u u=  is a K-dimensional white noise or innovation process.
The appropriate order of VAR has been selected based on minimum information criteria as well as other
diagnostics and suitable order was found to be two. Accordingly, VAR of order 2 (VAR(2)) was estimated and
stability of the model was checked based on roots of AR characteristic polynomial. Since, all roots are found
to be inside the unit circle, this selected model was found to be fulfilling the stability condition. The impact
of various macroeconomic shocks was determined using impulse response function of the selected VAR.
1 Slippage ratio, exports/GDP, and the call rate are seasonally adjusted.
2 For detailed model specifications, please refer to FSR – December 2010. The logit transformation of NPA ratio is define as:
Logit_npa
t
 = L (NPA
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1
3 For detailed VAR model specifications, please refer to FSR – June 2011.
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• Bank wise panel fixed-effect regression:
Bank wise panel regression was modeled where slippage ratio was considered as function of macroeconomic
variables. The bank effect were identified along with the overall model specifications. Bank group-wise results
were obtained by grouping bank-wise estimates.
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where,  α
i 
 is the bank specific parameter.
• Sectoral multivariate regression:
The impact of macroeconomic shocks on various sectors was assessed by employing multivariate regression
models using aggregate NPA ratio for each sector separately. The dependent variables consisted of lagged
NPAs, sectoral GDP growth, inflation, and short-term interest rate.
Derivation of the NPAs and CRAR from the slippage ratios, which were projected from the above mentioned credit
risk econometric models, were based on the following assumptions: credit growth of 18 per cent; recovery rate of
6 per cent; zero write-offs; risk weighted assets growth of 20 per cent; and profit growth of 10 per cent. The
regulatory capital growth is assumed to remain at the minimum by assuming minimum mandated transfer of 25
per cent of the profit to the reserves account. The distribution of new NPAs in various sub-categories was done as
prevailing in the existing stock of NPAs. Provisioning requirements for various categories of advances are 0.4 per
cent for standard advances, 10 per cent for sub-standard advances, 75 per cent for doubtful advances, and 100 per
cent for loss advances. The projected values of the ratio of the non-performing advances were translated into
capital ratios using the “balance sheet approach”, by which capital in the balance sheet is affected via the provisions
and net profits. It is assumed that the existing loan loss provisioning coverage ratios remain constant for the
future impact.
